[Special Feature: How to Perceive an "Immigrant Society"] The 2018 Immigration Control Act Amendment: Its Policy Implications

The "Act for Partial Amendment of the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act (hereinafter, the Immigration Control Act)," submitted to the Diet on November 2, 2018, was enacted on December 8 of the same year, promulgated on the 14th of that month, and enforced on April 1, 2019. What significance do these changes to the laws and regulations governing the entry, stay, and employment of foreigners hold for Japanese society? Should this amendment be interpreted as a historic policy shift, as is often claimed? While seeking an answer to this question, this article will outline my personal views on the policy implications of the 2018 Immigration Control Act amendment.

The 2018 Immigration Control Act amendment, which features the creation of the "Specified Skilled Worker" (particularly Type 1) residence status intended to help alleviate Japan's labor shortage, is frequently cited as a "historic shift" in this policy field. Under Type 1 of this residence status, employment of foreigners becomes possible in 14 job categories. Foreigners who pass the relevant skills and Japanese language exams are eligible for acceptance, while those who have completed Technical Intern Training (ii) or higher are exempt from the exams. Among the maximum of 345,000 people to be accepted over five years, the industries with scales exceeding 30,000 people are nursing care (60,000), food service (53,000), construction (40,000), building cleaning (37,000), agriculture (36,500), and food and beverage manufacturing (34,000)—all of which are industrial sectors where labor shortages are considered severe.

Under Type 2 of the "Specified Skilled Worker" status, employment is currently only permitted in construction and the shipbuilding/ship machinery industries. No upper limit is placed on the period of stay, and family stays are permitted under certain conditions. Another difference between Type 1 and Type 2 is that for the former, it is legally mandated that the receiving organization (affiliated organization) or a registered support organization commissioned by said organization provide prescribed support to the foreigner.

Overall, can this recent institutional change be called a "historic shift"? In considering the answer, several reservations are necessary. Let us organize this from three perspectives, including the assessment that it cannot necessarily be called such and the reasons why.

First is the quantitative effect of the 2018 Immigration Control Act amendment. As mentioned earlier, this amendment could increase the number of foreign workers by a maximum of 345,000 over five years. However, that scale cannot be called excessive. I would like to draw attention to the fact that the number of foreign workers increased by approximately 180,000 in the single year from October 2017 to October of the following year. In other words, more than half of the maximum number of workers to be accepted over five years through Type 1 of the "Specified Skilled Worker" status was met in the single year prior to the introduction of this qualification.

Let us assume the number of new arrivals via Specified Skilled Worker status is roughly 70,000 per year on average. This could be an effective means compared to securing labor through other routes. However, the figures on the right are the number of entrants, and since the stay for Type 1 is limited to five years, even if the numbers continue to increase initially, the number of people leaving Japan will also begin to increase as years pass. As a result, from a long-term perspective, the growth rate of foreigners working in Japan may slow down.

Second is the side effect of establishing the "Specified Skilled Worker" status. If acceptance through this residence status becomes mainstream, there is a risk that the inflow of technical interns and international students for employment purposes will dwindle. If such a trend emerges, the introduction of the "Specified Skilled Worker" status will not push up the total number of foreign-born workers as much as expected. However, it is unclear whether this kind of offset effect will occur. Technical interns will serve as a source of supply for "Specified Skilled Worker" status for the time being, and furthermore, if many companies and employers continue to prefer the form of accepting technical interns with whom they already have experience, this situation will not apply.

Third is the limited nature of the impact at the macro level. This is easily understood when considering the scale of Japan's labor market, where the number of employed persons exceeded 66 million as of March 2019. Newly supplied labor from overseas may be biased toward specific industries in specific regions, such as the fishing industry in Hiroshima Prefecture, agriculture in Ibaraki Prefecture, or the food service industry in the Tokyo metropolitan area. Of course, for individual employers who rely on the "Specified Skilled Worker" acceptance quota, it will be utilized as an indispensable scheme for securing human resources. However, its effect on the national economy as a whole will remain localized.

On the other hand, the argument that this amendment to the Immigration Control Act is a major shift is also quite valid. As with the negative view, I would like to explain this from three points.

First, a historic and symbolic meaning can be found in this amendment in that the Japanese government permitted the acceptance of workers from overseas citing labor shortages—that is, in opening the "front door." While it may not be possible to call it a complete break from previous policy directions, the significance of this point should be emphasized. This amendment was a process of "normalizing," if not entirely, Japan's foreign worker policy, which had long been ridiculed as a "side door" by permitting the employment of "trainees," "technical interns," and "third-generation Japanese descendants."

