[Special Feature: The Future of International Order] Yoko Hirose: Russia and the "Near Abroad" — Changing Relationships in the Wake of the Ukraine Crisis

On February 24, 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine as a "special military operation," and fighting has continued between Russia and Ukraine ever since. Initially, it seemed that Russia, which surpassed Ukraine in manpower and firepower, would develop the battle to its advantage.

However, the Ukrainian side, which suffered the annexation of Crimea and the crisis in eastern Ukraine in 2014, has seen its government, soldiers, and citizens unite to resist Russia thoroughly with high morale and solidarity. In particular, Ukraine's success in information and cognitive warfare is noteworthy. Furthermore, the rapid and coordinated military support from Western countries has strongly supported Ukraine's continued fighting and counteroffensive.

On the other hand, the Russian side has faced a series of miscalculations and is struggling against Ukraine, which it initially thought it could defeat easily. How do the countries of the former Soviet region (the "near abroad" from Russia's perspective), which Russia considers its sphere of influence (discussed later), view such a Russia? In this article, I would like to point out the possibility that the relationship between Russia and its near abroad is changing due to the Ukraine crisis.

The foundation of Russian diplomacy lies in the concept of a "sphere of influence." For Russia, the most important sphere of influence is the near abroad, and securing this sphere is its top priority. Russian leaders have believed that while there are various diplomatic goals, such as building a multipolar world to prevent the establishment of a unipolar world led by the United States, the basis of all diplomacy lies in firmly maintaining its sphere of influence, and that a grand international strategy can only be established once its own footing is secured.

For Russia, the encroachment of its sphere of influence by the European Union (EU) or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had to be avoided at all costs, and the expansion of NATO, a military alliance, was particularly unacceptable.

Among these, the importance of Ukraine was exceptional for Russia for three reasons. First, the three ethnic groups of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine are East Slavic, ethnically close, and intermarriage is common. In other words, there are many cases where these ethnic groups are mixed even in relative relationships, and they are in a relationship that can be called compatriots. Second is historical identity. In particular, the fact that the cultural ancestors of present-day Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine was the Kievan Rus' with Kyiv as its capital is a point that differs from other former Soviet states, and President Vladimir Putin emphasizes this point in particular. Finally, as NATO's eastward expansion progressed, Ukraine served as a buffer zone between Russia and NATO. Thus, Ukraine's importance to Russia was prominent, but in addition, it seems that President Putin's revisionist historical view of Ukraine, which was fostered in recent years, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic, has turned his obsession with Ukraine into something even greater.

In starting this battle, it is highly likely that Putin initially thought he could capture the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv, in two or three days and that Ukrainians would welcome the Russian invasion. However, the reality Putin faced can be described as a series of miscalculations.

Reflecting on the fact that it effectively surrendered Crimea to Russia without resistance in 2014 and caused turmoil in eastern Ukraine, Ukraine focused on military reform, received training from the U.S. and British militaries, modernized its armaments, and carefully implemented measures against cyberattacks and information warfare. In other words, despite the significant transformation of the Ukrainian military, there are signs that Putin believed he could replicate the successful experience of the Crimean annexation across all of Ukraine. However, the morale of the Ukrainian military is high, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has demonstrated leadership, and the people have stood up to Russia as one. Furthermore, the international community has united firmly in support of Ukraine, and various measures such as economic sanctions are being taken against Russia.

On the other hand, the morale of the Russian military is low, logistics and the chain of command are not functioning well, and because they did not initially assume a long-term war, they are struggling in a situation where everything is under-prepared.

Under these circumstances, a reality is emerging that goes against Russia's initial goals in every way. The following three points are particularly significant.

First, Russia's goal was likely to prevent NATO's eastward expansion, but in response to Russia's recent outrages, Finland and Sweden, which had maintained neutrality for many years, have moved to apply for NATO membership. Although NATO member Turkey currently opposes the accession of these two countries (as of June), it can be said that NATO's "northern expansion" is almost certain.

