



# **Ukraine's Recovery and Future: Lublin Triangle and Japan**

**Third workshop report for the  
"On Ukraine's Recovery and Future" series**

**Date: December 4th, 2023, 17:30 - 20:00**

**Host: Keio University  
Co-hosts: Sophia University and Tohoku University**

**Venue: G-Lab, East Research Building,  
Mita Campus, Keio University**

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December 4, 2023 | 17:30-20:00

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East Research Building, G-Lab

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Tohoku University

This workshop, the third in the series, is co-organized by Sophia University, Tohoku University, and Keio University. Regardless of when the conflict in Ukraine will end, it is imperative that we begin to consider the recovery and future of Ukraine. For this workshop, we have invited the ambassadors of three countries – Ukraine, Poland, and Lithuania – also known as the Lublin Triangle, a regional alliance of three European countries. Under this framework, we shall discuss how Japan can cooperate with the Lublin Triangle in supporting Ukraine.



Featuring the  
Ambassadors of the  
Lublin Triangle



H.E. Dr. Sergiy Korsunsky, Ambassador, Embassy of Ukraine in Japan



H.E. Mr. Pawel Milewski  
Ambassador, Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Japan



H.E. Dr. Aurelijus Zygas  
Ambassador, Embassy of the Republic of Lithuania to Japan


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Venue: Keio University Mita Campus,  
East Research Building  
G-Lab (6th Floor)



## Program

MC: Prof. Motohiro Tsuchiya, Vice-President, Keio University

### 17:30 – 17:40 Opening Remarks

Prof. Kohei Itoh, President, Keio University

### 17:40 – 18:00 Keynote Speech

H.E. Dr. Sergiy Korsunsky, Ambassador, Embassy of Ukraine in Japan

### 18:00 – 18:30 Session 1

H.E. Mr. Pawel Milewski, Ambassador, Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Japan

H.E. Dr. Aurelijus Zykas, Ambassador, Embassy of the Republic of Lithuania to Japan

### 18:30 – 19:00 Session 2

Prof. Takeshi Yuasa, Faculty of Foreign Studies, Department of Russian Studies, Sophia University

Prof. Hidenori Tozawa, Dean of the Graduate School and Faculty of Law, Tohoku University

### 19:00 – 19:50 Panel Discussion

H.E. Dr. Sergiy Korsunsky, Ambassador, Embassy of Ukraine in Japan

H.E. Mr. Pawel Milewski, Ambassador, Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Japan

H.E. Dr. Aurelijus Zykas, Ambassador, Embassy of the Republic of Lithuania to Japan

Prof. Takeshi Yuasa, Faculty of Foreign Studies, Department of Russian Studies, Sophia University

Prof. Hidenori Tozawa, Dean of the Graduate School and Faculty of Law, Tohoku University

Moderator: Prof. Yuichi Hosoya, Faculty of Law, Department of Political Science, Keio University

### 19:50 – 20:00 Closing Remarks

Prof. Yoko Hirose, Faculty of Policy Management, Graduate School of Media and Governance, Keio University

For inquiries, please contact: [geo@info.keio.ac.jp](mailto:geo@info.keio.ac.jp)

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MC:

Prof. Motohiro Tsuchiya

Vice-President for Global Engagement, Keio University



## Opening Remarks by President Kohei Itoh, Keio University



Prof. Kohei Itoh  
President, Keio University

Thank you, distinguished guests, fellow faculty, and staff members of Keio University and students. Welcome to this wonderful symposium, “Ukraine’s Recovery and Future: Lublin Triangle and Japan.”

We are especially delighted to have three ambassadors, H.E. Dr. Sergiy Korsunsky, Ambassador of Ukraine to Japan, and H.E. Mr. Pawel Milewski, Ambassador of the Republic of Poland to Japan, and also, H.E. Dr. Aurelijus Zykas, Ambassador of the Republic of Lithuania to Japan. Thank you so much for coming to this workshop.

We are also delighted to have distinguished faculties from Tohoku University and Sophia University. Thank you so much for coming all the way for this symposium.

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Please register in advance  
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I was especially intrigued by this map [on the screen] that highlights three countries, the Lublin Triangle. As you can see, Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine are connected. Of course, there is a missing piece, but it’s going to be a quadrangle in the future [with Belarus as in the 16<sup>th</sup> century] hopefully.

We are very much looking forward to listening to opinions of leaders on this very dynamic situation. I’m sure what they might have said three months ago is different from what they’re going to say today. And what they’re going to say, let’s say, in three months will be better. Thank you so much.

## Keynote Speech by Ambassador Sergiy Korsunsky, Embassy of Ukraine in Japan

### “Reconstruction and Recovery of Ukraine”




H.E. Dr. Sergiy Korsunsky

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine

Thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen. Good evening. It's my pleasure. Actually, I will talk about the construction a little bit later, but before that, I would like to say a few words about the Lublin Triangle, which is, I was very much surprised to see the name of this conference because this concept is not widely known in Japan, but it's a very interesting concept with very deep historical roots and it's important to understand where it's coming from.

So please, first, let me briefly tell you the history of Ukraine, which we believe began as a state, somewhere in the 9th century. Kyiv was founded even earlier, but at some point, you see in the 15th, 16th century, you see the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth. And even earlier, 13th, 14th century, you see the northern and western parts of Ukraine become Polish Lithuanian, under Polish Lithuanian rule.

# History of Ukraine



Then, what happened? The ancient Kyiv State, which was the predecessor of Ukraine, was destroyed by the Tartar-Mongols invasion. And the territory of Ukraine was split. Part of it, which is now the eastern part of Ukraine, was occupied by the Tatars and Mongols. But the western part or central part, including Kyiv, become part of the Lithuanian Polish Kingdom, so it has different names. My good friend and expert Ambassador Zykas will tell you more in detail, but it's important to understand that this Lublin Triangle came into life as early as the 13th century.



This is a very old map of Lithuanian. you can see how this map at that time connects us. It was still Kingdom of Poland, but part of Poland was Lithuania. And Lithuania, Grand Duchy of Crimea, so all mixed, but, nevertheless, this is an historical document, which says how our territory was developing.





This is Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1619. You see that huge part of Ukraine, including Kijów [Kyiv] and the big part of Russia was Polish Lithuania state, probably the biggest territory in the history. Those old connections unite us. What is important to stress is that we have no problem with that, absolutely. So, when we talk about this history, there is nothing, not a single bad idea about it. Sometimes we fight each other, but basically, what united us allows us to preserve our Central European identity.



forces.


One very interesting historical event connects us – when the Ottoman Empire started the Siege of Vienna, a very famous battle, there was a very strong attempt of Ottoman Empire to take over Europe. Poland was the first. But there was a very strong force from Poland, supported by Ukrainians. This is a monument in Vienna to Ukrainian Cossacks and Lithuanians, so we were altogether defending Europe from Ottoman Empire

Then there were several difficult periods in our history of these three countries together. The partition of Poland has been done many times in different ways. Since then, each one of us has been struggling for an independent territory, but we never lost our identity.




It is very funny to see a map in 1919. On this map we have a border with Lithuania, and we have even part of Kuban [the North Caucasus region surrounding the Kuban River]. That was Ukraine in 1919. Just a little bit more than 100 years ago, that was the territory of Ukraine, which was recognized because at that time it was the first Ukrainian Republic. But it did not exist for a long time because Ukraine was invaded by Communist forces from Russia. After the Bolshevik Revolution, the first republic was destroyed, then there was in 1920 an attempt of Communist forces to take over Poland and Warsaw. There was a huge battle, and we won, and that stopped them from advancing to Europe.

### MOLOTOV-RIBBENTROP PACT



But, very unfortunately, right before the Second World War, based on the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, when Stalin and Hitler agreed how they divide Europe, part of the territories went to the Soviet Union. Other part of them went to Germany. Baltic States were invaded, and so on. That was the preset of the Second World War. And then, as you know, war began 1 September 1939 when Germany invaded Poland. Finally, it was a war against the Soviet Union and others.

But now, the last slide I would like to show you another map. It says that the Lublin Pact in 1569 was the first agreement made in Lublin to create the ancient Lublin Triangle. Very recently, this concept was reborn, and that has arisen because, first, as I show you, we've had a very long history, a very positive history, in terms that we understand that we have a common enemy, a paramount enemy on the east, which is a threat to all of us. We must be together to fight against this evil, which is now Russia.



In June 2023 Eurostat (European Union Statistic Agency) says that almost a million Ukrainians settled in Poland. More than 8 million crossed the border with Poland and went to many countries in Europe. But you see figures. You see in Poland and Germany the biggest numbers. As compared with the numbers of population, a very big number of Ukrainians settled in Lithuania. It was extremely difficult to manage all this mass of people coming, and mostly women and children. We have endless stories about how it was done in those first months of invasion, so many moving stories.

Right now, the situation is a little bit different. Ukrainians who want to stay in respectable countries settle down there. They begin to work; they begin to contribute. When I talked to some Polish friends, they told me that it's not just in Warsaw. In every corner of all over Poland you can easily find Ukrainian cafes, restaurants, and businesses. Ukrainians are already integrated into society. But of course, the question is whether they stay longer. It's still a valid question because many of them would like to return, but they don't know where to return. The similar goes to Lithuania, to say nothing about those countries' support, military

support, economic support, and political support on every level.

And here we come to recovery and future. On February 19, here in Tokyo, there will be a conference, Japanese-Ukrainian bilateral event upon the initiative of Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, the Prime Minister of Ukraine invited as a senior governmental official. And there will be a governmental delegation and business delegation. We will be talking with our Japanese counterparts about reconstruction of Ukraine. And we are now in the process of defining the substance of the conference and discussions.

We want many things to happen. We want that Japan would make it easier for Ukrainian business to travel to Japan. It just needs to counsel business visas for Ukrainians. We ask the Japanese government for that. We want them to consider big strategic projects to do in Ukraine because that's what Japan is all about.

