[Feature: The Future of International Order] Roundtable Discussion: How Will the World Change After the Invasion of Ukraine?

This special roundtable discussion was originally scheduled to be moderated by our colleague, Professor Toshihiro Nakayama. However, very sadly, Professor Nakayama passed away suddenly on May 1st. I would like to express my deepest condolences to him once again.

Now, three months have passed since the Russian invasion of Ukraine began on February 24th. Today, I would like to reconsider the significance of that invasion for the international order and look ahead to its future.

First, I would like to start the discussion by looking at the current situation three months after the invasion. I think important points for considering the future are why this situation occurred and what should have been done to prevent this invasion. Mr. Ogushi, as an expert on Russia, what are your thoughts?

Why did Russia carry out such an invasion? As you know, the official war objectives stated by Russia were to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO, to demilitarize Ukraine, and to denazify Ukraine. Additionally, the protection of the so-called People's Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk, and the protection of Russians within Ukraine, can be cited as official war objectives.

Russia's strong obsession with Ukraine is based on Putin's own belief that Russians and Ukrainians are originally culturally close and integral to one another. Therefore, I believe he felt it was unacceptable for Ukraine to join NATO, a military alliance that, from Putin's perspective, is anti-Russian.

Furthermore, demilitarizing Ukraine to ensure it does not turn against Russia is understandable for the time being. However, what is often described as incomprehensible is "denazification."

Since the political change at Maidan [Independence Square in Kyiv] in 2014, it is a fact that nationalistic tendencies have strengthened within Ukraine, whether or not one calls them neo-Nazi. In particular, radical nationalists were active and committed acts of violence when overthrowing the Yanukovych administration.

I visited Kyiv and Donetsk Oblast in March 2014, and at that time, a group of radical nationalist youth known as the Right Sector was being heavily reported on in Russia. They were called "neo-Nazis," and they were active to a considerable extent. However, I believe there was exaggeration in the Russian reporting.

At that time, I asked a Ukrainian expert, "Who exactly is the Right Sector?" Since that person was a pro-Maidan scholar, they said something like, "That's Russian propaganda, don't believe it. They're just football supporters."

At the time, I didn't quite understand the context of the term "football supporters," but intense football supporter groups around the world are like gang groups that follow their teams on away matches and engage in armed conflict with local supporters. It is a fact that they were active during the process in which the Maidan political change became violent.

Furthermore, in the subsequent war in Donbas, they achieved considerable military success against Russia. While they initially had a poor reputation among ordinary Ukrainian citizens because they were violent, they became celebrated as heroes of sorts because of their performance in the war against Russia, and I believe it is a fact that a climate emerged that tolerated their use of violence.

Among them are people called Banderites. Bandera was a Ukrainian nationalist who led the Ukrainian independence movement during World War II and had very strong anti-Semitic and anti-Polish tendencies. These people collaborated in the massacre of Jews when the Nazis entered, and they also massacred Poles. Later, they fought against the Soviet army. It is certain that Banderism still lurks to some extent among today's nationalistic Ukrainians.

Furthermore, there is the Azov Battalion, which fought until the end in Mariupol. These nationalistic people were central when the Ukrainian side recaptured Mariupol in 2014. Therefore, I believe that is likely one of the reasons why Russia carried out what looked like an extermination operation in Mariupol this time.

The Ukrainian side says that when they integrated the Azov Battalion into the national army, they conducted ideological screenings and excluded all those called radical neo-Nazis. However, it is certain that such radical nationalistic tendencies were strengthening within Ukraine before the war. Of course, that does not justify starting a war, and using it as a reason for war is absurd, but the Russian side used it as their justification.

When Russia says "denazification," it means the elimination of those so-called nationalistic people.

We have had an explanation of the invasion's objectives from the Russian side, but Mr. Hosoya, what is the perspective from Europe?

I went to Poland just last week and exchanged views with Polish international political scientists and Russia experts, hearing many valuable opinions. I also visited the Warsaw Rising Museum, which opened eight years ago, and learned about its harrowing history.

