[Special Feature: The Future of Free Trade] Is President Trump Really an Outlier?

Since the Trump administration took office in January 2017, the world has been continuously tossed about by President Trump. To be sure, President Trump is not the kind of American president the world has grown accustomed to. The expectation that "once he becomes president, his words and actions from the campaign will settle down, and while he may be unconventional, things might turn out okay" was spectacularly betrayed. Even so, the first year might have been relatively calm. Even the self-confident President Trump may have been overwhelmed by the sheer magnitude of his responsibilities upon actually taking office. His complete lack of Washington experience may also have acted as a slight restraint. When Chief Strategist Stephen Bannon, the ideological pillar of Trumpism, was dismissed last summer, it was taken as evidence that the unconventional messaging that worked during the campaign was recognized as ineffective when it came to the stage of actually bearing the responsibility of governing as president.

Furthermore, only after becoming president might he have realized that the office of the president is not that of an "emperor," but a "president" bound by the Constitution. Entry restrictions from some majority-Muslim countries were halted by the judiciary (though later approved after revisions), and the repeal of Obamacare, a campaign promise, could not be realized despite a Republican majority in Congress. Although there were announcements of withdrawal from the TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership) and the Paris Agreement on climate change, one could view the first year as not a complete turn toward "Trumpism," but rather a selective application of it. Regarding relations with allies, while the president's remarks greatly shook the relationship of trust, the policies did not deviate significantly from the conventional path. The "National Security Strategy" and "National Defense Strategy," key foreign policy and security documents issued between the end of the year and the beginning of the next, were within expectations, even if peppered with Trumpian rhetoric. Focusing on Japan-U.S. relations, the personal relationship between the leaders also played a role, and the "worst-case scenario" imaginable during the election was somehow avoided.

However, entering the second year of the administration, it appears that the tilt toward Trumpism is deepening. The first year may have been a warm-up, but he seems to have gained confidence that he can get by with the "Trump way." Perhaps as a sign that he believes he is fine on his own, he dismissed his second Chief of Staff, John Kelly, and rumors are circulating that he has no intention of naming a successor. The Trump color has also become evident in foreign policy, which had been relatively cautious. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster, appointments endorsed by the foreign policy establishment, were dismissed as the second year began. Furthermore, the position of Secretary of Defense James Mattis, who had quietly prevented the encroachment of Trumpism into defense policy, is said to be insecure. It would not be an exaggeration to say that Secretary Mattis's greatest mission was to protect America from Trumpism. Gary Cohn, the National Economic Council Director who clashed with President Trump over the introduction of punitive tariffs, resigned. The fortresses preventing "Trumpification" have been almost entirely dismantled.

In response to this, Trumpification has also progressed on the policy front. President Trump's behavior at the G7 Charlevoix Summit was, in effect, a declaration that the United States no longer intends to support international orders or norms. The photo uploaded to Instagram by German Chancellor Merkel—showing world leaders surrounding Trump and desperately trying to persuade him—reiterated the impression that the U.S. is withdrawing from maintaining order and norms. Despite desperate persuasion from French President Macron, he also announced withdrawal from the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action), the nuclear deal with Iran. The U.S. also withdrew from the UN Human Rights Council. The relocation of the U.S. Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem and the introduction of unilateral punitive tariffs are further examples. All of these were campaign promises, but the international community's reaction was one of disbelief that he would actually go this far. The U.S.-North Korea summit in June can only be described as "Trump style." President Trump decided on it unilaterally, over the objections of those around him. It took on the appearance of an international reality show co-produced by the U.S. and North Korea.

Why does President Trump go this far? Is it a mere whim, or is there some kind of underlying ideology? To answer this question, it is necessary—though seemingly counterintuitive—to step away from President Trump for a moment and focus on the changes occurring at the root of American society.

If one is only distracted by President Trump's unconventional actions, one tends to miss the phenomena occurring in the undercurrent. By treating President Trump as a heretic, one can neutralize the Trump administration as an exceptional event as long as a "normal administration" is born "after Trump." Furthermore, this kind of thinking seals off the fact that the "pre-Trump" era was the very soil that gave rise to the Trump phenomenon, leading to an idealization of the "pre-Trump" period. Because President Obama was a "common-sense" president, it is particularly easy to drift toward such thinking. The formulaic "theory of America" that "America swings, but the pendulum always swings back" also encourages this line of thought.

But is that really the case? As Rebecca Lissner and Mira Rapp-Hooper point out, "President Trump is not the architect of the Trump phenomenon, but rather its avatar" (Washington Quarterly, Spring 2018). Unless we interpret it with this mindset, we will misjudge the depth of this phenomenon. The leader who succeeds America after Trump will likely not be able to return to pre-Trump America as if nothing had happened. If President Trump is skilled at anything, it is as a destroyer. President Trump has exposed the dark things swirling in the undercurrents of American society (I have discussed this in detail in my article in Leviathan No. 62). President Trump mocked the social pretenses (tatemae) that somehow held America together and effortlessly stimulated people's anxieties and anger. And the people rejoiced. After all, at the time of writing, President Trump's approval rating among Republicans is in the high 80s, reaching 90 percent between June 4 and 17 (according to Gallup; though it is not unusual for support from one's own party to exceed 90 percent).

These figures are a consequence of partisan polarization reaching its extreme, but they are also a sign that by accepting Trump—who was not even originally a Republican—the Republican Party itself is being encroached upon by Trumpism. Using this resonance as a strength, President Trump is overturning established lines one after another.