This year, I published a book about reconstruction efforts of Japan, the experience of Japan in 100 years, beginning from the Kanto Earthquake and then the Second World War, and then the Kobe Earthquake and then the Tohoku Earthquake. Each time, huge experience, a lot of thoughts, a lot of efforts to rebuild infrastructure. It's so important to see how this experience, practical things, which were done, how they crystallize, like in a mechanism how you have to do this recovery. It's not easy. What should be done first? What should be done second?

And then we come to the issue, by whom it should be done, because if we look at the map of Ukraine and we'll see not just 8 million Ukrainians abroad, but we have 5 million Ukrainians internally displaced. And those people who left the eastern and south part of Ukraine or other regions, they created a vacuum in one part of the country and made other parts over-populated. It's very difficult to manage with infrastructure.

We work with our partners. We invite them to visit Ukraine to see with their own eyes what should be done right now, what can be done later on. And in this regard, it's important to know that whatever we will be doing in the next year, maybe the year after next year, it should be definitely directly connected to our European aspirations because we are going to open negotiations on European Union membership. And those two countries present here know it very well.

I've been already involved, deeply involved, in negotiations with Brussels on a free trade agreement, and I know how difficult it was for Central European states to negotiate membership. There were a lot of conditions, very tough sometimes, so we probably will experience the same. The idea is, what I am talking about, that we have to do recovery together with them. It's a very reasonable thing to do.

We cannot exclude other countries' involvement, like Japan already has begun discussions with Turkey to participate in Ukrainian reconstruction. It is true that Turkish companies did a lot of construction jobs in Ukraine, but again, when we talk about the future, you ask me to talk about the future of Ukraine, it's in

the European Union. That is why, in 2014, the Revolution of Dignity happened.

I will open to you a small secret. I don't talk about this normally, but the last visit abroad of President Yanukovich was to Turkey [where I served as ambassador at that time]. I saw him October 13, 2013, in Ankara. And it was a usual visit like all formalities and everything. But on the way to the airport, because he was already returning to Kyiv, I asked him that the free trade agreement with the EU would not be signed. And I asked him, "are you going to sign this agreement?" And he said, "oh, absolutely, of course." I said, "please, do it. People in Ukraine, they need it. We have been negotiating for seven years, very tough. Please do it." He said, "oh, of course, I will do it." He returned to Kyiv, and he said, "no, I'm not going to sign it." And that was the beginning of a Revolution of Dignity in November. Then, the agreement was signed because he was ousted. This is for your understanding what kind of leaders we had. They were responsible for the future of Ukraine. Now we cannot afford such experiments anymore.

Finally, we have reached the stage when Ukraine was invited to become a member of the European Union, and we must negotiate, and we have to do everything in our force to enter the EU and then, together with our neighbors and friends, to build a prosperous Ukraine. For them, we definitely need the experience of Japan, Japanese companies, and Japanese quality. I don't know any other country with such a deep understanding of urban planning, with such quality of bridges, Shinkansen, and production of absolutely outstanding quality. That's what we need. We want a new Ukraine. There is no reason to rebuild what was left from the Soviet Union.

During those years before my appointment to Japan, I was able to visit every country around Ukraine, more than 30 countries, including Lithuania and Poland, and I have seen how countries were transforming. This was in front of your eyes by European standards. You have to remove the old Soviet infrastructure, you have to change it into modern equipment, whether we are talking about hot water or heating or whatever, because it was not sustainable. We need to change all that quickly because people who give their lives and their families, they deserve to live in a normal country, in a modern country, with modern industry, and that is where we see this partnership between Japan and the EU, with the participation of Ukrainians who settle in our neighboring countries. They have to be involved in reconstruction efforts because it's their country, and they are very much willing to do so.

I will stop at this moment. Thank you very much for your attention. I hope I answer questions about our future. It's our European future. Thank you.

## Speech by Ambassador Pawel Milewski, Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Japan

"The Rationale of Poland's Support for Ukraine's Independence and Reconstruction"



H.E. Mr. Pawel Milewski

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Poland

Mina-sama, konbanwa. Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. Mr. President, my dear colleagues, friends, your Excellencies, Ambassadors, dear Professors, teachers and students, it's a great pleasure for me to be here at Keio University, another visit to this important place here in Tokyo.

I express my thanks also to Sophia University and Tohoku University for co-organizing this important and very timely event. I was very much moved by the presentation of my dear friend, Ambassador of Ukraine, of this historical perspective of our relationship that describes so well the history of my country, Poland, which disappeared from Europe's map 120 years ago and was reborn at the beginning of the 20th century. There is a Polish saying which describes well this kind of turbulent history in our part of the world. It says that you may have lived in a very remote village in Poland, never ever crossing the border of any country, but most likely the borders crossed your village, either from west or east, from north and south, and I think that reflects the Polish perspective on this very important topic.

Ladies and gentlemen, I will talk about the Polish support to Ukraine so far and about our thoughts on the country's reconstruction, Japan's role and our expectations, our hope, as Ambassador Korsunsky said, how we see Japan participating in these processes. I would also like to give a little bit of the original perspective toward the Three Seas Initiative, which is another important regional initiative linking our countries together.

This month is extremely important for at least two reasons. Poland was the first country which recognized the independent Ukraine in December 1991. It was 32 years ago. And a couple of weeks later, we established



diplomatic relations, in January 1992. This month is also extremely important, and it was partly mentioned by Ambassador Korsunsky, that in December 2013, we had a huge demonstration in the Maidan Square in Kyiv, extremely pro-European, pro-European Union.

At that time, Poland and other nine EU member states, the so-called new EU member states, we celebrated the 10th anniversary of our membership. Seeing the Ukrainian people waving European Union flags in the Maidan Square was the best proof to us that we made a great choice back in 2004. Poland and Lithuania do understand well this pro-European Union enthusiasm of Ukrainian people. Poland has been always and will be a strong advocate of the membership of Ukraine towards the European Union and then NATO.

I am extremely satisfied that the organizers of this conference today decided to use for the discussion a format Poland attaches a lot of importance to, which is the Lublin Triangle. The initiative was launched in 2020 in the Polish city of Lublin by Poland, Ukraine, and Lithuania, three countries which, let me underline it very clearly, have a lot in common in terms of history, culture, and political heritage. Its goal was to strengthen our cooperation and to support Ukrainian aspirations to join the European Union and NATO. Even though the initiative preceded the brutal and provocative Russian aggression against Ukraine by almost two years, its objectives have now proven more relevant than ever, and they seem more achievable than ever.

Last year, Ukraine was granted a candidate status by the European Commission, while last month the Commission recommended opening of membership negotiations with Ukraine. It is a major development and we congratulate Ukraine on this success. Poland and Lithuania have supported Ukraine's membership bid from the very beginning, conducting discussions with EU officials and other member states, and we will continue to do our utmost to make Ukraine's membership in the European Union a reality sooner rather than later.

Membership in the European Union requires a huge effort, predominantly Ukraine's but also all those partners and friends, the international community of democratic countries, who have shown their attachment to the international order based on the rule of law and the principles of the United Nations Charter by supporting Ukraine's fight for freedom, sovereignty, and the right to exist as an independent nation.

Poland, Lithuania, and Japan are such countries. We should not wait until the fighting concludes to devise ways to support Ukraine's reconstruction and recovery. We should be ready to step in and initiate recovery activities as soon as Ukraine wins the war. These activities should be driven by the Ukrainian authorities in the way that best suits the needs and aspirations of the Ukrainian nation.

There is a lot of thinking on the topic already with multiple useful conferences and events, such as this one,

trying to delineate required action and engagement. As we know, the Japanese government will co-organize with Ukraine, as it was already mentioned by my Ukrainian colleague, a conference in February next year. Also, Poland is planning a similar event on a probably smaller scale in the first half of 2024 together with our Japanese and Ukrainian partners.

We are also looking at ways of using other platforms to support the process. The Three Seas Initiative could be an interesting option in this regard. Its projects focus on infrastructure, be it in transport, energy, and digital spheres, including a regional Eastern European perspective, as well, external partner support. All these factors will be crucial for Ukraine's post-war recovery.

Let me tell you and remind you that Prime Minister Kishida was attending the Three Seas Initiative Summit in Bucharest in September this year, and we see a rising level of willingness and engagement from Japan in this regional initiative.

We are convinced that this effort will bring about desired outcomes, and Ukraine in the long term will rise above the challenges as a modern, prosperous country with a broad network of meaningful alliances across the world.

Practical results are also required. We have collectively shown that in the face of need, we, the international community, can mobilize our resources and effectively respond to the challenge. Poland is one example of how this can be done.

Ladies and gentlemen, as you are well aware, Poland has supported Ukraine from the very beginning of the war in a multidimensional way by providing aid both in Ukraine and within its territory to Ukrainian refugees. We have provided military equipment, heavy one, light weapons, artillery, munitions, and humanitarian assistance, hosted the world's biggest community of Ukrainian refugees, and served as a logistic hub facilitating transfer to Ukraine from international partners. Poland is today the main support gateway for Ukraine.

We have spent over 11 billion euro, that is over 2% of the Polish GDP, and Poland is one of the fastest-developing economies in the European Union right now, and on aid to Ukraine, already in the first year of Russian invasion, which places Poland at the forefront globally in terms of assistance to Ukraine as a percentage of the GDP. In 2022, the Polish Official Development Assistance increased by over 250% compared with the 2021 level, the highest increase among 31 members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee. The hike was related to Poland's above-standard response to the refugee crisis caused by the Russian attack on Ukraine.

Presently, Poland is home to several million Ukrainians, including those who lived in Poland before

February 2022. We approximately had 1.5 million of our brothers and sisters from Ukraine before the aggression started in February 2022. Since the war broke out, over 17 million people have crossed the Ukrainian-Polish border, out of whom over 2.5 million were evacuated in the first month of the war. Over 90% of the evacuees were women and children. Among the evacuated were also over 100,000 representatives from more than 180 nations worldwide, including 115 Japanese citizens.

According to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, in the latest data, there are over 1.6 million Ukrainian refugees registered for temporary protection in Poland right now. About the same number has received a Polish Personal Identity Number and taken advantage of public services, such as schools, health care, social benefits, on par with the Polish nationals. Around 80% of refugees, the majority of them women, have found employment. Some 190,000 Ukrainian children and over 25,000 higher education students, plus 400 Ukrainian teachers, are now part of the Polish education system.

