Keiichi Inamine: What It Means to Be the Governor of Okinawa

Following the election held after the passing of Governor Takeshi Onaga last August, this magazine requested that I—a Keio University alumni who served two terms (eight years) as the head of the Okinawa Prefectural Government—write an easy-to-understand piece on "what it is like to be the Governor of Okinawa." This includes aspects that are often difficult to convey to the Japanese mainland regarding the various challenges associated with the relocation of U.S. military bases in Okinawa, for which a path to resolution remains distant.

I am not sure if I can meet these expectations, but I would like to explain it in my own words.

The major difference between the Governor of Okinawa and governors of other prefectures is the extremely high weight placed on base issues related to diplomacy and defense, which are the exclusive prerogatives of the national government. Regardless of the actual volume of administrative work, 70% to 80% of one's thoughts are occupied by base issues. It is no exaggeration to say that the majority of a governor's responses in the Prefectural Assembly concern base issues, and the number of follow-up questions is overwhelmingly high. Most media reports related to Okinawa also focus on base issues.

At the National Governors' Association held twice a year, requests from Okinawa regarding base issues—such as the enforcement of discipline among U.S. military personnel and the revision of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)—are added to the end of the resolution items with unanimous approval. However, there are almost no questions or opinions for or against them, and each time, I felt a temperature difference compared to other prefectures.

Why has such a difference in perception emerged? To unravel this, one must go back to the 27-year period of U.S. administration following World War II.

During World War II, Okinawa became the only domestic battlefield, resulting in the tragic loss of one-fourth of the prefecture's population. The problem, however, lies in the fact that the occupying forces remained, and under the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, Okinawa was completely severed from Japan and placed under U.S. administration.

Internationally, after the war, tensions continued to rise with the Chinese Communist Party taking control of the mainland in 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 amidst the Cold War. Meanwhile, within Japan, persistent anti-base movements spread, such as the Uchinada and Sunagawa struggles. Fearing the growth of left-wing forces in mainland Japan, the U.S. significantly reduced its bases there and concentrated them in Okinawa, which was under U.S. rule. A symbolic example of this was the relocation of the Marine Corps stationed in Yamanashi and Gifu to Okinawa between 1955 and 1956.

Of course, intense protest movements also occurred in Okinawa, such as the Isahama and Iejima struggles. However, in Okinawa, where Japan's administrative rights did not apply, these movements were forcibly suppressed. Before long, over 70% of the area dedicated to U.S. military bases in Japan came to be located in Okinawa, which accounts for less than 1% of Japan's total land area.

In 1972, Okinawa ended 27 years of U.S. administration and achieved reversion to the mainland.

The central force of the reversion movement was teachers' organizations, and their slogan was the return of U.S. military bases to a level "comparable to the mainland." However, the situation of the bases did not change much after reversion, leading to broken dreams and a shift toward anti-base sentiment. This established a structure of conflict with conservatives who advocated for economic promotion, further fueling the post-reversion turmoil.

According to an NHK survey immediately after reversion, 51% said reversion was good and 41% said it was bad. By the following year, 1973, 38% said it was good and 53% said it was bad, with negative opinions exceeding the majority, reflecting the complex emotions of the prefectural citizens.

Against the backdrop of such public opinion, the first post-reversion gubernatorial election saw the birth of progressive governors: the first, Chobyo Yara, and the second, Koichi Taira. In the 1978 election following Governor Taira's resignation due to illness, Junji Nishime, a conservative who appealed for economic promotion, was elected. In NHK's 10th-anniversary survey of the reversion, the "good" response grew significantly to 63%. This can be seen as an evaluation of the Nishime administration, which steadily grew the economy that had lagged significantly during the U.S. administration. On the other hand, dissatisfaction with the lack of progress on base measures gradually increased, leading to the birth of Governor Masahide Ota, a progressive peace scholar, in 1990.

The danger of Futenma Air Station, which is surrounded by residential areas, had been pointed out many times. However, the issue began to move significantly in 1995, during the Ota administration, following the tragic rape of a young girl by three U.S. Marines. Immediately afterward, a prefectural citizens' rally was held with the Speaker of the Prefectural Assembly as the convention chairman and all organizations in the prefecture participating (85,000 participants according to organizers), strongly calling for the enforcement of discipline in the U.S. military and a revision of the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement.

This incident had a powerful impact on both the Japanese and U.S. governments. I have heard that even within the U.S., there were opinions that "it might no longer be possible to maintain bases in Okinawa."

The month after the prefectural rally, SACO (Special Action Committee on Okinawa) was promptly established to work on the consolidation, integration, and reduction of U.S. military bases.

Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, concerned about the movements in Okinawa, asked Ken Moroi, an advisor to Chichibu Onoda Cement who had strong ties to Okinawa, to sound out Governor Masahide Ota's true intentions. Mr. Moroi immediately flew to Okinawa, spoke with Governor Ota privately, and upon returning to Tokyo, told the Prime Minister, "Mr. Ota studied in the U.S. and is actually pro-American, not anti-American. He is requesting the relocation of Futenma Air Station as the highest priority."