The population of Warsaw before the Warsaw Uprising was 1.3 million, but after the uprising, it dropped to 9,000. In other words, 1.29 million people either died or fled. If you ask who slaughtered them, it was the Russian and German armies. First, the Soviet Union attacked from the east under the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and invaded eastern Poland, and later, the Nazi-Soviet war began and Nazi Germany took control.

With the recent siege and attack on Kyiv by Russia, the first thing many Polish people remembered was this experience in Warsaw during World War II. In other words, many people assumed that Kyiv would eventually be thoroughly destroyed like Warsaw. However, Polish people are surprised that it didn't turn out that way. Ukraine resisted more than expected, and Russia's operations have not gone as well as expected.

However, the opinion of Polish researchers was unanimous on one point: "Russia is relentless." In other words, they don't think Putin will easily stop military operations. They expect he will likely attack and destroy Kyiv again.

Traditionally, Russia creates puppet regimes in Poland and Ukraine to make them part of its own sphere of influence. Furthermore, it relentlessly crushes any forces that resist. Behind this, I believe, is the fact that Russia does not view Ukraine or Poland as "states."

President Putin clearly stated that "Ukraine is not a state to begin with," but I consider this to be a 19th-century view of the international order. In other words, an international order is created through the rule of great powers, and the survival of small nations is determined solely by the intentions of those great powers. If a great power says they "may survive," they can; otherwise, they are controlled by military force and a submissive puppet regime is established.

On one hand, there is this 19th-century, great-power-centric view of power politics. On the other hand, in the 20th century, we have protected the norm that even small nations have the right to exist as sovereign states. This is the Covenant of the League of Nations and the basic principle of the UN Charter. The basic foundation of the 20th-century international order was that sovereign states gain the right to exist through the right of self-determination, sovereignty, and the principle of sovereign equality, and that sanctions are imposed through collective security against countries that commit aggression.

Therefore, my view is that we should not look at this war simply as a "war between Russia and Ukraine." Rather, it should be seen as a conflict between a 19th-century, great-power-led view of power politics and the position of defending the liberal international order that developed in the 20th century. Consequently, the view that Ukraine is a puppet of the United States and that this war is a conflict between the U.S. and Russia is a typical trap of the 19th-century worldview.

That is a view of the international order as seen from Russia, and we should not accept that view. Instead, Ukraine has the right to self-determination, is fighting against Russia of its own will, and is seeking the right to exist as a sovereign state. Therefore, the moment one calls it a puppet state of the U.S., they are defending a Putin-like, 19th-century view of the international order.

For this reason, I believe it was correct for Prime Minister Kishida to state the day after the invasion that it was "an act that shakes the very foundations of the international order." In other words, this is not a bilateral war between Russia and Ukraine. It is a conflict over the principles of the international order.

We have heard about how to view this war from a broad perspective. Next, Mr. Mori, please.

I would also like to state two points from a broad perspective. The first is about the order, and the second is about strategy.

The issue regarding the order overlaps with what Mr. Hosoya just said, but I think this Ukraine issue has very sharply highlighted the question of how to respond when a great power emerges that attempts to unilaterally change the "status quo"—in the sense of the current international order—by force.

The significance of Russia's aggression against Ukraine from the perspective of the international order includes, first, the violation of Article 2, Paragraph 4 of the UN Charter, which is the fundamental principle of the post-war international order, and second, the grave violations of international humanitarian law, such as atrocities and mass killings of unarmed civilians in Ukraine. These two will likely be regarded as challenges to the order.

In response to the violation of these fundamental principles supporting the current order, 141 countries voted in favor of the resolution condemning Russia. However, the number of countries imposing sanctions for violations of international law is limited to about 40. Therefore, the reality is that when the international order is broken, only about one-fifth of the world's nations are willing to bear the cost of enforcing the rules against the violating country. This has revealed the reality that the order is sustained by a limited number of liberal democratic states.

In this situation, will Russia, a nuclear-armed state, succeed in making its change of the territorial status quo through inhumane use of force a fait accompli, even while under sanctions? Depending on how this ends, the security environment of countries around the world and the dynamics of international politics may change.

Second, it has become clear that for countries adjacent to China and Russia, the cost of maintaining their own independence and peace is extremely high without an alliance with the United States. As seen in the moves by Finland and Sweden to apply for NATO membership, anxiety is rising considerably. In Taiwan as well, vigilance toward China seems to be higher than ever.

