[Feature: How to Perceive China] Toshihiro Nakayama: Can the Biden Administration's China Policy Be Trusted?

During last year's presidential election, there were strong voices in Japan expressing concern about the Biden administration's anticipated policy toward China. Opinions such as "the Trump administration isn't so bad after all" were scattered across Japan, rooted in the idea that a tough, if somewhat crude, policy toward China was preferable to the United States taking a soft line. This view was particularly prominent in foreign policy and security circles. While it is actually quite doubtful whether President Trump himself had a coherent "China policy," the Trump administration's policy toward China was tough without hesitation. The Trump administration rejected the peaceful coexistence line that had been the keynote since the U.S.-China rapprochement in the 1970s and clearly declared an era of great power competition. This was explicitly stated in major policy documents and repeatedly affirmed by senior Trump administration officials.

The anxiety toward the Biden administration was not entirely groundless. The Obama administration, in which President Biden served as Vice President for eight years, attempted to engage China with a "U.S.-China G2" mindset, especially at its inception. The "U.S.-China G2" is a basic stance of first reaching an agreement between the U.S. and China on important issues facing the world and using that as leverage to solve problems. This G2-style thinking stalled early in the administration, and Obama's foreign policy began to take a tougher stance toward China. However, within the Obama administration, "expectations" for China to change persisted. This was a sense of problem-awareness that "China must not be made an enemy," and it was like a habit of thought for the President himself, who bet on the "possibility of dialogue."

If Hillary Clinton had won the 2016 presidential election, she likely would have chosen a tougher line toward China than before. Hillary Clinton was the preeminent hawk within the Obama administration and would have pivoted to a tougher policy toward China. However, at the same time, a brake would have likely operated based on the idea that "China must not be made an enemy." In comparison, the Trump administration unhesitatingly accepted that the relationship with China was a "confrontational relationship," making it clear that it was no longer an "era of great power cooperation" but an "era of great power competition," and that policy toward China would not be formulated based on "expectations for China."

Japan does not wish for the degree of U.S.-China conflict to escalate, but if the choice is between an "America that drifts toward China" and an "America that does not hesitate to confront China," it would unhesitatingly choose the latter. When the Biden administration took office, it was natural to assume it would more likely be "Obama Foreign Policy 2.0" rather than a reproduction of Trump's foreign policy, and inevitably move toward the former—an "America drifting toward China." Japan's concerns about Biden's foreign policy were based on such anxieties.

The Trump administration's acceptance of the "great power competition" paradigm and its recognition of the "strategic competition" between the U.S. and China at its center can be seen as an achievement of Trump's foreign policy (this transformation was discussed in the October 2020 issue of this magazine). Such a shift in direction might have required a potent medicine like the "Trump Shock." However, by the time the Trump administration proposed this shift, the recognition was already quite widely shared that China would not change as Western nations expected, and that expecting Western nations to "shape" China's future path was no longer anything but an illusion.

James Mann's "The China Fantasy," which denounced this illusion, was published as early as 2007. However, there is a high threshold between recognizing that the U.S. and China will not "converge" and introducing that as the main axis of policy. The coexistence line that had been the keynote since the U.S.-China rapprochement in the 1970s was like a giant tanker, and changing direction would not have been easy. Indeed, when the Trump administration's hardline stance toward China became clear, there was pushback centered on the "China Hands" who had managed America's China policy. This was demonstrated in the form of a joint letter to President Trump and members of Congress published in the Washington Post (July 3, 2019), titled simply "China is not an enemy."

In addition to the four main authors, there were nearly 100 co-signatories, eventually approaching 200. Although it was a bipartisan letter, the signatories clearly leaned toward the Democratic Party. Since this joint letter also existed in the context of criticizing Trump's foreign policy, not everyone who signed it was necessarily advocating for the continuation of the traditional coexistence line with China, but it is an example that shows how deeply rooted such thinking was *1. To reiterate, Trump's foreign policy achieved a certain level of success in rejecting such a pre-established harmony in China policy.

However, looking back at America's China policy during the Trump era, many questions also arise. While the Trump administration's policy toward China was certainly tough, it seemed to make being tough an end in itself. It was a crude policy that lacked perspective on the nature of the conflict with China, the ultimate goal of the relationship, and how China might change in the future. Consequently, some senior administration officials developed the idea that the "CCP (Chinese Communist Party)" was the main target and that confronting them ultimately required putting the "logic of force" at the forefront. There was also a noticeable mindset emphasizing the clash of power over power, regardless of ideology or thought. While these are important components of the U.S.-China relationship, the policy lacked the insight that equating them with the relationship itself would result in a distorted policy. It was a potent medicine, but as a long-term China policy, it was deficient.

A characteristic of the U.S.-China conflict is that it is not occurring on a single dimension. Reservations must be made regarding whether it should even be recognized as a "conflict" in the first place. What is actually happening is more complex. The U.S.-China relationship exists at different points on a coordinate axis of "confront—compete—cooperate" for various issues, and it is important to view the totality as the U.S.-China relationship. Therefore, unlike the U.S.-Soviet Cold War, it is vital to assume that the U.S.-China relationship will continue to fluctuate significantly. The U.S.-China relationship lacks the "stability of conflict" that existed in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. There is no doubt that it is leaning heavily toward "confront—compete." However, the Trump administration either misjudged the essential "complexity" of the U.S.-China relationship or deliberately ignored it in its eagerness to put strategic competition with China at the forefront.