Poland has also facilitated online education for children who prefer to continue their status in the framework of the Ukrainian system.

I would like to underline the fact that Poland has never established refugee camps. The Ukrainian citizens fleeing war have been accepted by Polish families in their homes, and welcomed as guests. I will never forget the images from BBC, CNN and other TV channels showing Polish people coming from different parts of the country to the Polish-Ukrainian border hours after the Russian aggression started and carrying posters with information in Ukrainian saying “you are safe here”.

In total, almost 80% of Polish people have been involved in the social effort to support Ukraine and its people, a fact that makes me very proud.

Apart from that, Poland has supported Ukraine in such spheres as medical services, energy provision, temporary housing for displaced people, and Internet use.

I have mentioned already that Poland has served since the beginning of the war as the main logistics hub for the distribution of different kinds of aid to Ukraine. The hub, established in the framework of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, collects aid from various countries, prepares it for delivery to Ukraine, and, finally, organizes transfers. Hundreds of millions of American dollars’ worth of aid has been transferred that way, and that includes the generous donations of in-kind aid from Japan. I believe that Poland’s experience and capabilities in that regard will be particularly useful in the context of Ukraine’s reconstruction. Our country can easily serve as a hub for reconstruction-related activities.

Already now, as many as 2,000 Polish companies have expressed interest in participating in the process. Many have been present in Ukraine for years and employed the Ukrainian workforce. They know the market

and they operate in accordance with the European Union standards, a fact that has to be kept in mind in the reconstruction processes, given Ukraine's aspirations. We are determined to show Ukraine our unwavering support as long as it takes to achieve victory.

We see the Ukrainian plight in a broader context and know that Ukraine is fighting not only for its own sovereign future, but for ours, too. Poland, like Ukraine and Lithuania, has experienced in its history the brunt of the Russian imperialistic ambitions and its ruthlessness as regards the means to achieve them.

This fact has actually, and to our satisfaction, been understood beyond Europe. Early on, in the Russian aggression against Ukraine, Prime Minister Kishida famously stated that today's Ukraine could be tomorrow's East Asia. We appreciate Japan's stance on the war since its beginning, the provision of generous humanitarian aid to Ukraine, and prominent placement of Ukraine on the agenda of discussions of the G7 during the Japanese Presidency.

Poland and Japan have been working hand in hand for Ukraine. Poland has been included by Japan on the list of countries eligible for the Japanese ODA in order to support Ukraine and Ukrainian refugees residing in Poland, including through a Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Projects program. Prime Minister Kishida visited Poland twice this year, first in March, when this decision was made, and second in July when he was on the way to the NATO Summit that took place in Lithuania in Vilnius.

In February 2023, JICA and the Polish Solidarity Fund signed an agreement to jointly implement a project on the transfer of advanced mine detectors to Ukraine as well as a related training program. JICA currently explores the possibility for implementing programs aiming at enhancing IT skills of Ukrainian refugees in Poland and at integrating Ukrainian children into the Polish educational system. Poland hopes to significantly expand cooperation with Japan to other areas in the nearest future.

The importance Japan attaches to the Ukrainian cause has been confirmed on numerous occasions, including through high-level visits to Ukraine, via Poland, of Prime Minister Kishida, as I mentioned, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Hayashi, and, recently, Deputy Ministers Tsuji and Iwata. This last visit, which included a number of Japanese business people, is the proof that Japan has started thinking about the future reconstruction needs. The declaration of the Japanese government that it will support Japanese companies which decide to participate in the reconstruction process and invest in Ukraine is a step in the right direction. In our view, Poland, whose entrepreneurs have been present in Ukraine for years, can offer Japan and other partners, its experience and support in facilitating such efforts.

We believe that Japan can become one of the most significant actors engaged in the reconstruction of Ukraine. Japan is one of the leading economies in the world. It has some of the largest and most sophisticated construction companies, and rich experience in the field of post-conflict and post-disaster

reconstruction. It has also very rich experience in providing development aid in a global perspective. Financial engagement will be the key, especially given the growing needs and extent of the destruction faced by Ukraine.

Let me conclude by stating the obvious fact: given Ukraine's sacrifice, courage, and determination in defending its right to exist in the circumstances discussed at length above, the joint effort by the international community to create a better, safer, more prosperous future for this country, to help raise it from the ashes, is a matter of moral imperative and solidarity.

Thank you very much for your attention. I am very much looking forward to a discussion afterwards.



## Speech by Ambassador Aurelijus Zykas, Embassy of the Republic of Lithuania to Japan

"Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine: Challenges for Lublin Triangle Today"



H.E. Dr. Aurelijus Zykas

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Lithuania

Dear fellow Ambassadors, President Itoh, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, it's a big honor actually to be here at Keio University and to talk to you all. My last time at Keio University was seven years ago when I was doing research on Yukichi Fukuzawa, and I'm really glad to be back here at Keio University.

My topic is about "Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine: Challenges for Lublin Triangle today."

As always, I am starting my presentation from an introduction of Lithuania because still, even if you came here and you know Lithuania very well, I have to tell a little bit at least.

**Lithuania at a glance:**


<b>Area</b>	<b>65,300 km<sup>2</sup></b>
<b>Population</b>	<b>2,7 mln.</b>
<b>Language</b>	<b>Lithuanian</b>
<b>Currency</b>	<b>Euro</b>

The image is a composite graphic. On the left, a dark green background contains the title 'Lithuania at a glance:' in white, followed by a table of key facts: Area (65,300 km<sup>2</sup>), Population (2,7 mln.), Language (Lithuanian), and Currency (Euro). To the right of the table is a Lithuanian flag. Further right is a map of Europe with Lithuania highlighted in green and labeled 'リトアニア共和国' (Lithuanian Republic). Below the European map is a world map with a red dot in the Baltic region and a Japanese flag, suggesting a size comparison.

Lithuania is a small country with a size of Hokkaido Island of Japan. Its population is less than 3 million, and despite being a very, very small country, we still preserve our unique language, which is Lithuanian language, and also our currency is euro. Usually, Japanese people, when they just try to place Lithuania somewhere on the European map, they usually use the word like Baltic three states, which is Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. But actually, we, as Lithuanians, usually also feel ourselves not only a part of Baltic States but also a part of the bigger Central Europe.

And if you count the history, actually we've had history together with all other, like two Balkan states, only for 150 years, which was Russian Occupation and Soviet Occupation. While, if you compare, for example, how long is our history with Ukraine, it's approximately 600 years.

Let me go to this topic, and I greatly appreciate Sergiy for making the short introduction of history because I would like also to start from the origins of the Lublin Triangle. Because as you know very well, the Lublin Triangle, the agreement was made in 2020 by three nations, and the major aim was to facilitate Ukraine's going toward the Western direction, that was the European Union, and that was the European values because we already had experience of being in the European Union.



However, as you can see, actually this name itself, it has a long history because the first union was signed in 1569, as it was already mentioned, and that was Lublin Union. You can see here a kind of state which was created by this union, and that was called Polish Lithuanian Republic. Two countries, the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, they decided to go together, to have one ruler, to have a union, but to preserve different legal systems, difference currencies, and so on and so forth. As you can see, this was one of the biggest states in Europe, maybe it was even the biggest state then. And from this date, actually four modern nations, Ukraine, Poland, Belarus, and Lithuania, were emerged finally.

Even if we have many differences about our languages, religion, and so on and so forth, we feel very many similarities being together, and we can understand very much what's happening in Ukraine nowadays.

I forgot also to touch on Belarus, which is the fourth member. And now we are talking about the Lublin Triangle, but we could talk about the Lublin Quadrangle, as President Itoh mentioned [in his opening remarks]; however, as you know very well, Belarus chose another way. Unfortunately, we have the dictator Lukashenko ruling, and at least, at this moment actually, Belarus is not part of this union.

When the Lublin Triangle was made in 2020, nobody expected it could become such an important union of three countries. Everything has changed since last year, since the invasion of Russia to Ukraine. And now, as the Lublin Triangle, we have kind of common values and a common fight together.



For us, this fight against Russia is a fight for our values. That's very important. And let me give another detour to history, which is, I think you know learning from history is very important. In the 13th and 14th centuries, as you might know, the major part of the Eurasian continent was ruled by a huge empire, which was called the Mongol Empire. That was a nomadic empire, which was not keeping any rules, any international rules. It was very aggressive then, and this power was spanning to the East, from the Sea of Japan, to the West, to the Black Sea.

In Japanese history you have the Mongolian invasion, which was happening in the 13th century during the Kamakura period. In the western frontier of the Mongolian Empire, there was the Grand Duchy of Lithuania made of Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania, three modern nations nowadays. This Grand Duchy of Lithuania served as a frontier, not letting Mongolians to enter Europe. It was a kind of barrier frontier from the barbarians from the East.

Now, in the 21st century, we feel the same. We are protecting Europe from the barbarians from the East, and in this aspect, the Lublin Triangle is making this role. Three countries are together, and we are acting as a frontier.

And another thing about this war against Russia, fight against Russia, for Lithuanians, it's also a fight to survive because we do understand what could happen if Ukraine loses this. Then very naturally, the question comes, who is next? And I think all the countries on the eastern frontier of NATO, on the eastern frontier of the European Union, they feel the same. We have to fight this war because we have to defend ourselves. That's a question of survival for all of us.





For us, actually, we can see three major things, how we can resist Russia and this war: one of them is isolating Russia; the second one is supporting Ukraine as much as we can; the third one is reconstruction of Ukraine, which is happening already.

Regarding the isolation of Russia, from the very first days when the invasion started, Lithuania took the decision that we have to join any sanctions against Russia, and we are persistently continuing this. Of course, there are many countries that are saying we should go back to business as usual. Maybe it's okay to trade with Russia. Lithuania's trade with Russia is zero percent. That was not easy to achieve because, as you might know, 30 years ago, when Lithuania declared independence, we were dependent on Russia 100%.