The United States cannot "deter" everything for small and medium-sized countries facing extreme choices: whether to enter a subordinate relationship under a hegemonic power or to fight at great sacrifice to protect their independence while receiving support from the U.S. and its allies. The question is what kind of strategic options can be provided to these vulnerable small and medium-sized nations by countries that profess an order based on free and open rules and find peace and prosperity within it.

I would like to speak from the Chinese perspective. By observing China's actions regarding Russia's invasion of Ukraine, I believe we can understand how China evaluates the existing international order and how it intends to position itself within it. I will present two points.

One is China's perception of the United States. Just before the invasion of Ukraine, China and Russia issued a joint statement proclaiming a "friendship with no limits." The international community was interested in the extent to which China would remain "pro-Russia." In fact, looking at China's words and actions during this period, the axis of its diplomacy is not so much being pro-Russia as it is "countering the U.S."—if not anti-American, then opposing the United States. These three months confirmed that the axis of Chinese diplomacy is its relationship with the U.S.

The other point is that China was calmly observing the actions of the international community. As a Vice-President of the Security Council, China's actions were key to effectively sanctioning Russia, which is in a position to defend the fundamental principles of the post-war international order. During these three months, China has not supported Russia's actions. On the other hand, while taking the position of not aligning with the international community's labeling of Russia's actions as "aggression," not condemning Russia, and not supporting sanctions, China was watching to see exactly how far the international community would go in following the sanctions against Russia.

While it was natural for the U.S. and European countries to move toward sanctions against Russia, China was constantly observing the stance of the Global South, such as Southeast Asia, Africa, and South America. Through this, China gained a certain conviction. In other words, the world is not necessarily one with the U.S. and Europe; there is another vast space between the U.S. and itself.

China, having chosen such actions, can hardly be said to be fulfilling a role in defending the post-war international order. This raises the next question: how does China perceive its own reputation risk? I believe this point will be a major topic when looking ahead to the future of the international order.

I would like to raise three issues from the perspective of the international order and the security order.

One keyword is the return of classical warfare. I also never imagined that in the 21st century, a great power would deploy a large-scale ground operation against a neighboring country with which it shares a border. My motivation for studying security was the 1991 Gulf War; seeing the footage of the multinational force led by the U.S. military unilaterally attacking the Iraqi army left a vivid impression on me that this was the future of warfare.

However, this year's war by Russia gives the impression of watching a poorly made war from the past. Until last year, I thought that modern warfare would involve normalized cyber and information warfare, and that combat involving physical clashes would be decided in a short period. Yet, in reality, a classical and long-term conflict completely different from that is unfolding. This shock is the first point.

The second point is why this war could not be prevented. The Cold War could remain a cold war because the fear of escalation—that a direct war between the two superpowers, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, could destroy humanity through nuclear war—was always present. It was deterred precisely by the fear of nuclear war.

I think Russia's invasion of Ukraine was decided on the assumption that the invasion and occupation would be completed in a short time, and that the U.S. and NATO would be unable to intervene militarily during that period. Russia carefully hinted at the use of nuclear weapons and suggested a third world war while proceeding with the invasion. It also looks like a war that Russia deployed while unilaterally deterring NATO.

In reality, the war has stalled due to the resistance of the Ukrainian military, and NATO countries are supporting Ukraine by providing weapons and information. It is clear that Russia underestimated the consequences of this war. However, it was not possible to include such consequences in Russia's calculations beforehand.

The third point is that we are at a crossroads for the international order. Russia is invading another country while openly ignoring principles such as territorial integrity and respect for sovereignty. This is a blatant violation of the UN Charter. If the international community cannot impose an effective penalty for this act, we will truly return to the world of "Leviathan."

Certainly, Russia's previous goal of preventing NATO expansion has failed, and Finland and Sweden have accelerated their moves to join. Also, Ukraine will likely never return to Russia's sphere of influence. Furthermore, unprecedented economic sanctions have been imposed on Russia. However, even so, three months have passed and we have not yet been able to drive Russia to a complete defeat.