Second, while promoting the "Russkiy Mir" (Russian World), which shows the solidarity of Russian speakers and Russian Orthodox believers worldwide, Russia aimed to firmly incorporate Ukraine. However, there is no doubt that anti-Russian sentiment among Ukrainians has worsened to the extreme due to Russia's series of battles and atrocities. In such a situation, even if Russia were to militarily suppress Ukraine, I believe that intense backlash from Ukrainians, such as protest actions, would continue indefinitely.

Third, the goal of firmly holding and securing Russia's sphere of influence is also crumbling as the near abroad, which Russia considers most important within its sphere, has begun to hold Russia in contempt. This is because, from Russia's perspective, Ukraine should be a small country with a completely different military scale compared to Russia, but the sight of Russia struggling against Ukraine was shocking to many former Soviet states that had feared Russia as their "elder brother." In other words, the former Soviet states were surprised, thinking, "Was the Russia we feared until now this weak?" and felt that Russia was no longer an object of fear. If that is the case, Russia will no longer be able to control its near abroad, and the former Soviet states will no longer feel the need to defer to Russia. In short, while Russia is unable to extricate itself from the quagmire of the invasion of Ukraine, its sphere of influence is self-destructing.

The situation in which former Soviet states hold Russia in contempt is clearer than fire from their actual actions.

First, let's look at the results of the UN resolutions regarding Russia's invasion of Ukraine (Table).

The March 2 resolution was the "UN General Assembly Emergency Special Session Resolution Condemning Russia," March 24 was the "UN General Assembly Emergency Special Session Resolution on Russia" (a humanitarian resolution emphasizing Russia's responsibility), and April 7 was the "Resolution to Suspend Russia's Membership in the Human Rights Council." The three pro-Western countries (Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova) all voted in favor, and Belarus voted against all of them; others basically tried not to express their will by being absent or abstaining. However, it is interesting that in the April 7 vote, because human rights issues were being questioned, countries with serious human rights issues even within the former Soviet Union turned to vote against it.

This voting behavior at the UN was also seen at the summit of the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization), a Russia-led military alliance, held on May 20. The summit was a meeting with special significance intended to celebrate the 30th anniversary of the signing of the CSTO treaty, but only Belarus stood by Russia regarding the invasion of Ukraine. No wording directly supporting the invasion was included in the joint statement, and statements urging an early ceasefire came from the leaders of Kazakhstan and Armenia. On the other hand, a mood of tension was prominent, with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan making an unusual criticism of Russia regarding its response to the 2020 Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, and Kazakh Foreign Minister Mukhtar Tileuberdi stating that Kazakhstan would not provide Russia with a means to evade sanctions. Among CSTO member states, it is said that there were requests for troop deployments, particularly to Belarus and Kazakhstan, but both countries continue to refuse to deploy troops.

Furthermore, even in Belarus, the only country standing by Russia, internal discord seems to be growing. In particular, many people are participating as volunteers on the Ukrainian side, and the U.S. and UK are continuing their outreach to these volunteers, as they could become a driving force for democratization that might topple the Alexander Lukashenko administration in the future.

On the other hand, Kazakhstan, which was considered as loyal to Russia as Belarus, has maintained a tough stance toward Russia this time, despite receiving CSTO support during the attempted coup in January. For example, it did not hold events on the May 9 Victory Day over Germany. It also banned pro-Russian demonstrations while permitting pro-Ukrainian ones, allowed organizations for humanitarian aid to Ukraine but not for the Donbas, and has called for an international inquiry into Russian war crimes in Bucha.

Additionally, although South Ossetia, an unrecognized state within Georgia, was supposed to be extremely loyal to Russia, anti-Russian tendencies seem to be strengthening, with about 300 South Ossetian soldiers refusing deployment to Ukraine and the incumbent President Anatoly Bibilov, a pro-Russian who was rushing integration with Russia, suffering defeat in the May 8 "presidential" runoff election.