We made very much about our economy, but still, the most vulnerable sector is the energy sector because we don't have our energy resources. That's why it's very important for us always energy independence. One of the major projects in Lithuania was building an LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) terminal, which lets us collect LNG from any part of the world, bring that to Lithuania, and survive.

Very symbolically, when we built this LNG terminal eight years ago, and there was plenty of criticism about that in Lithuania, very symbolically this LNG terminal is called Independence because that means independence for us. And of course, nowadays, especially since the invasion started, we are investing very much to the sustainable renewable energy to survive. There are plans that in ten years Lithuania will be fully self-sustainable.

And now let's go to support for Ukraine.

# Support for Ukraine: over 1 Bln. EUR


- Military support: 459 mln. EUR
- Humanitarian and civilian support – over 12 mln. EUR
- Energy sector: 11 mln. EUR



Standing strong

with Ukraine

Total bilateral aid to Ukraine, share of GDP



#CoCreateFutureOfUkraine

Lithuania is 1<sup>st</sup> or 2<sup>nd</sup> largest contributor worldwide as a percentage of GDP

Lithuania is a small country. As you can see, only less than 3 million in population, however, up to now, we have invested quite a lot and the support for Ukraine presently, at this moment, is counted over 1 billion euro. Half of this is for military support because we are providing different weapons, ammunition, we are providing different equipment for Ukraine, because, as I said, that's a war actually for all of us.

Another part for the support of Ukraine is humanitarian and civilian support, which accounts for around 12 million euro, and actually, that's about the medical equipment, like also Lithuanian medical doctors are going to Ukraine to help their soldiers and so on and so forth.

And one more is the energy sector, 11 million euro, because I think Lithuania, being a very northern nation, we do feel very much what it means a cold winter because we do understand, I don't think that Japanese can understand, but for us, we do understand that you can die if you don't have electricity during winter. That's the reality. When you have minus 10, minus 20, no electricity, simply you are dying. That's why Lithuania last winter, we were investing very much, we were supporting very much Ukraine's energy sector, sending generators, transformers, and much equipment to keep Ukraine electricity alive.

And you can see here actually the numbers. By the share of GDP, Lithuania is the No. 1 or No. 2 country by our GDP. You can see Norway is No. 1, which is an amazing thing. Norway is supporting Ukraine, in just wonderful ways. Lithuania here is No. 2, with 1.4 of our GDP for support of Ukraine; however, if you count private initiatives, citizen initiatives, and also EU money, which is going through Lithuania, Lithuania becomes No. 1.

## Support for Ukraine: citizen initiatives



- . More than 50 million EUR donated for military
- . Combat drone "Bayraktar": 5.9 mln. EUR
- . "RADAROM!" campaign: 14 mln. EUR

- . Accepting 80,000 refugees (4th among OECD countries by the number of hosted refugees per capita)
- . 400 mln. EUR support from government



I mentioned citizens' initiatives because that's also a very amazing thing. The citizens of Lithuania, and we are not very different from Poland actually. We are doing the same things, much smaller in numbers; however, it's counted that already 50 million of euro were donated by citizens only. They are just transferring money to Ukraine for military purposes, but there are several very nice examples, for example, the combat drone Bayraktar, which costs plenty of money, which is very, very expensive. The Lithuanians decided that they would like just to crowdfund around 6 million euro, which is huge money, and to buy a Bayraktar for Ukraine. They did that in two days. In two days, 6 million euro were collected, and actually this Bayraktar is produced by a Turkish company, and when Turkey knew about this, they were so fascinated, so touched, that they said, okay, we are giving Bayraktar just free of charge, and that money was used for different purposes.


Another campaign was for RADAROM, which is 14 million euro, collected within several days to buy radars for Ukraine.

At the same time, Lithuania is accepting now around 80,000 refugees. They are all in Lithuanian territory. By the number of populations, we are fourth in Europe. And you can understand what it means having 80,000 refugees with a 3 million population. This last month, I went to Vilnius, my capital, for an ambassadors' conference, yes, you can feel that very much.

And as already Ambassador Milewski told, we don't have refugee camps. There are no tents, there are no refugee camps. Every Ukrainian is living in houses, like with local families. The government is supporting that, but it's like within the families. It's already been almost two years since the invasion but we don't feel any fatigue. People are supporting, people are accepting refugees newly coming to Lithuania.

## Rebuilding Ukraine: 16 mln. EUR

- „Rebuilding Ukraine“: Vilnius, July, 2022
- Finished and ongoing pilot projects
- “Future school for Ukraine”
- Demining civil territories



**Taiwan  
contribution: 5  
mln. EUR**

And finally, let's talk a little bit about rebuilding issues because, again, from the Lithuanian perspective, we have this position that we must help Ukraine from the very beginning, rebuilding Ukraine, that's important from the very beginning. I know that the Japanese stance is a little bit different. Japan is saying, okay, let's wait until the war ends, and then we can start rebuilding. But for Lithuania, we do feel that we have to start it from the very beginning because there are cities like Kyiv, which are European and so on and so forth, that are recovered, and they really need rebuilding.

In Vilnius, we had the Rebuilding Ukraine Conference last year in July. The Rebuilding Ukraine Conference in Japan will happen next year, in February, and just some finished or ongoing pilot projects that are already implemented in Ukraine. You can see for example, school reconstruction in Borodyanka. You can see mobile settlements for people who came back also in Borodyanka. Also, we have reconstructed a kindergarten in Irpin, and also are reconstructing this school in Kyiv. There are different projects, and for example in Mykolaiv, we have a project about the electricity network because we are helping Ukraine to go closer to EU standards by the electricity grid.

By the way, an important thing is that to these already finished projects, we had a very nice partner, which is Taiwan, and Taiwan contributed 5 million euro to these projects already. For some finished or ongoing projects, we have the account of 60 million of contributions.

And to new projects that are starting in Ukraine nowadays, one of them is Future School for Ukraine because our ambition is actually to help Ukraine rebuild the schools. We would like to invest more in education, and this is like we have an already model school for Ukraine, which is really beautiful and that



could be a very nice place for kids to learn.

Another project is not so bright and nice, which is demining in the civil territories, because Ukraine, the territory that is recovered, they are very densely mined. Sometimes it's like five mines in one square meter, and we need really much demining efforts. Lithuania is leading the demining coalition now, and I'm very glad that Japan already joined this coalition.



And my last slide, my last slide is with a picture of last year, which is our Prime Minister Ingrida Šimonytė and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida handshaking because they announced about a strategic partnership and raising the level of our relationship slipping and Japan to a new level. And let me go back a little bit to the history.

You still remember the Mongolian Empire? I think that, as it was in the 13th century, there was only one country between us, I mean the Lublin Triangle and Japan. Now we have the same situation: there is only one country between us, which is Russia. We share the same challenges, we share the same problems with this country, and I really do believe that our two countries and the Lublin Triangle and Japan, we could work together and we could create a future for Ukraine.

Thank you very much.

## Speech by Professor Takeshi Yuasa, Sophia University

### "Regionalism in Eurasia after Russia's Invasion of Ukraine"



Prof. Takeshi Yuasa

Faculty of Foreign Studies, Department of Russian Studies, Sophia University

Your Excellencies, Ambassadors, President Itoh, and Professor Tsuchiya, audience, friends, and colleagues, thank you very much for inviting me here today. I'm no expert on Central and Eastern Europe, but I research the former Soviet Union region, especially focusing on Central Asia. In that sense, my interest is about the construct of regionalism in Eurasia. And I understand, as the Ambassador suggested, the Lublin Triangle is also a regional platform or a kind of regionalism to support Ukraine's recovery in the future. And in a sense, here today, I would like to make my presentation on regionalism in Eurasia after Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

#### Authoritarian Regionalism (AR) in the Post-Soviet Region

- Tools for Russia and China?
  - Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)
  - Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU)
  - Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)
- AR's effective activities to support member states' legitimacy
  - Ex: Election observer mission by SCO as counter action against OSCE
  - Development and institutionalization of AR
  - Russia's weakening centripetal force in CSTO?
- Geopolitical division in Central Europe and Lublin Triangle (L3)
- Autonomous behavior by member states in AR

The regional multilateralism has become a tool that even authoritarian states, like Russia and China, this multilateralism can be used to great advantage. And the 21st century is an era of such regional multilateralism or regionalism in which multiple nations try to unite through common history, culture, and interests.

And there are common issues that cannot be resolved by each individual state in the region and are a driving factor to establish regionalism. The Lublin Triangle also can be seen as part of such contemporary trends in international politics. Hereafter for further discussion in today’s workshop, I would like to present my views on trends on regionalism and the post-Soviet region order.



Here I want to pick up several characteristics of Russian-led regional organization in Eurasia.

First, for decades Russia and its partner China have built multilayered regional institutes to deal with region-wide issues and challenges. Here, I want to call them authoritarian regionalism. These are the CSTO, Collective Security Treaty Organization, and EAEU, Eurasian Economic Union, and Russia has developed these organizations after the collapse of the Soviet Union. And SCO, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, is also listed up here. That started as the dialogue process on border area security issues between China and the post-Soviet countries. And it also institutionalized as an international organization since 2001, and recently, India and Pakistan joined the SCO as member states, and moreover, Iran also got full membership in the organization. As regional powers, Russia and China wanted to establish their influence in their member countries.

Authoritarian regionalism is on the opposite side of Western-led frameworks in international society, and there are frameworks by countries in main, embracing and evaluating liberal democracies, democratic ideas, such as EU, Council of Europe, and NATO is also categorized among them.

OSCE might be an organization bridging the two camps, liberal democratic and authoritarian; however, as we saw the ministerial meeting in Skopje last week, the activity has seriously stagnated due to Russia's obstruction. And while countering against Western countries and their frameworks, member countries of authoritarian regionalism, Russia and China in main, used their organization as a tool to support their authoritarian domestic regimes.

For example, the election observer mission coordinated by the SCO in member states is modeled after those of the OSCE but in very small scale. Unlike the OSCE, SCO's observer mission gives high mark results of the procedures of elections in their member states, like Kazakhstan or Tajikistan, for fairness and legitimacy.