Upon hearing that report, Prime Minister Hashimoto was delighted, saying, "That kind of raw information is exactly what I wanted to know most," and immediately moved to take concrete action. Overriding opposition from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Defense Agency, he directly approached Ambassador Mondale and obtained President Clinton's understanding. At the Hashimoto-Mondale meeting in April 1996, the return of Futenma Air Station within five to seven years was announced.

Prime Minister Hashimoto's enthusiasm for solving the Okinawa problem was strong; he held individual meetings with Governor Ota as many as 17 times. Now that both have passed away, the contents of those meetings remain a mystery.

A rift formed between the two just before the Nago mayoral election in 1998. Suddenly, Governor Ota rejected the sea-based facility concept, which was the plan for relocating Futenma Air Station. Angered by this, the government stopped holding the Okinawa Policy Council, which had started in September 1996 for the promotion of Okinawa, and the tap of the pipeline was closed. The Okinawan economy slumped, and the unemployment rate reached a record high of 9.2%.

Out of a strong sense of crisis that Okinawa would sink if things continued this way, a movement to change the prefectural administration emerged, centered on the business community.

In 1998, following strong requests from the business community to break the prefectural recession, I decided to run for governor.

The campaign headquarters was composed of the business community, the medical association, agricultural cooperatives, and former progressive leaders, calling itself the "Prefectural Citizens' Party" and starting with a unique structure.

However, the primary focus of elections in Okinawa is the base issue, and one cannot fight an election campaign without addressing the Futenma relocation. Furthermore, how were we to face the movement of over 60% of local public opinion against new bases? Ultimately, a conditional acceptance plan—"dual military-civilian use," "with a time limit on use," and "promotion of the northern relocation site"—gained the understanding of the citizens and led to victory.

In 1999, the prefecture announced the Henoko relocation plan for Futenma with conditions. In a cabinet meeting on December 28, the government fully accepted the prefecture's plan, albeit with the condition "in response to changes in the international situation."

However, the plan did not progress easily afterward. The biggest factor was the subtle difference in temperature between the national and prefectural governments. While the prefecture argued that there were limits to the scope of cooperation given the harsh public opinion, the national government pushed difficult demands, saying that since it was decided, we should cooperate fully. They even demanded that the prefecture crack down on protest movements against survey towers. It was a different situation from the current cabinet's forceful stance involving the entire nation.

In 2006, during the U.S. Forces Japan realignment talks, the relocation site was finalized at the current location, but the conditions of "military-civilian use" and "time limit on use" vanished. I could not agree to this, yet I could not follow in the footsteps of the previous administration by entering into a total confrontation with the government. I exchanged a basic confirmation document on the condition of continued future consultations.

Governor Hirokazu Nakaima, who appeared after me, was exposed to a harsh reality. Following the Abe, Fukuda, and Aso cabinets, the government changed to the Democratic Party of Japan, and the Yukio Hatoyama cabinet was born.

What tore apart the threads that were somehow connected despite being tangled was Prime Minister Hatoyama's statement: "Outside the country, or at least outside the prefecture." Public opinion against the Henoko relocation instantly exceeded 80%. People thought that since the Prime Minister of the nation had said it, it must be achievable, and that they would no longer have to make a "bitter choice."

If that was the national policy, Governor Nakaima also included "relocation outside the prefecture" in his re-election pledge. His campaign manager was Naha Mayor Takeshi Onaga.

Later, Prime Minister Hatoyama retracted his statement. After the Kan and Noda cabinets, the LDP's Abe cabinet returned. Prioritizing the strengthening of Japan-U.S. relations, they worked energetically on the relocation issue.

Governor Nakaima, prioritizing coordination with the national government, moved forward with the reclamation approval and was labeled a traitor. Mayor Takeshi Onaga, who had served as Nakaima's campaign manager and was a leader of the conservatives in the prefecture, looked back at post-war history and argued that the base burden is a national issue and should not be placed excessively on Okinawa alone. He led a portion of the conservatives and secured support from progressive and independent voters who sympathized with him, running against Governor Nakaima in the 2014 gubernatorial election and winning by a landslide.

After being elected, Governor Takeshi Onaga never wavered in his convictions and continued to be in total confrontation with the government. In the midst of this, he was stricken by cancer and passed away. It was a tragic end.

Denny Tamaki declared he would carry on the deceased's will and won a landslide victory in the "memorial battle" election. While the new governor emphasizes dialogue, the government's guard is firm, and at present, no solution is in sight.

Until now, the Okinawa Prefectural Government and the municipalities where bases are located have all spent a vast amount of human resources and time on base issues. The challenges the prefectural government should be addressing—economy, welfare, education, environment, remote islands, etc.—are piling up. Successive governors have felt the desire to settle the base issue quickly and devote their full efforts to these various problems. Governor Tamaki likely feels the same.

The promotion of Okinawa cannot progress without the full cooperation of the national government; yet, it is also difficult to solve such a deeply entangled problem all at once. I sincerely hope that both sides will search for a compromise at the very limit and find a ray of light.