Tsuyoshi Goroku: One Year Since the Invasion of Ukraine—What is Needed for a Resolution?

It has been nearly one year since Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. While everyone fears further prolongation, there is currently no sign that President Putin intends to stop the attacks, and the Ukrainian side is prepared for a total resistance to defend their homeland. Ceasefire negotiations, which were held intermittently last March, have had no prospect of resuming since they stopped in April following the discovery of atrocities committed by the Russian military in Bucha, a town near Kyiv. There is still no end in sight for this war, which has already caused immense sacrifice and damage.

Looking back at the state of the war over the past year, it can be broadly divided into three phases.

First, the large-scale Russian forces that had been massing around the Ukrainian border since the fall of 2021 began a full-scale invasion from three directions: north, east, and south. According to a report by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), Russia had a plan to finish operations and begin occupation within 10 days of the invasion, and to annex all of Ukraine by August. However, due to the unexpectedly strong performance of the Ukrainian military, the Russian army was forced to withdraw from the outskirts of the capital, Kyiv, at the end of March and redeployed its forces to the eastern Donbas region.

After the initial plan ended in failure, it was the Russian military, superior in firepower, that held the initiative from April to around July. While significantly exhausted by the stubborn resistance of the Ukrainian military supported by weapons from Western countries, the Russian side concentrated its forces in the east, gradually seizing major cities such as Mariupol and Severodonetsk and expanding its controlled territory.

However, a change in this situation was seen after late August, when the Ukrainian side took the initiative. After the Ukrainian military succeeded in a large-scale counteroffensive in the eastern Kharkiv region in early September, it quickly recaptured the west bank of the Dnipro River in the southern Kherson region in early November, which had been occupied in March without major fighting. As a result, the area under Ukrainian control recovered to approximately 83%, compared to about 76% of the country in March. On the other hand, as the Russian military struggled, Putin moved to a partial mobilization in late September and declared the unilateral "annexation" of four southern and eastern provinces.

Since December, intense fighting has continued in the east, but as winter deepened, the tempo of combat slowed, and the overall war situation has reached a stalemate. At the time of writing (February 2023), Russia is launching a major offensive, but attention is focused on whether Ukraine can withstand this and how much territory it can recapture in its expected counteroffensive.

In starting the full-scale invasion in the first place, Putin made at least two major mistakes.

The first was underestimating the Ukrainian people's will to resist. Consequently, Putin began the invasion with the naive outlook that he could complete a "special military operation" aimed at turning Ukraine into a vassal state within a short period.

However, according to a public opinion poll by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, two weeks before the full-scale invasion, 57.5% of the population and 71.9% of men responded that they would "engage in some form of resistance (armed resistance, or civil resistance such as demonstrations, protests, marches, boycotts, strikes, and civil disobedience, or both)." Furthermore, according to other surveys, many citizens were pessimistic about support from the West and believed they had to manage on their own first. For the people of Ukraine, the war with Russia had been ongoing since the spring of 2014 when Crimea was occupied. Additionally, as large-scale Russian forces gathered around the border from the spring of 2021 and tensions continued for a year, it can be said that there was a readiness and determination to stand up if the time came even before the invasion.

This will to resist has continued even as the war has dragged on. According to a public opinion poll last December, 85% of respondents answered that "Ukraine must not abandon its territory under any circumstances, even if the war is prolonged and the maintenance of independence is threatened." To break people's morale, the Russian military has continued to intentionally destroy housing, schools, and hospitals, and since October, has repeatedly attacked energy facilities to use winter as a weapon, but those intentions have largely failed.

Another major miscalculation was the unity of the Western countries supporting Ukraine. Looking at the response of Western countries to the invasion of Georgia in the summer of 2008 and the invasion of Crimea in the spring of 2014, Putin may have thought that this time, too, European countries—especially those dependent on Russia economically—would be unable to take bold sanctions. He may also have judged that NATO and the EU had been shaken by various issues over the past few years, and that there was no change in the US's inward-looking stance or the fading of its leadership under the Biden administration, as symbolized by the chaos surrounding the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan.