Relating to that, secondly, these authoritarian regional organizations have been institutionalized and matured over the past 20 years. They also have gained strength and experience to develop. As a result, the authoritarian regionalism has continued to attract not only certain member states but also countries wishing to join them in the future. In this context, the SCO is a typical example. It has been institutionalized and developed into an organization covering most of Eurasia, although it has a compact secretariat and budget.

On the other hand, the attractiveness of CSTO may have reached its peak and follows its own authority. It doesn't provide any effective action for a member state, especially Armenia. That is a de facto party to the recurrent conflict on Nagorno-Karabakh in recent years.

And third, divisions between areas of authoritarian regionalism and areas of liberal democracy have become clearer year by year, and the Lublin Triangle is geographically located between the two.

I would like to point out that small- and medium-sized member states, like countries of Central Asia, are getting more and more not subordinated to regional powers, like Russia and China. Of course, they are very influential to the region, but small- and medium-sized countries in Central Asia, and the Caucasus might be acting as autonomously as possible according to their own resources, and their attitudes are becoming clearer, especially after the beginning of the war last year.

And Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, for example, are concerned that a prolonged war in Ukraine may have a negative impact on their own politics and economy. And they are increasingly taking a stance to keep balance with other regional powers like China and India.

### L3: Perspectives and Challenges

- “Continuity is the father of success.”
- Possibility to find partners in the post-Soviet region
  - Moldova, Armenia, Georgia: Vulnerable, but aiming countries to consolidate democratic system
- Collaboration with Japan
  - “Central Asia plus Japan” Dialogue: Japan’s experience as a catalyst for regional cooperation in Central Asia
  - Expanding the possibilities of Japan’s diplomacy for future peace and stability in Central Europe

And lastly, I want to show the slide about the Lublin Triangle perspectives and challenges. And as I overviewed, regionalism is a critical matter for contemporary international society. Future order in Eurasia will likely be created by a complex intertwining of various regionalism and sovereign states. The future image is still not clear; however, it may clearly change in a way that is unimaginable for the generation of being familiar with the Soviet strict framework.

And as I mentioned, the Lublin Triangle is positioned for its geopolitical destiny to oppose authoritarian regionalism. It will be necessary to proceed with the development and institutionalization with the Triangle as a political and security framework to gain Ukraine’s victory and recovery and the framework of the stabilization of Central and Eastern Europe as a whole. To achieve such goals, the Triangle might try to cunningly imitate the tactics used by its rivals, maybe it’s some ironic suggestion, but I want to say that. The Triangle should imitate the tactics, use the tactics by its rivals, authoritarian regionalism. And here I list up my noted ideas for that.

First, a regional framework requires steady and continuous activities. Continuity is the father of success. As rival authoritarian regionalism has done, the Triangle should keep constant meetings in all levels. Meetings of heads of state and ministers must be held annually at least to search for strengthening its political security and economic cooperation among these three countries.

Secondly, I would like to ask, could the Triangle find partners in other post-Soviet countries and regional organizations that share ideas and challenges, for example, Moldova, and although geographically distant, Armenia and Georgia. These countries can be important partners of liberal democratic countries because they aim to consolidate procedural democratic systems, although their process is still fragile. Such kind of

cooperation would lead to a decline in authoritarian Russia's influence in Eurasia and in the long term to change in its so-called garrison state nature of Russian regime.

Third, collaboration between the Triangle and Japan, that was what Ambassador Zykas suggested, should be searched for. I think they already have a common base for collaboration, sharing values like human rights, rule of law, and democracy. I also want to ask, could Japan, as a catalyst, help build relationships with democratic-minded countries in the post-Soviet region? Japanese diplomacy has the experience of continuing the Central Asia plus Japan dialogue since almost 20 years ago. This, Japan's initiative, became a prototype not only for liberal democratic powers, such as the United States and the European Union, but also for China's approach network towards Central Asia. Japan's collaboration with the Lublin Triangle may lead to expanding the range of possibilities for Japan's own diplomacy. So, answer to my question may be yes.

Thank you very much for paying attention.

## Speech by Professor Hidenori Tozawa, Tohoku University

"US-follower, "Checkbook Diplomacy" or as a Middle Power?  
On the Possibilities and Limits of Japanese Diplomacy in a Turbulent World"



Prof. Hidenori Tozawa

Dean of the Graduate School and Faculty of Law, Tohoku University

Good evening, everyone. My name is Tozawa from the School of Law, Tohoku University. I am a historian doing research mainly in the inter-war period in Europe. I'm not a specialist on the region nor on current topics of international relations. Although I teach international relations at the Faculty of Law, to be honest, the world today is beyond my understanding after COVID-19 already, then especially after the Russian invasion in Ukraine last year.

But facing the threat of more violence in the world, even World War III is feared, I feel we were just sitting on our hands. Maybe you share the feeling. So, I would like to stimulate the discussion about what we can do or what we should do as the last speaker before the panel discussion.

My topic today is about the possibilities and limits of Japanese diplomacy. I worked as a researcher and a counselor at the Japanese Mission to the European Union from 1998 to 2001 in Brussels. Through the experience in Brussels as a diplomat, I became quite skeptical about our diplomacy, I must confess. But 28 years have passed since then, and there have been a lot of changes in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in the world. I would like to review those changes and assess the possibilities and limits of our diplomacy now, rather critically.

# Introduction

## The Israel-Gaza war changed the situation

- more intractable conflict ethically and politically
- fears of further escalation in the region and beyond
- signs of growing weary of supporting Ukraine
- UN Security Council (once again) shows structural inability



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Let me start the introductory part. The workshop today is about Ukraine mainly, as the three Ambassadors of the Lublin Triangle countries gathered. The Ukraine War changed the world, but the Israel Gaza War changed the situation completely. Conflicts in the Middle East are much more intractable ethically and politically, and we fear this Israel Gaza War might escalate, joined by Hezbollah or even Iran, then, a war scenario would be a full-scale World War III.

I wonder how the Doomsday Clock will be set 90 seconds earlier next year than it was this year. There are also signs of growing weariness of supporting Ukraine. And the United Nations Security Council once again showed structural inability when the permanent members of the Security Council defied the laws and were engaged in barbaric acts themselves; the United Nations is simply unable to act.



# Introduction

## How to resolve or settle the situation?

- new framework for conflict resolution?
- mediation / conciliation by third countries (or actors)?
- Japan's unique position
  - to explore possibilities (and limits)  
of Japanese diplomacy



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Then, how to resolve or settle the situation? When the United Nations Security Council wouldn't work, or the reform of the UN system looks impossible, there are some new frameworks for conflict resolution that might be pursued.

Maybe Prof. Yuasa's presentation touched upon those possible frameworks, but those frameworks or plans for new frameworks are not at all clear at this moment.

Then, more plausible would be a mediation by third countries or actors. In the case of hostage exchanges, ceasefire or pause of the hostility with the hostages, then Qatar did the role of mediator. But it wouldn't work for the ceasefire or the settlement of the conflict itself.

The United States would be a conciliator, as in the case of the Camp David Accords in 1978 or the Abraham Accords recently, but it would be quite difficult this time as Israel looks unbending. And also, it may be more difficult in the case of Ukraine.

Then China might be the candidate for mediating the parties of both conflicts, as in the case of normalization of the relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran recently.

Or middle power countries could be a good mediator, as in the case of the Oslo Accords in September 1993 when the PLO asked Norway to mediate the negotiation with Israel.

Or Elon Musk with the Space X or some NGOs might be a mediator. I really cannot foresee, but for that

role, Japan could stand in a unique position, at least theoretically. I will explore the possibilities of Japanese diplomacy for playing that kind of role.

## Historical Background

### Three principles of Japanese diplomacy

- United Nations-oriented
- Cooperation with liberal democratic countries
- Adherence to the position as a member of Asia



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Maybe I don't have to touch on this aspect, but anyway, the three principles of Japanese diplomacy are United Nations-oriented, cooperation with liberal democratic countries, and adherence to the position as a member of Asia. And of these principles, cooperation with liberal countries, particularly with the United States or with the Japan-U.S. Treaty as the cornerstone, have formed the backbone of Japan's foreign and security policy since the end of World War II.

# Historical Background

## A (blind) US-follower?

- alternative lines
- more independent version (notably Nakasone diplomacy)
- How to evaluate “Koizumi diplomacy” or “Abe diplomacy”?



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But this diplomatic line, based on Japan-U.S. relations, have been criticized as a blind U.S. follower. The alternative diplomatic line, which places more emphasis on Asia as opposed to the United States, has been pursued by the Japanese government from time to time, zen-hoi-gaiko or omni-directional diplomacy is a typical slogan for it. The last attempt of such foreign policy was pursued by the Hatoyama Yukio administration of the Democratic Party of Japan with catastrophic results. And after him, the diplomatic line has returned to the U.S.-oriented.

Successful diplomacy needs stable and longer tenure of governments. In this perspective, well, Koizumi diplomacy or Abe diplomacy would be worth considering. There is a strong view that Abe diplomacy was conducted under the leadership of Prime Minister Abe himself based on the strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance while he advocated and promoted the Free and Open Indo-Pacific or the Japan-U.S.-Australia-India framework, Quad, while taking a harder stance towards the neighboring countries, such as China, North Korea, and South Korea, but, I'm not quite sure if he has got his policy on his diplomacy because after the assassination of Abe, his patriotic aspect has been put into question, especially with relation to the Unification Church in the long time.

# Japanese Foreign Policy

## Whither “Kishida Diplomacy”?

- "Realism Diplomacy for a New Era"
- the longest serving foreign minister
- liberal version of “Abe diplomacy”?



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What does Kishida diplomacy aim for? He advocates a realism diplomacy for a new era. I would rather ask Prof. Hosoya the meaning of this policy, but it sounds to me like some opportunism. He spent most of his career as the longest-serving foreign minister, and it was under the Abe administration. But what did he do? I don't see any particular beliefs of his foreign policy. Maybe a little version of Abe diplomacy. I happen to be an alumnus of the same high school as Kishida, and he tends to gather people from our alumni in the politicians or government officers. It's a bad idea, I think. But still, he can trust or he can choose the people. Still, his diplomatic line has not yet been clear in my view.

