[Feature: The Future of International Order] Atsuko Higashino: Why is EU Enlargement Not Progressing?

On February 28, 2022, immediately after the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, Ukraine applied for EU membership. On March 3, Georgia and Moldova similarly applied for EU membership. Since 2009, these three countries have participated in the "Eastern Partnership," a cooperation framework between the EU and some former Soviet states*1, and have strengthened relations with the EU by concluding Association Agreements. While these three countries had set future EU membership as an important national goal in recent years, there was a common understanding between the EU and the governments of the three countries that the actual application for membership would be quite far in the future.

This situation was drastically changed by the current war. President Putin's claim that preventing Ukraine's NATO membership was the purpose of Russia's military aggression—regardless of whether that was the true motivation for the war*2—resulted in stripping Ukraine of the goal of NATO membership, even though the feasibility of achieving it was never high to begin with.

For this reason, it can be said that the only remaining means for Ukraine to strengthen its ties with the West is EU membership. Needless to say, NATO, a military alliance, and the EU, which is advancing integration in broad areas such as foreign and security policy and criminal justice cooperation beyond market integration and economic and monetary union, have different functions and roles. In that sense, NATO membership cannot be completely replaced by EU membership. Therefore, the reality is that even if Ukraine were able to join the EU, it would not serve as a guarantee of military security. This was clearly demonstrated when Finland and Sweden, already EU member states, abandoned their long-standing neutral policies and applied for NATO membership in May 2022 after witnessing Russia's invasion of Ukraine; there were concerns that they might be attacked by Russia during the period until membership was realized—that is, at the stage "before" the collective defense clause of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty was applied to the two countries. In the EU, Article 42(7) of the Lisbon Treaty (EU Treaty), the "mutual assistance clause," stipulates collective defense in the event of armed aggression, but that does not mean that the current EU is a military alliance comparable to NATO. This is precisely why many European countries are members of "both" NATO and the EU. However, to reiterate, for Ukraine, which has been effectively deprived of the possibility of NATO membership, EU membership has become the only pursuable goal in strengthening relations with European countries.

Consequently, Ukraine's expectations for the early realization of EU membership have inevitably become extremely high. However, as discussed below, EU membership requires an extremely complex and long-term process*3. While current EU member states generally show a welcoming stance toward Ukraine's application for EU membership, the EU's honest recognition is likely that it is also difficult to significantly change or shorten the EU enlargement process—which has been built over more than 20 years since the end of the Cold War—to suit Ukraine's special circumstances. As will be mentioned later, there is also the aspect that "special treatment" for Ukraine is difficult while there are multiple candidate countries making persistent efforts within an enlargement process that tends to stagnate.

At this point, I would like to confirm the various regulations and processes surrounding EU enlargement. Articles 6 and 49 of the Treaty on European Union stipulate that any European country that respects freedom, democracy, human rights, fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law may apply to join the EU. The EU has experienced six enlargements to date, and the number of member states has increased from the six countries at the time of the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 to 27 countries*4.

When a country wishing to join submits an application, the European Commission sends a "Questionnaire" to the government of that country to investigate its state of preparation for EU membership. The government of the country wishing to join answers this "Questionnaire" and submits it to the European Commission. The European Commission scrutinizes this, determines whether the country can obtain "candidate country status," and makes a recommendation to the European Council. The European Council decides unanimously whether to grant "candidate country status" to the country.

However, obtaining "candidate country status" does not guarantee that the country will definitely achieve EU membership in the future. Countries that have obtained "candidate country status" go through an even longer process from this point to reach the start of formal accession negotiations. First, the European Commission investigates whether the country that has obtained "candidate country status" meets the three conditions for EU membership known as the "Copenhagen criteria" ("political criteria," "economic criteria," and "acceptance of the acquis communautaire (EU law)"). Among these three conditions, the "political criteria" concerning democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and the protection of minorities tend to be particularly emphasized. Based on this investigation into the fulfillment of the criteria, the European Commission determines whether the country that has obtained "candidate country status" can start accession negotiations with the EU and makes a recommendation to the Council. The Council (ultimately the European Council) makes this decision unanimously. Once the start of accession negotiations is decided, the European Commission creates a "negotiation framework" that sets out the guidelines and principles for the candidate country's accession negotiations*5. This "negotiation framework" also needs to be approved by the Council of Ministers of the EU.

After following these already dizzying steps, and through preliminary negotiations called "screening," accession negotiations finally start. Accession negotiations are conducted for each of the 35 policy areas (called "chapters" in EU terminology). When negotiations on all chapters are completed, a "Draft Accession Treaty" is drafted, and after this is approved by the Council, the European Commission, and the European Council, it must be ratified by all member states and candidate countries.

As of the writing of this article (June 2022), three countries—Turkey (started accession negotiations in 2005), Montenegro (2012), and Serbia (2014)—are conducting accession negotiations with the EU. Turkey applied for EU membership in 1987 and is the country that has been kept waiting for membership the longest in the history of European integration. The EU views Turkey's non-recognition of Cyprus, an EU member state, and the country's shift toward authoritarianism and suppression of human rights after the attempted coup in 2016 as problematic, and currently, EU accession negotiations are showing almost no progress. Negotiations with Montenegro are progressing relatively smoothly, but it has been pointed out that Serbia has been strengthening its approach to China and Russia in recent years, and its enthusiasm for EU membership is declining.