So, what lies at the core of this resonance? Perhaps it was an impulse to fundamentally upend the conservatism that had been the Republican Party's official stance. Trumpism was more than a denial of the "changing America" symbolized by President Obama; it was also a denial of the conservatism embodied by the Republican Party. One could even say that Trump awakened a "reactionary ideology" that had been pushed aside in the name of conservatism. In the sense that it rejects the principles that have supported America, it is un-American, but it can also be seen as typically American in that such currents have always existed in the undercurrents of American society. President Trump is likely not practicing this self-consciously. Rather, he has given words to the dissatisfaction coiled among those he calls the "forgotten people," and this is creating a resonance in a way no one imagined.

The most common explanation is that the conservatism the Republican Party has championed is supported by three pillars. It is often likened to a stool supported by three legs. For conservatism to gain momentum, these three legs must be stable. The first is limited government, the second is a muscular foreign policy, and the third is traditional values. Although it tends to be somewhat mythologized, President Ronald Reagan is said to have best embodied this "three-legged conservatism." It is likely no coincidence that in recent years, there has been no election where Reagan's name was less prominent than the 2016 presidential election. Among conservatives, it is no exaggeration to say that Reagan is a saint-like figure. However, it was clear that the Trump phenomenon was driven by something different from the "three-legged conservatism" Reagan embodied.

It was a reactionary ideology that is "politically incorrect"—something previously sealed within the neatly packaged conservatism—but which resonates more with the dissatisfaction of the "forgotten people." President Obama highlighted an America that had broken away from "the reactionary," but it cannot be denied that this conversely had the effect of awakening reactionary thought. This reactionary ideology rejected all three legs that supported conservatism.

First, regarding "limited government," they rejected it as an idea that only benefited big business. Even if told that the smaller the government, the better for revitalizing entrepreneurship, such things become irrelevant when one's own life is struggling. Furthermore, their call for limited government stemmed from dissatisfaction with the government's active introduction of policies to rescue minorities (as they perceived it); in that sense, limited government itself was not a pure objective. From the perspective of those barely maintaining middle-class status and facing the "fear of falling" daily, "preferential policies" for minorities highlighted a sense of unfairness. President Trump, from the highest position in the executive branch, unhesitatingly messaged them: "The federal government is for you." This was an idea unrelated to limited government.

Next, regarding a "muscular foreign policy," while they unhesitatingly affirm American nationalism, they could not accept the foreign policy establishment's idea of projecting it to the world and having the U.S. maintain international order and norms. The foreign policy establishment uses sterile terms like "liberal international order" to advocate for America's international role, but when translated into reality, there was a definite dissatisfaction: the feeling that it is their own sons and daughters who are mobilized and sent to the other side of the world to support it, and if the result is a prolonged Afghanistan or Iraq, they do not want to take on that role. It is no coincidence that Trump, as a presidential candidate, took a critical stance on intervention in Iraq. Rather than going out to slay monsters, they would close the country. The wall was a physical expression of such an idea.

And regarding "traditional values," there was previously the official stance of "living correctly as a Christian," with specific issues revolving around abortion and same-sex marriage. However, no matter how one looks at it, President Trump can hardly be called a model Christian. Yet, support for President Trump remains solid among the religious right, a robust support base for the Republican Party. This is because even if President Trump does not pretend to be a person of deep faith, he understands what the religious right wants and ensures he responds to it. Furthermore, the religious right is said to feel particularly strongly that American values are being threatened by "foreign substances" from the outside, and they hold expectations for President Trump as a guardian of a certain "(restorative) American way of life." Concrete expressions of this were the wall to be built on the border with Mexico and the attempt to introduce entry restrictions from some majority-Muslim countries immediately after the administration took office. It cannot be denied that the preservation of this American way of life has always been embedded within "traditional values." However, the discomfort toward "foreign substances" has not been expressed so directly at the presidential level in recent years. In that sense, President Trump's actions during the Charlottesville riots last year could even be said to have had consistency to that extent. It was an expression of discomfort toward change.

Thus, whether President Trump himself was conscious of it or not, traditional conservatism was pushed aside within the Trump world.

While I have discussed the reactionary ideology awakened by President Trump in a negative context, it is also hard to deny that it holds a strong reality for the "forgotten people." President Trump was the only one who responded to their "sense of no exit." It was by no means an economic answer, but it responded to their dissatisfaction that had nowhere else to go. If the Trump phenomenon is supported by such deep-seated impulses of rejection, it is better to think that the America that has supported the post-war international order is facing a major challenge from within.

Looking at President Trump's behavior at the G7 Charlevoix Summit, we cannot expect Trump's America to return to the "standard path" as a guardian of the free trade system. After all, it is reported that during the process of drafting the statement, the U.S. itself expressed discomfort with the phrase "rules-based international order" (New York Times, June 6, 2018). "America First" is deeper than President Trump himself. It is a strong regressive nationalism, relying on an aggressive defensive instinct—a declaration of defiance, stating that like countries that have "free-ridden" on American internationalism, the U.S. will now act based on narrow national interests and immediate gains. Thomas Meaney and Stephen Wertheim argue that Trump's foreign policy should not be seen as a heresy, but rather as part of a lineage of "radical American imperialism" that lies in the undercurrents of American politics, even if no one wants to accept it (New York Times, March 11, 2018). And they claim that, to that extent, it is American. Moreover, Trump supporters understand this intuitively.

Now, how to deal with this kind of America? The world does not yet have the answer.