# Possibilities of Japanese Diplomacy

## For Ukraine

- support for the "bastion of the liberal camp"
- (rare) success of the invitation of President Zelensky to the G7 Hiroshima Summit
- contribution expected for postwar reconstruction ("checkbook diplomacy" and beyond)



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And from now on, from this page, it's like the sort of brainstorming for the discussion.

For Ukraine, our government support is very clear. Ukraine is the bastion of the liberal camp, and as the Ambassadors today mentioned, what happens to Ukraine today might happen in some countries in Asia. The invitation of President Zelensky to the G7 Hiroshima Summit was a very rare success. It was a success even to the skeptical eyes like myself.

The contribution expected for reconstruction is not just a checkbook diplomacy. As Ukrainian Ambassador mentioned, we have a lot of experiences for reconstruction in the post-war period and the post-disaster period. We can offer the experiences of good practice and bad failures as well.

# Possibilities of Japanese Diplomacy

## For the Middle East

- different context from European/ American countries
- diplomatic/economic affinity to Arab countries
- strong ethical objection to Israel's recent stance
- mediator / facilitator ?



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For the Middle East, we have a different historical context from European or American countries. In the 1970s, we had a quarrel or fight with the late Henry Kissinger. After all, he admitted our own diplomacy towards the Arab countries. We have a good relationship with the Arab countries. I think we have a strong ethical objection to Israel's recent stance. And in that sense, we could be in a good position to play a role as a mediator or facilitator or conciliator, whatever.

# Possibilities of Japanese Diplomacy

## For the rest of the world

- toward a UN reform (again)?
- stability based on the firm Japan-U.S. alliance
- deterrence to China (and North Korea)
- contribution to other "usual business" of global issues

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For the rest of the world, we have tried to reform the United Nations again, but in the foreseeable future it might not be fruitful. The more important thing for us is the stability of East Asia. If the stability of East Asia crumbled, then the world might be as just days before the Second World War. With the strong Japan-U.S. Alliance, we have to try to deter China or North Korea.


Paradoxically, in the last sentence I mean the contribution to other “usual business,” the usual business of global issues. In the time of a war or danger, we tend to ignore the usual business, but there is a lot of other global issues which need to be tackled even in this situation.

## Possibilities of Japanese Diplomacy

### Mediator / Facilitator / Conciliator ?

- lack of experience
- lack of resources (and will) ?

→ gather like-minded countries and actors



Can Japan play the role as a mediator or conciliator? We lack experience, and we also lack resources, especially human resources. Our career diplomats tend to change the position in two to three years. The basic rule is, from the advanced countries to developing countries, quite difficult to concentrate on some kind of project in the longer term. Just one country, just Japan, couldn't be good enough for playing the role.

My idea is that we must gather a group of countries, like-minded countries and actors, feeling the same, like the Lublin Triangle and Japan. Not just government-to-government relations, but Track 2 diplomacy or Track 1.5 diplomacy, including the academics and our businesspeople and related NGOs and so on might be fruitful for the better future.

Thank you very much for your attention.

## Panel Discussion



- Moderator: Yuichi Hosoya, Professor, Keio University
- Sergiy Korsunsky, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine
- Pawel Milewski, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Poland
- Aurelijus Zykas, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Lithuania
- Takeshi Yuasa, Professor, Sophia University
- Hidenori Tozawa, Professor, Tohoku University



**Hosoya:** Thank you very much, everyone, for joining our event. I am really glad to be able to moderate this session. This is an extremely important topic, and this is extremely important timing. Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has been saying this year that we are now at a turning point in history. If Russia wins the war, it means that we will see seriously damaged international order or free and open international order based on the rule of law. We need to avoid the situation. We are now at the turning point in history. So, I agree with what Prime Minister Kishida has been saying. This is one thing.

The other thing is of course Ukrainian reconstruction, as well as recovery, is extremely important. I would also like to add that Japan is good at doing this, because, after we were defeated by the Second

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World War in 1945, Japan was totally ruined and devastated, but within a few years Japan was reconstructed. And within a few decades after that, Japan became one of the richest countries. We know how to reconstruct a country after total devastation.

That's why we did it in the Japanese foreign policy in the 1990s in Cambodia after the civil war. We did it in the West Balkans as well after the Yugoslavian war. We provided support to West Balkan countries to reconstruct them after the war. We also did it in Afghanistan after the Afghanistan war. Japan provided the largest amount of contribution, financial contribution, to Afghanistan. Of course, the United States did a huge military contribution, but we didn't do it. What we did was to provide civilian assistance to reconstruct Afghanistan. We felt sad to see the attack upon airports two years ago because the airport in Kabul was constructed and financed by the Japanese government. What we did in the last two decades are now totally damaged by a new regime.

But regardless of that, Japan has been doing many reconstructions or providing some assistance for reconstruction in many countries in the world. There is no reason for Japan to avoid our responsibility to reconstruct Ukraine after the war or even during the war. That's why at the Ukrainian Reconstruction Conference in London organized in June this year the Japanese government decided to pledge 7.6 billion US dollars for Ukrainian reconstruction. Maybe we need to double it or we need to provide a much, much larger amount of financial or other assistance to Ukraine because Ukraine is located at the heart of Europe. Without Ukrainian reconstruction, we cannot see peace and a prosperous Europe. That's why I think that this topic is extremely important.

I would like to ask each speaker to add some comments, perhaps to the other speakers, or to ask a question to other speakers or to add something to your previous talks, if you have some. May I ask first Ambassador Korsunsky for additional comments to your previous remarks, please?

**Korsunsky:** Thank you very much. I do want to add something which was mentioned by my fellow ambassadors and by other speakers. First of all, I would like to stress one very important achievement, which is not now very well seen but was done by Lithuania and then Poland – that's energy independence. I do remember – the Ambassador of Lithuania reminded me – how it was difficult for Lithuania first to put a floating LNG terminal and to begin to receive LNG rather than Gazprom Gas. That was a huge development, very difficult to move forward politically and economically, but they did it.



Then I can tell you that in the year of 2011, I was able to see the strategy for Central Europe independence, energy independence, put forward by Poland. That was an excellent plan, the best I have ever seen. And more than that, it was done, it was realized.

Poland built an LNG terminal in Świnoujście. Then, Croatia built a terminal in the Adriatic Sea. If you look at a map, it connects north to south of Central Europe, and LNG gas began to flow. Then, the EU removed all the obstacles for interborder trade. In this way, they achieved independence. If that allows us now to receive gas from the West, from the European Union, from Poland, and from borders with Slovakia and Hungary, this is very important because that is how Russia was managing Europe for many, many years. Much later, Germany did it, and other developed countries. That was really a huge achievement worth studying their experience.


Another thing which I must mention, again the Ambassador of Lithuania reminded me, is the demining. It's unbelievable to imagine the number of landmines Russia put in our land. We have five mines per square meter. Imagine all kinds of mines, very sophisticated mines. They put it purposefully everywhere they can against children, civilians, military. It's absolutely an immense task. We have now a demining coalition led by Lithuania. I'm very happy that yesterday we have a formal announcement that Japan joined this demining. Efforts and assistance from Japan began earlier. We began to receive the practical equipment. We are very grateful because we need a hundred times more, but it's important that the experience of every country, and as you mentioned, Japan has Cambodia experience. It would be added to other countries.

When it comes to Poland, I have to mention another coalition we created. That is an IT coalition within the Ramstein framework. Almost every Ukrainian IT company moved its operation to Poland. Poland was very much comfortable in accepting them. And it is very important again that Japan join the IT coalition. That is answering your question what Japan can do.

Of course, I would be insincere if I would not say that we do need weapons. We would very much welcome if Japan would not provide lethal weapons but weapons which can protect our skies, anti-missile defense. I am trying to explain, when we talk to governmental officials, that this is not lethal weapons which really Japan cares about. This is humanitarian assistance because we use sometimes self-defense to protect civilians, to protect port infrastructure, and to protect peaceful cities. You can't kill Russians – I would say, unfortunately, but nevertheless – but it's humanitarian assistance. It's not pure weapons in terms of killing power.

As I said, we very much hope assistance in energy. That's another sector where Japan is extremely helpful. Last year almost 1,000 different generators were supplied to Ukraine. This year it's even more. We already received several huge high-power electrical transformers, huge power, and we are continuing to receive them. That is something Japan can do. That's my reflection of what has been said. Thank you.

**Hosoya:** Well, thank you very much for your insightful talk. Then I'd like to ask Ambassador Milewski for your talk on anything you'd like to talk about.



**Milewski:** Thank you very much, Professor. I would like to make three points.

First, referring to what Ambassador Korsunsky has just said about energy. Poland has gone through a really very deep energy transformation, which made us well prepared for the crisis. Some of the Western European countries have not done it, and it might turn out problematic in the future. And I think this is also a very good example for others, also Japan, how to prepare for any kind of military conflicts and tensions, and, God forbid, war, in terms of the energy infrastructure.

The membership of Ukraine in the European Union will require a transformation of the Ukrainian energy sector in accordance with the European Union standards. As Poland and Lithuania and other countries went through such a process, Ukraine will have to do it as well.

I think, and I fully agree with Ambassador Korsunsky, that Japan has the opportunity to help Ukraine transform the energy sector.

The second point is about NATO. Secretary General Stoltenberg's famous phrase was that, before the war, the Russian army was second in the world; now it is the second to Ukraine, just after the Ukrainian army. This is because all of us have supported the Ukraine military forces.

The Secretary General mentioned the cooperation between NATO and some other non-European countries, including Japan. There was information about a NATO office being established here in Tokyo. It was not welcomed by all of the NATO member states, but it was by Poland. And I think that the more global cooperation NATO will have with the like-minded countries like, for example, Japan, here in this part of the world, the better not only for European security but also for the global security. I would be extremely glad to see a NATO office here in Tokyo. I know that this or next week there is a NATO delegation coming to Tokyo to discuss this.