However, more troublesome than this complexity is the assumption that this relationship will continue for a long time. Consequently, the issue of "fluctuation" emerges as a more serious problem. This perspective was missing from the Trump administration's China policy. Certainly, some suggest that the peak of the U.S.-China conflict will arrive in the 2030s. The currently popular future novel by Admiral James Stavridis and others, "2034: A Novel of the Next World War," sets a "hot war" between the U.S. and China in the mid-2030s. However, even if the U.S.-China conflict were to turn into a hot war, there is no guarantee that it would be the final resolution. Rather, it is more realistic to assume that this competitive relationship will continue until the middle of this century. Cold War historian John Lewis Gaddis described the Cold War as a "long peace," but the U.S.-China relationship is likely to be a "long competition" in that it will be a more dynamic competition rather than a static one like the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

If that is the case, America's China policy must, above all else, have "sustainability." It must not be a grandstanding play that fans conflict for momentary gain, but must anticipate competition in the 2030s, 2040s, and even the 2050s. The Trump administration's China policy decisively lacked this perspective. China is likely the first "peer competitor" the United States has ever faced. Since appearing on the main stage of world politics in the early 20th century, the United States has generally been on an upward trajectory, despite fluctuations. The U.S. has faced many enemies—Nazi Germany, the Empire of Japan, the Soviet Union, and violent extremism since 9/11—but with the exception of the Soviet Union, they were not "existential threats" that threatened the very existence of the United States. Yet even with the Soviet Union, as Gaddis described, the logic of the "long peace" could be shared after the Cuban Missile Crisis. There is no guarantee that such logic can be shared with China. Rather, looking at President Xi Jinping's public speaking on the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party, the situation appears to be regressing.

Moreover, the current United States cannot be described as being on an upward trajectory, even with flattery. Today's America is not the "confident America" we are familiar with, but rather an America tormented by the anxiety that perhaps the "Post-American World" (Fareed Zakaria) has arrived. Thinking this way might sound slightly exaggerated, but we are at a turning point in world history. In other words, the current situation can be described as one where a peer competitor is emerging while American hegemony is wavering.

In this situation, how is the Biden administration trying to construct its China policy? About six months since the Biden administration took office, it is safe to say that the fear that its China policy would be "soft" was groundless. A major theme of Biden's foreign policy is a break from Trump's foreign policy. However, this is not necessarily the case for China policy *2. Rather, it even seems as if confrontation with China is the major theme of Biden's foreign policy. However, there is an important difference between the Biden administration's China policy and that of the Trump administration. It is that the Biden administration recognizes the "complexity" and "long-term nature" of the U.S.-China conflict. Furthermore, while they would never admit it openly, they are conscious that the world is entering a "Post-American World."

The concept of a "foreign policy for the middle class" forms the core of the Biden administration's diplomatic stance. This is the idea that America's foreign policy must be meaningful for the middle class as well. Multiple administration officials, including Secretary of State Blinken and President Biden himself, have mentioned this idea. This is extremely unpopular among the foreign policy and security elite because it seeks to achieve policy goals through foreign policy—such as securing jobs and boosting the middle class—that should inherently be realized through domestic policy. However, this idea is rooted in the recognition that the internationalism that has supported America's foreign actions is not as rock-solid as it once was. "America First," the major theme of Trump's foreign policy, catered exactly to this "foreign commitment fatigue" prevalent in America, and it was a product of Trump's sharp political instincts. Sensing this mood spreading in America, Trump accepted and amplified it. The Biden administration recognizes this mood as something that must somehow be pushed back. However, simply calling for the restoration of internationalism has no persuasiveness at all. Therefore, they aimed for the restoration of internationalism with a logical structure that America's internationalism is meaningful for the middle class as well.

So, what does it mean to apply middle-class foreign policy to Asia, and particularly to China policy? Before that, let's look at what happens when middle-class foreign policy is applied to the Middle East, for example. The Middle East is not a "region of possibility" for the United States. It is a region where recurring problems must be dealt with. Furthermore, the American presence itself in the Middle East is not welcomed, and rather, that very fact is a primary cause of the difficulty in the relationship between the U.S. and the Middle East. Recall that the presence of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia was one of the causes that triggered the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Also, if you ask whether there are reliable allies or partners in the Middle East, the answer is certainly not. In other words, the Middle East is a region of troubled partners where one has no choice but to deal with a group of recurring problems. As the degree of energy dependence on the Middle East, which was already low, continues to decline, involvement in the Middle East has become difficult to justify under the logic of middle-class foreign policy. As if to prove this, the Biden administration is moving forward with a policy shift to lighten its "footprint" in the Middle East.

In contrast, China policy is a policy matter that can be fully justified even under middle-class foreign policy. First and foremost, the challenge from China is obvious. Moreover, the American public is fully aware of this. And it is clear that America's continued involvement in the Asian economy, which is the engine of the world economy, brings benefits to America. Furthermore, and most importantly, American leaders can show the American people that this challenge is not one that America takes on alone. Unlike the Middle East, America is a welcomed presence in Asia. This is an extremely important point at a time when the internationalism supporting America's foreign actions is waning. Regarding China, countries such as Japan, Australia, and India—while their interests do not perfectly overlap with America's—are running alongside the U.S. and generally share its concerns.

Among them, Japan's presence is particularly important. Japan is a reliable democracy and a dependable ally. Japan is constantly worried about America's China policy, but in fact, Japan itself is one of the vital keys supporting America's China policy. Japan must be more conscious of this situation.

*1 The joint letter published in the Washington Post can be confirmed on the newspaper's website, but the linked website established at the same time (www.openletteronuschina.info) no longer exists. This is a move that makes one want to "read between the lines." It may be that even the moderates on China no longer want to publicly disclose that they signed a joint letter stating "China is not an enemy." Incidentally, no one who signed this letter has entered the Biden administration in a major post related to China policy.