Finally, Azerbaijan's actions exuded an attitude of complete contempt for Russia. Despite the fact that Russian peacekeepers are deployed in an area equivalent to about 60% of Nagorno-Karabakh, which Armenian forces held onto following the 2020 Second Nagorno-Karabakh War with Armenia, the Azerbaijani military attacked the Armenian side in March. Although two Armenian soldiers died in this attack, there was no escalation of fighting, and Russia's Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu appeared only to have spoken by phone with the defense ministers of both Armenia and Azerbaijan. The reason the Azerbaijani side attacked the Armenian forces in the first place was that they no longer viewed Russia as a fearsome entity and held it in complete contempt, but Russia's response, which did not include punishments, seems to have led to further disregard for Russia. Consequently, it is said that Azerbaijan's harassment, including infrastructure cut-offs to the Armenian population, has continued since then. Within Azerbaijan, some are even advocating for the complete recapture of Nagorno-Karabakh while Russia is preoccupied with the invasion of Ukraine.

Furthermore, both Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, which are exporters of oil and natural gas, are reportedly seeking new routes to further bypass Russia. Kazakhstan, in particular, conducts 90% of its oil exports via Russia, making it an urgent task to secure alternative routes.

In this way, while the distancing from Russia by countries that were pro-Russian or neutral has become prominent due to the invasion of Ukraine, the approach toward the West by pro-Western countries has also become more pronounced. The most symbolic event was the Ukrainian President signing the EU membership application document on February 28, followed by Georgia and Moldova also signing application documents in succession on March 3. Since the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, Georgia had been preparing to meet Western standards with the goal of joining the EU in 2024, but it has moved that plan forward. Moldova has also indicated a policy of rushing EU membership, deepening its European-leaning policies since the pro-Western Maia Sandu was elected president two years ago. Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova have originally aimed for EU membership (note that Ukraine and Georgia have also aimed for NATO membership in parallel, while Moldova has never expressed an intention to join NATO), and their stance of trying to counter the Russian threat by moving closer to Europe in response to Russia's military invasion of Ukraine is evident.

Thus, Russia's invasion of Ukraine has had a major impact on the former Soviet states. The fact that CSTO member states, which were previously considered pro-Russian, have begun to distance themselves from Russia is significant, and in inverse proportion, the movement toward the West within the former Soviet Union is prominent.

Russia will likely no longer be able to maintain its position as the elder brother among the former Soviet states as it has in the past, nor enjoy its status as a regional power while playing a part in a multipolar world.

On the other hand, we should consider that the shock brought by the collapse of the Afghan government and the withdrawal of U.S. troops last year is still continuing. In other words, it can be said that Eurasia has been undergoing major tectonic shifts since last year.

While Russia continues to expose its disgrace in this invasion of Ukraine, the United States, while playing a central role in supporting Ukraine, seems to have gained an opportunity to repair relationships with Europe and NATO that were shaken during the Donald Trump era.

At the same time, the decline of Russia's presence is bound to increase China's presence. In the current movement, China is keeping a certain distance from Russia to avoid the sparks of sanctions reaching itself, but it is likely to further deepen economic relations with Russia through exports of Chinese products to Russia and further imports of energy. Another country that has significantly increased its energy purchases from Russia is India. While India is also a key country in the Western Indo-Pacific strategy, it continues to take an independent path in diplomacy, and its future movements are being watched very closely.

As these tectonic shifts in Eurasia continue, former Soviet states seem to be searching for which countries and regions they should cooperate with and what their diplomatic stance should be. Former Soviet states have sought how to behave skillfully between the West and Russia. I have referred to the movements of such countries as the "Politics of the In-Between," but if Russia loses in this invasion of Ukraine, or even if it wins but becomes unable to function as a state due to economic sanctions, the geopolitical map of Eurasia will change drastically. And the countries that have sought the "Politics of the In-Between" may at least be liberated from the pressure of Russia. Currently, the fighting between Russia and Ukraine is still ongoing, and it is impossible to imagine the post-war world. However, there is no doubt that this event will drastically change the attitude of former Soviet states toward Russia and have a major impact on future international relations.