And the last point would refer to Prof. Yuasa's statement about Japan's contribution to the entire Central Eastern European region. I think that Japan has quite a good example of cooperation between the V4, the Visegrád Four, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary. It was established by Prime Minister Koizumi 2003. Then Prime Minister Abe was a huge fan of that. He visited the region a number of times. Now it's a little bit problematic because of different views among the Visegrád Four towards the aggression of Russia against Ukraine. I would absolutely support Prof. Yuasa's idea – why Japan should not think of having closer cooperation with the Lublin Triangle, with some other countries bordering Ukraine to support



them not only humanitarian-wise, recovery-wise, but also politically? Thank you.

**Hosoya:** Well, thank you very much. I also think that it is important to enhance Japan-NATO cooperation. That's why we really welcomed NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg's visit to us and this generally, and at the beginning of February, he made a very important speech exactly in this room. He focused on the importance of NATO's cooperation with Japan here in this room. And we largely agreed with what he said here on the importance of much closer cooperation with Japan and NATO because we share important values. Liberal democracies are becoming a minority in the world. Now, authoritarian powers are becoming more powerful. That's why we need much closer cooperation among each other.

By the way I visited Kyiv University five years ago to give a lecture. And last year I visited Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan, Ambassador Milewski's alma mater, to give a lecture. Ambassador Zykas, next time I really need to visit Lithuania to give a lecture, but could you give us your thoughts?

**Zykas:** Thank you very much. I would like to start with a saying that now we have quite a difficult moment of the ongoing invasion because some countries are starting to feel some fatigue. Because the war is already for almost two years, countries are tired of it. I think that's one of the biggest mistakes we could do.



Another is dispersion of the attention because we had new conflicts appearing in the Middle East, in Venezuela, and so on and so forth. I think that also would be a very big mistake because that's also a strategy and we know what country is behind these new wars.

And a third mistake would be actually believing that Russia is weak because as we are supporting Ukraine, and we are doing very much for it. Russia is also doing very much to build it's army. That would be also a mistake.

And I'm very thankful that Japan, in this part of the world, is supporting Ukraine from the very first moment without any doubt, and Japan is doing very much, including joining different initiatives. We are very, very appreciating Japan joining the mining initiative, Japan joining the IT initiative and so on and so forth.

However, what we would expect from Japan is not only joining the current initiatives, but taking real leadership because, as we know actually, Japan is the No. 3 economy of the world. As you already mentioned, Japan has plenty of experience of rebuilding different countries, including Japan itself, Cambodia, Afghanistan, and so on and so forth. It's really kind of strange that Japan is not taking the leadership in this.



I do understand there are some excuses about that. For Japan, it might be this region could seem very far away, but we all know that everything is so well interconnected. We cannot be within our region only. And as Ambassador Milewski already mentioned, what's happening in Ukraine, actually that will be a precedent with what could happen in East Asia.

So actually, for Lithuania, as a small country, as you know, we are quite much involved in the East Asia region, including Taiwan issues and so on and so forth. Even small countries can take leadership in some things.

Another excuse for Japan would be that there are constitutional and legal restrictions. But let me remind that the war is already happening for the second year. It's not a short war, and many things can be done. If you think that is a long war actually, we can change the law, and Lithuania is doing that. These could be actually the ways of how Japan could contribute.

And in this time the Lublin Triangle countries are very much eager to cooperate with Japan. They have been very much eager to cooperate and they are very much eager to go into this discussion, because, from our side, we know we have know-how about how everything could be done. We have already experience in Ukraine. We have enough infrastructure for this. We can help. And also, we have less cross-communication. There are no issues and we can help very much.

By the way you mentioned Afghanistan as one of the places. We already have experience of working with Japan together in Afghanistan in Ghor Province and that was a very successful example at that time. That's what I wanted to say.

**Hosoya:** Thank you very much indeed for your insightful comments. As you are a leading scholar of Japan studies, I am glad to hear that you encourage Japan to play a much bigger leadership role.

Then I'd like to ask Yuasa-san to add something to the previous discussion.



**Yuasa:** Thank you, Hosoya-san. Well, first of all, I appreciate your support, especially Ambassador Milewski about my idea how we cooperate in a regional framework.

Additionally, I would like to point out Japan's approach to Central Asia, as I mentioned in my presentation. Next year will be the 20th anniversary to create the Central Asia plus Japan Dialogue, kicked off in 2004. Next year would be a memorial year. According to some news sources, the Prime

Minister of Japan may visit these countries. In that sense, in the coming years, as a Japanese citizen, I hope that Japan restarts what Tozawa-sensei is suggesting; the rebirth of the Abe diplomacy, the new version by Kishida-san. But I imagine the experience of the 1990s. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Hashimoto administration was eager to enhance the relationship including Russia, but enhancing their so-called diplomacy to the continental countries.

We have to review and restart some effective support and effective ways to construct a new version of diplomacy, new diplomacy towards that region including Russia. The Lublin Triangle may be a reliable partner for that. That is my additional comment for my presentation.

There are a lot of comments and questions to the Ambassadors, but I also propose what Ambassador Korsunsky suggested. Of course, we cannot provide some lethal weapons to Ukraine, but we also had experience to support demining in Afghanistan. An NGO organized by the retired Self-Defense Forces personnel was very active. NGO missions are very important for the Ukraine recovery. Thank you.

**Hosoya:** Thank you very much, Yuasa-san, for your additional comment. Tozawa-san, do you have some additional comments?

**Tozawa:** Thank you, Hosoya-sensei. I took this difficult task as a speaker today, it's beyond my major, because I wanted to learn how I can imagine the future of the world. We are talking about Ukraine's recovery and future, but before getting into the recovery or reconstruction phase, we must stop the war or fighting, or at least we must have tools for ceasefire in order not to waste money.



But in the disaster science, there are some discussions about the pre-disaster reconstruction or the sort of preparation for the coming disaster, but in the case of war, it's quite difficult. I don't know if we can prepare for some reconstruction plans beforehand. But still, today I learned how important the energy sector is even during a war phase to save lives in winter. In different phases, we can plan or we can do something for emergency aid or future reconstruction. That's what I learned today.

Today I used the words "checkbook diplomacy" to be critical, but I think we have a constitutional constraint. The checkbook diplomacy is also valuable to some extent. And that's what we can offer, or we offered in the post-war area, in the post-war period. But today, we will be soon the fourth in the world economy, and our diplomacy tends to be swayed to domestic policy. I wonder how long we can afford to give a checkbook for this kind of thing, getting support from the Japanese people. There are some signs of weariness of giving more money to a foreign country in public opinion to so some extent.

Hosoya: Thank you very much. I suppose, Ambassador Milewski, you have some response.



Milewski: Thank you very much, Prof. Hosoya. Talking about the ceasefire, in truth I should ask my Ukrainian friend to speak, after I take the floor. Because Poland was not attacked, not invaded by the Russian Federation, it should be up to the Ukrainian people, up to the Ukrainian president and the government, to decide whether to stop the fire, to start negotiating or not.

I must disappoint you very much, Professor. Poland is concerned about ceasing fire with the Russian Federation or talking about any kind of peace or suspending the war. We have been accused by the Western countries of being Russophobic for so many, many years. Being just too sensitive to the Russian modernization process and the Western values affiliation of the Russian people, it all proved extremely, extremely wrong, and naïve. Now many of our Western European colleagues are listening to the Polish, the Lithuanian, the Latvian and the Estonian governments saying that we should have been much smarter about Russia.

Ceasing fire with the Russian Federation first and then thinking about the recovery and reconstruction of Ukraine would be a huge mistake. That would also give an extremely bad example to other authoritarian regimes also here in this part of the world, which are of course negotiating and talking to each other and trying to stop or suspend a war. I think that either we'll win it or we'll lose it, and I talk not only about the neighbors of Ukraine but all the countries who believe in values, including Japan. We should continue assisting Ukraine, and think about and act on its recovery and reconstruction already now. Thank you.

Hosoya: Thank you very much. Japan was perhaps the first country after Russia's invasion to Ukraine that this war is not a war between Russia and Ukraine, but this war is one to seriously damage international order. So, all the countries in the entire community must be involved with this because, otherwise, this international order will be totally undermined.

So, Ambassador Korsunsky, I think you have something to add.

**Korsunsky:** There are a lot of people in the world, politicians, journalists, and analysts suggesting that we negotiate with Russia, that we ceasefire, and that we would find some temporary arrangement or whatever. All of them are dead wrong because they suggest that we deal with a normal country. I want to disappoint every one of you.



You can't imagine the evil we deal with. It's ten times worse than the Soviet Union. Ten times worse than the Stalin regime. This is a whole country mad about a global war. "If you are Russophobic, you are Neo-Nazis." This is not my words; this is what Putin said three days ago. Read his speech on the latest congress. They pray to him like a god. You would not believe your eyes if you see what is happening in Russia. You would not believe your eyes if you read, as we do, because, unfortunately, we speak Russian. It's unbelievably evil. The only way to stop fighting is to defeat Russia – give us 3,000 Abrahams, 2,000 F3-35s, and Russia is done. We are not asking anyone to fight on our land. We will do it. Give us weapons. We can't produce that.

And you see now, the whole world cannot produce weapons because Russia can afford to spend half of its budget for military. You can't. A normal country can't because you care about your population. You support a normal life. In Russia, they will eat cabbage for 10 years, just cabbage, because Putin wants that. They are mad about him. This is real. This is not our words. This is real. It's a huge threat to mankind.

That is why we understand. We have been talking about this for many years to Europe. They never listened. Germany never listened to us, never. They will say, "no, I mean, Russia, we will work with it economically, you know, we will integrate them." The United States pushes a button. And there's no way. You must understand that at the end of the day. This is a country which is a threat to humankind. If we stop, they will wipe us out, and they will come for other countries.

This is the reality, the unfortunate reality. We can't stop. And we will never allow them to win. Never. We will fight with spades if we don't have weapons. We have no choice. If we don't fight, we do not exist.