In reality, however, Western countries, centered on the G7 and EU, quickly imposed extensive and large-scale economic sanctions on Russia. Since then, even as Russia has attempted to shake them using various means such as energy, the sanctions have been maintained and strengthened. Furthermore, support for Ukraine has been implemented on a large scale; according to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, as of late November last year, the total amount of pledged support in the military, humanitarian, and financial sectors exceeded 113.1 billion euros.

After his initial plans failed, Putin seemed to aim for "Ukraine fatigue" to arise in Western society due to the prolongation of the war. However, at this point, the situation has not reached the serious level that was feared; rather, the level of support is increasing in both quality and quantity. While the possibility of such "fatigue" arising in some countries in the future cannot be denied, there is a general agreement among major countries to "continue supporting Ukraine for as long as necessary."

Furthermore, what was likely unexpected for Russia was the support in terms of weapons, training, and intelligence that Western countries have continued since the beginning of the invasion. Initially, the focus was on weapons to repel the Russian military, such as anti-tank missiles, but support was gradually strengthened, and the Ukrainian military was eventually provided with weapons essential for recapturing territory. Finally, in January 2023, Western countries took the step of providing Western-made main battle tanks, which they had initially been cautious about. From the perspective of the West, while needing to balance the avoidance of direct conflict with Russia and support for Ukraine, support was initially limited due to fear of escalation. However, as the situation where NATO and Russia are mutually deterred continued, it can be said that Western countries have carefully increased the level of weapons support while watching Russia's moves.

This war would end if only Putin stopped the indiscriminate attacks and decided on a full withdrawal of the Russian military. However, such an optimistic scenario is difficult to envision at present. Also, while there are calls for negotiations, what Putin originally sought was the vassalization of Ukraine. It is unclear whether that objective has been revised downward, and it is unknown if a "deal" is even possible in negotiations. President Zelenskyy presented five conditions for resuming negotiations last November (1. Restoration of Ukraine's territorial integrity, 2. Respect for the UN Charter, 3. Reparations for war damage, 4. Punishment of war criminals, 5. Guarantees that aggression will not happen again), but these are incompatible with Russia's position, which excludes the four southern and eastern provinces it unilaterally declared "annexed" from the subject of negotiations.

As Russia has no intention of abandoning its goals of aggression, from Ukraine's perspective, there is no choice but to first use military force to push the Russian army outside its borders to restore territorial integrity. In a poll by the Rating Group, as of last November, 85% of the Ukrainian people answered that "victory" means recapturing all territory, including Crimea. While controversy may arise among countries supporting Ukraine regarding whether to support recapturing Crimea by force, the key for Ukraine for now is whether it can liberate by force the approximately 10% of its territory that has been occupied by Russia since February 24, 2022, and has not yet been liberated. In this context, what the Zelenskyy administration seeks to prevent further prolongation of the fighting is further military support, including fighter jets and long-range missiles. Whether Western countries can continue the provision of weapons, which can be called a "lifeline" for Ukraine, and whether they can take the step of providing the aforementioned weapons, will become increasingly important.

In addition to the provision of weapons, the Ukrainian side is strongly requesting long-term security guarantees from supporting countries in preparation for upcoming negotiations. Regardless of how the war stops or ends, unless the possibility of Russia attacking Ukraine again after a period of "post-war" is eliminated, Ukraine cannot feel secure, and Europe cannot regain stability.

Regarding the challenge of how to guarantee Ukraine's security, NATO membership is considered the best option among the Ukrainian people. However, as there is no prospect of that in the short term, the Zelenskyy administration, together with a team led by former NATO Secretary General Rasmussen, announced the "Kyiv Security Compact" concept last September. This is a legally binding framework to temporarily guarantee the country's security until Ukraine joins NATO or the EU, and it proposes various measures to improve Ukraine's deterrence and defense capabilities against Russia.

The "guarantor countries" are divided into a "core group" that provides military guarantees and a "broad group" that provides non-military guarantees centered on a sanctions mechanism. In addition to the West, Canada and Australia are mentioned for the former, while the G7 (including the EU and Japan) and South Korea are mentioned for the latter.

It is unclear what will happen with negotiations regarding this concept in the future, but how Ukraine's restored security can be maintained with an eye toward the "post-war" period is the key to restoring and maintaining the stability of the entire European order. If this fails, Europe will continue to face the risk of fighting reigniting at any time for decades to come.