Even after spending years to finally draw a decision from the EU to start accession negotiations, there are countries that have still not actually been able to start accession negotiations. Let's look at the examples of North Macedonia (applied for membership in March 2004) and Albania (applied for membership in April 2009)*6. North Macedonia was recognized with "candidate country status" in December 2005, and Albania in June 2014. However, at this point, neither country has been able to enter formal accession negotiations.

First, regarding North Macedonia, the European Commission has issued recommendations almost every year since October 2009 to start accession negotiations with the country. However, because Greece, which had a naming dispute with the country, continued its strong opposition, the start of accession negotiations with the country was shelved for a long time. This "naming dispute" reached a certain resolution with the Prespa Agreement in February 2019*7, and the European Commission recommended the start of accession negotiations with the country again in May 2019. It seemed as though the country's years of effort had finally borne fruit.

Regarding Albania as well, the European Commission had recommended starting accession negotiations with the country in April 2018. In response, the European Council concluded in June of that year that there was room to start accession negotiations in June 2019 if the country progressed with reforms in the judicial field and measures against corruption and organized crime. Although no conclusion was reached at the European Council in June 2019, expectations were high that North Macedonia and Albania would be simultaneously allowed to start formal accession negotiations at the European Council in October of the same year.

However, at the European Council in October 2019, French President Macron strongly opposed the start of accession negotiations with both countries, stating that "the EU needs to first advance its own reforms toward enlargement." Many heads of member states, including Germany and Italy, were said to have intended to declare the start of accession negotiations with both countries at this meeting, and many member states reacted strongly to President Macron's abrupt claim. German Chancellor Merkel persuaded Macron that the EU should respond to North Macedonia's efforts and expectations, mentioning that North Macedonia was even forced to change its country name for EU membership, but Macron is said not to have changed his view. Furthermore, Macron stated at the meeting that Albania's reform efforts were insufficient, and the Netherlands and Denmark were also said to have shown a stance of aligning with Macron's claim*8.

It is said that six hours of heated debate took place over this issue at this European Council, but Macron's will did not waver, and the start of accession negotiations for these two countries was once again postponed. After the European Council ended, European Commission President Juncker and European Council President Tusk criticized Macron without hesitation, stating that the EU's failure to decide on the formal start of accession negotiations with both countries at this European Council was a "historic mistake." It was a European Council that strongly impressed the fact that a rift had opened between EU member states over EU enlargement.

Subsequently, for these two countries, the European Council finally approved the start of accession negotiations in March 2020, and the submission of the "negotiation framework" was also completed in July 2020. However, even so, the situation where both countries cannot start accession negotiations continues. North Macedonia has still not been able to start accession negotiations due to a "language issue" that worsened with Bulgaria. Bulgaria claims that the language used in North Macedonia is part of a Bulgarian dialect and takes the position that it will not approve the entry into accession negotiations with the country unless North Macedonia recognizes this. Regarding Albania, the Council has attached conditions that reforms in the electoral and judicial fields and measures against organized crime and corruption should be advanced "before" the start of formal accession negotiations. In other words, North Macedonia 17 years ago and Albania 8 years ago are still in a state where they have not been able to enter accession negotiations even after obtaining "candidate country status."

As seen, in recent years, it is not easy for candidate countries even to enter accession negotiations. Ursula von der Leyen, who became President of the European Commission in December 2019, called her commission a "geopolitical Commission" and has taken a proactive stance toward the progress of the enlargement process*9. However, as we have seen, it has been extremely difficult to move the enlargement process forward.

Regarding Ukraine's current application for membership, the EU is using maximum ingenuity toward shortening the process. For example, in the case of Albania, after the country applied for membership in April 2009, a 384-page questionnaire was sent from the European Commission to the country's government in December of the same year, and the country's government sent back the answers to the European Commission in April 2010. In the case of Ukraine, on April 8, just over a month after the country's application for membership, European Commission President von der Leyen visited Kyiv with a 40-page questionnaire, and the Ukrainian government sent back the answers 10 days later. Needless to say, this is the shortest record in past EU enlargements.

As a result of scrutinizing the response form from Ukraine, the European Commission recommended to the Council that the country be given "candidate country status." It is expected to be approved at the European Council on June 23-24. However, even if Ukraine is approved as a candidate country at that European Council, Ukraine must go through the long and complex process already described in order to become an EU member state. The EU membership process is extremely burdensome for candidate countries as it is. Ukraine must carry out this enormous task in parallel with the war with Russia, and must also advance reforms in all fields within the country to complete accession negotiations. And the EU will also embark on the unprecedented task of opening its doors to a country in the midst of war and supporting its membership. Political will and ingenuity will be required of both the EU and Ukraine.

*2 As Person and McFaul argue, the view is becoming mainstream in the US and Europe that the issue of Ukraine's NATO membership was merely a pretext for the invasion for Russia, and President Putin's actual aim was to prevent further democratization of Ukraine (and neighboring countries considered to be in Russia's sphere of influence). Robert Person and Michael McFaul, “What Putin Fears Most,” The Journal of Democracy, 22 February 2022.What Putin Fears Most | Journal of Democracy

*8 “France under fire for ‘historic error’ of blocking Balkan EU hopefuls,” Reuters, 18 October 2019,https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-summit-balkans-idUSKBN1WX1CT

Postscript: At the European Council held on June 23 after the completion of this article, it was decided to grant candidate country status to Ukraine and Moldova.