Second, acceptance through "Specified Skilled Worker" status could be expanded in its application in the future. Let us look back at the history of the acceptance of technical interns, which could be called synonymous with foreign workers in Japan. It began in 1993, about a quarter-century ago. When the system was launched, the number of permitted job categories was less than 20, and the scale of acceptance was around several thousand people per year. "Employment" was limited to a maximum of one year (about two years if combined with training).

Currently, 80 job categories (144 types of work) are open to technical interns. Furthermore, employment is permitted for up to five years, including a temporary return home. In the most recent year of 2018, the number of foreigners entering as technical interns reached 150,000. There is no guarantee that the developments observed in technical intern training will not appear specifically for "Specified Skilled Worker" status. Depending on future circumstances, the possibility that this residence status will significantly "transform" cannot be denied.

Third is the issue of the awareness of companies and employers. Not a few people and organizations were stirred by the establishment of the "Specified Skilled Worker" status through the 2018 amendment. According to reports, applications for "Registered Support Organizations" exceeded 1,100 by April 19. Even now, the mood in Japan to welcome workers from abroad with open arms is by no means strong, but recent series of public opinion polls by media outlets regarding the pros and cons of accepting foreign workers show that, in many cases, respondents who answer "in favor" or "somewhat in favor" constitute the majority.

The psychological impact of the public recognition of foreign employment in fields where acceptance had not been openly promoted until now cannot be ignored, even if it cannot be visualized. Actively appointing foreign-born workers is emerging as a given option for more companies and employers than before. It is no longer an irregular or exceptional means of securing human resources. I would like to point this out as one aspect that will likely characterize the Reiwa era.

I personally hold the view that the introduction of Type 1 of the "Specified Skilled Worker" status, the centerpiece of the amended Immigration Control Act, may have produced accompanying institutional by-products. These by-products are: first, the mandatory "support" for Type 1; second, the establishment of Type 2 (alongside Type 1), which allows for family invitation and permanent residency with no limit on the period of stay as long as employment continues; and third, the compilation of the "Comprehensive Measures for Acceptance and Coexistence of Foreign Human Resources," for which a budget of over 20 billion yen was allocated during the same period.

One of the background circumstances for the creation of the "Specified Skilled Worker" status was a series of criticisms against the frequent violations of the Labor Standards Act, poor working environments, and labor exploitation that sometimes drove workers to disappear under the Technical Intern Training Program. Additionally, moral condemnation of the principles of prohibiting family invitation and preventing permanent residency prescribed by this system comes to mind. Both were discussed to varying degrees in Diet deliberations regarding the amendment and were frequently covered by the media. This process can be said to have required that the planning of Japan's foreign worker policy—or what the government denies is "immigration policy"—include measures and rules that can respond to these issues, at least formally.

The primary focus of this amendment was originally supposed to be securing the necessary amount of labor "power" in the necessary workplaces for the necessary period, nothing more and nothing less. However, as a revamped version of the Technical Intern Training Program, which has continued to invite numerous criticisms and doubts from many quarters for a long time, or in establishing a new residence status as an extension of it, if policy planning were to proceed by pushing only the aforementioned "necessity" to the forefront, opposition and friction from the surroundings would not subside, hindering the legislative amendment process. Even if a policy to invite workers from abroad is primarily an expression of the pursuit of national interest, in order to neutralize this kind of self-serving logic even slightly, a certain degree of liberalism and humanity is required in the institutional design. This requirement may have been reflected, as a kind of political sense of balance, in the "support" as an obligation, the "Type 2" status that recognizes the possibility of family invitation and permanent residency albeit with conditions, and the "coexistence" measures accompanied by a 20-billion-yen budget.

This is, of course, nothing more than my speculation and lacks firm evidence. Setting aside the appropriateness of my personal view, what should be measured are the substantive effects these "by-products" may have on Japanese society in the future. Namely, will the support improve the working environment of the individuals concerned? What will be the number of foreigners who obtain Type 2 status and their retention rate in Japan? Will the "Comprehensive Measures" contribute to the progress of coexistence? Ultimately, will it lead the relationship between foreigners and the host Japanese society in a healthy and friendly direction? Whether the 2018 amendment is a "historic shift" will be judged in later years from these perspectives as well.

I do not possess the ability to predict the social consequences of this series of developments surrounding the amendment. Many people around me believe that the situation allows for no optimism at all. Compared to my speculation about the "by-products" of this amendment, this seems like a much more moderate view.