**Hosoya:** Thank you very much, Ambassador Korsunsky, for your important statement.

We are very fortunate to have all the three Ambassadors of the Lublin Triangle countries. It's really rare to have all of the three Ambassadors here in Tokyo in one conference. That's why I think there must be some questions to you and let me collect a few questions.

We have another six or seven minutes. If you have a question or comment, please raise your hand.



**Question:** Thank you. I study here at Keio University. I am from Italy. So, my question is related to Italy, to the unfortunate case that we had a couple of weeks ago in which our foreign service basically got into contact with Russian exponents. I cannot say they were necessarily related to the Russian government, but that's what it looks like. Basically, they got into contact with our Prime Minister, pretending to be another foreign dignitary, and they got publicly the admission of the Italian government that the funds for Ukraine and the help for Ukraine is kind of getting too much from the European side.

I wanted to get your reaction to it, understanding that you might definitely be against this kind of proposition and especially the Italian government trying to hide their hands behind their backs after saying something that should not have been said. But what do you think about it? Thank you.

**Hosoya:** This is a question to the Ambassador, right?

**Question:** All of them.



**Korsunsky:** I think she knew she talks to a prank, so she tried to mislead him. We are very grateful to Italy for help. We know a lot about your complicated internal politics. We know, trust me, very well that all the parties on the north and all the history of friendship of the former leadership of Italy with Putin. Now, Italy is an unbelievable supporter, and we are extremely grateful for that. We need all G7 to be united, and Italy is extremely strong on this.

We do not pay attention to this phone conversation. I know of two dozen cases of prank calls. Do not think this is something really as a political statement.

**Hosoya:** Any more questions?

**Question:** Hello. I am a journalist, and I have a question about the European and also the U.S. reaction about the Ukraine support.

As Dr. Zykas mentioned, in Hungary and in Slovakia, for example, there has been a trend which is against, which is reluctant to support Ukraine in terms of weapons and in terms of finance support.

This is a question for Dr. Korsunsky. What is your evaluation of the situation? And what do you think should be done to facilitate support for Ukraine in those countries?

**Hosoya:** We have the Ukrainian Ambassador as well as two Ambassadors from EU member states, so maybe I'd like to ask all of them.

**Milewski:** Thank you. I'm absolutely not about to speak on behalf of Hungary or Slovakia. I'm not here to do so, but each and every one of the EU member states has its own foreign policy based on its principles. If you look at Central, Eastern European countries, and I just mentioned the Visegrád Four, which is very much diverse as regards foreign policy. You can see the differences in the Russian policy but also in the China policy. And if you examine the Russian policy of countries like Hungary for example, you may understand more about why the current government is more cooperative with the leadership in China, and it's the same with Russia. If you analyze more the energy cooperation, for example, between Hungary and Russia, you may understand more about the position of the Hungarian government towards the Russian brutal aggression.



To me, coming from Poland, it's absolutely unacceptable to say anything positive about understanding Russia's concerns regarding the NATO expansion to the East. Well, we, NATO is not an organization which is expanding by force eastward. I mean, all of the countries, including mine, Poland, we requested the membership in NATO, because following the fall of communism, we found ourselves in a huge danger from the Russian Federation. The Polish President Lech Kaczyński, when he traveled to Tbilisi, to Georgia, said that if we did not stop the Russian Federation, that was in 2008, a while ago, invasion against Georgia, the next countries attacked by Russia would be Ukraine and then perhaps the Baltic States and then perhaps Poland . His words turned out to be correct.

That time, believe me, many of the Western European countries' politicians were saying that it was so Russophobic, so anti Russian, that Russia needed to be encouraged to be more European. Poland was criticized, but it proved to be right. Thank you.

**Hosoya:** Thank you very much indeed.





etcetera, etcetera. So let them work.

**Korsunsky:** We distinguish bilateral relations with Hungary from what Hungary is saying as a member of the European Union. When they say they will block funds and assistance or whatever, we think that the European Commission, European Union countries and institutions of the EU take care of this. That is their business because there is a clear, uniform position of the EU towards Ukraine. It was decided. There is European parliament,

On the bilateral side, we tried to negotiate with Hungary many times in the most positive way. Zelensky met with Orbán and we tried to explain to them. We even changed a little bit. I mean, we took into account their demands, which were absolutely extremely strange, I would say. They claim our demand that every Ukrainian citizen must speak Ukrainian language. It's like China say that part of Japan must speak Chinese. So why, I mean, you have no business in our territory. It's our policy, and we have 200 nationalities living in Ukraine, speak at home with whatever language you want, but everyone must speak the state language. It's so natural.

But, okay, we understand. Internal politics works. Unfortunately, as you see, we could not find a proper dialogue, and we are pretty not sure why. We know who is boiling this water. But when it comes to more important issues, EU and NATO, we have institutions, let them work.

**Hosoya:** Thank you very much indeed. Tozawa-san and I published a book, European Integration History, more than a decade ago, and this is the standard history of European integration in the Japanese language, and it's translated already into Chinese language. We are familiar with European affairs, and always European countries have been struggling with different voices on foreign policy.

As regards environmental policy and trade policy, Europe can have a single voice, but regarding foreign policy, it's always difficult to coordinate different voices. It's always the case to try to mitigate confrontations among each country. But now, it is really important for the European Union to have a strong voice to decide the future, and here in Japan or here in Tokyo, it's always difficult to have such an honest European voice who knows Russia very much. So, that's why I think, at least because of this, today's event is extremely valuable and successful.

Thank you very much. And I'd like to end the panel discussion by thanking all the five speakers.

## Closing Remarks by Professor Yoko Hirose, Keio University

Prof. Yoko Hirose  
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Good evening. First, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the Ambassadors and the Embassies of Ukraine, Poland, and Lithuania, and then Sophia University and Tohoku University for their kind cooperation and participation. And I believe it is a great thing that such a wonderful workshop was held one year and nine months after the outbreak of the Ukraine war.

The Ukraine war is still going with no direction in sight for the resolution. Moreover, the second winter is coming and the whole of Ukraine is in a very serious situation. The fighting and the cold are very hard, and we can't deny the possibility that Russia will destroy Ukraine's infrastructure with missile attacks and other means, like it did last year. And ordinary people will be forced to live in very hard conditions.

Unfortunately, it is undeniable that international solidarity for supporting Ukraine is becoming increasingly out of sync due domestic political situations in some European countries and the United States, as well as a result of new fighting in Israel.

However, the international community should never allow Russian behavior, which is attempting to change the status quo by force. The defeat of Ukraine means the defeat of liberal democracy. We must support Ukraine and the end of this story. And our support should not be just for fighting but for the reconstruction of Ukraine. And the international community needs to provide support so that Ukraine can recover as soon as possible and begin a peaceful and stable situation, and regain economic and political independence.

As for reconstruction, some argue that there is no meaning in thinking about or doing it while the fighting continues; however, I think such argument is wrong in two ways.

First, it is very important to be prepared so that Ukraine can start reconstruction immediately when the war ends. If we start thinking about reconstruction after the war is over, there will be a huge time lag for the start of reconstruction.

Second, we should proceed with reconstruction in areas where fighting has not taken place and in areas that Ukraine has recaptured from Russia. Demining is an urgent need. It is said that it will take at least 10 years for all land mine removal to be completed. If land mines cannot be removed, Ukraine, an agricultural country, will not only be able to restore the farmland but also be unable to ensure the safety of people's lives, making it impossible to hope for social and economic development.

Demining is an urgent issue, and Japan has long experience in demining in Cambodia cooperating with the Cambodian government to invite Ukraine demining personnel and install mine detectors to remove land mines in Ukraine. We have made efforts in various ways to clear land mines, such as providing training on how to use them and providing demining equipment.

In addition, it is also important to respond to damage caused by the catastrophic flooding caused by the outflow of water due to the collapse of the dam of the Kakhovka Hydro Power Plant in June this year. The flood engulfed many residential areas and homeland in Ukraine and washed away land mines that had arrived by Russian military.

This also leads to soil and water pollution, and there is an urgent need to address these issues. If Ukraine cannot recover agricultural land, it will not be able to become economically independent and various environmental pollution will create new risks for people's health.

I hear that there are already health hazards, but we need to stop them as soon as possible. Japan has faced many natural diseases, including serious earthquakes, and has proceeded with reconstruction. I believe Japan's experience can be utilized to address many recovery issues, including environmental damage in Ukraine.

It can be said that the main actors of the workshop of Lublin Triangle and Japan have played an important role in supporting Ukraine. The Lublin Triangle is a regional association for three countries which are near Poland and Ukraine, with shared tradition and historical ties and was established on July 28, 2020, in Lublin in Poland.

Still, I feel it is a great significance that the Lublin Triangle was established about two years before the Russian invasion of Ukraine. One of the goals of the Lublin Triangle is to cooperate in the direction and activities of the three countries' activities to counter the common security changes and threats, and it includes Russian hybrid warfare. Hybrid warfare is a combination of irregular warfare and regular warfare, and as the irregular warfare component has grown in importance and influence, it has become a threat around the world.

Hybrid warfare has gained international attention due to the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. And the ongoing war by Russia is also hybrid warfare. Therefore, we have to deal with hybrid warfare with a cooperative situation. Therefore, I strongly feel that the foresight in establishing the Lublin Triangle was extremely high.

On the other hand, it is said that the Lublin Triangle should be a square with Belarus. Unfortunately,

Belarus currently maintains an undemocratic system and it is supporting Russia. Many Belarusian politicians' activities, threats, and others are promoting various activities in the Ukraine triangle countries, while Belarus is assertively sending refugees to Poland and Lithuania. In fact, along with Russia, Belarus has been promoting regional instability. This is a very unfortunate situation, but I pray that the war will end as soon as possible and democracy will be realized in Belarus and that the Lublin Triangle will eventually become a beautiful square and become a cornerstone of peace and stability in the region.

So I believe today's workshop will be a turning point in the cooperation between Ukraine and neighboring countries, Poland, Lithuania, and Japan, which is also a friendly neighbor country with just one country in between – Russia.

Once again, I'd like to thank everyone for their cooperation and participation. Slava Ukraini, thank you very much.



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Lublin Triangle and Japan

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