The reason Russia cannot be cornered is that, in addition to the ongoing military stalemate, as Ms. Kamo mentioned, the unity of the international community opposing Russia is not sufficiently solid. China continues to trade, and India not only refuses to align with the international community but is also rushing to purchase energy. Looking at it this way, I feel that the international community does not sufficiently share a sense of mission to impose a penalty for breaking the international order.

The question that the international community does not necessarily share the awareness that the international order is being greatly shaken is undoubtedly an extremely important point when discussing the future of international security and international cooperation systems.

I think you have said something very important. In other words, the fact that the international community has not been able to give Russia a sufficient penalty will lead to future instability in the international order.

What comes to mind is the Manchurian Incident of 1931. When the Manchurian Incident occurred, it was naturally a violation of the Covenant of the League of Nations to a considerable degree, but in the end, the international community and the League Council did not recognize it as an act of aggression. Seeing that, great powers learned, in a sense, that when they take military action, the international community cannot impose sufficient sanctions against it.

Later, in 1935, Italy invaded Ethiopia (Abyssinia). In response, the League of Nations did recognize it as aggression in the Council, but in practice, it imposed almost no sanctions.

Hitler emerged after this. There was a foundation where the international community could not impose sufficient sanctions—that is, when a great power with military force acted, each country thought of its own interests and, economically, could continue its core trade. Militarily, there was a tendency to dislike sacrificing one's own country for the security of another.

In today's terms, the threat of using nuclear weapons ultimately leads to a very cruel question for any country, including the United States: is it worth saving Ukraine even at the cost of a nuclear war?

Therefore, as I mentioned earlier, the war in Ukraine is extremely important, but at the same time, what the international community, including China, learns from watching it and how it affects subsequent principles of action and norms will have even greater significance.

Mr. Hosoya, what are your thoughts on the specific restructuring of the European security system?

The current situation can also be seen as the result of stumbles in creating a stable European security order over the 30 years since the end of the Cold War. At the end of the Cold War, there was an attempt to create a more inclusive security and order that would encompass all of Europe, based on the CSCE (later OSCE: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe), using President Gorbachev's phrase "Common European Home."

Furthermore, with France at the center, there was an attempt for Europe to create a security order independently and autonomously. This centered on the EC and EU. In contrast, with the U.S. and UK at the center, there was an attempt to create a European security order based on the values of liberal democracy with NATO as the axis.

In the end, the U.S.-UK type of security order centered on NATO became the foundation of the post-Cold War order. However, from a European perspective, neither the U.S. nor the UK is a continental European state. Therefore, it can be said that continental Europe ultimately stumbled in independently creating a security order. In other words, France, Germany, and Russia were unable to independently create an inclusive security order.

In a sense, I think the closest thing to that was "Minsk II" in 2015. France, Germany, and Russia took the lead in trying to resolve the Ukraine issue. I believe this was an agreement that made considerable concessions to Russia, but in the end, President Putin himself reached a military decision that undermined it. Of course, Russia criticizes Ukraine for not following the promises.

I believe the key to truly ending the Ukraine war will be for Europe to inclusively and independently construct a stable post-Cold War European security order. Militarily, Russia might win, or it might lose. It might remain in a stalemate. However, apart from the continuation of combat, a stable order in Europe must be created.

This is a paradoxical phenomenon: while the European security order based on NATO, with the U.S. and UK as the axis, is expanding and becoming stronger with the accession of Finland and Sweden, other options are now being lost. Where Russia should have originally joined to create a cooperative security order, it is instead moving toward the establishment of a European security order based on the U.S.-UK-centered NATO that Russia dislikes even more. I believe this will have a massive impact on the international order in Europe for the next 50 or 100 years.

From Russia's perspective, the objectives of the war have already failed grandly, but why did Russia have to make this choice now? What was Russia's own view of the international order? Mr. Ogushi, what do you think?

Mr. Jimbo said he didn't think a classical war would become this large-scale, and I think Russia also initially intended to end it with a short-term decisive battle. However, it didn't go as planned.

Why is this? It's because protecting Donbas and keeping Ukraine out of NATO are fundamentally contradictory. This is speculation, but in Putin's decision-making process, the Ukrainian military seemed to be strengthening its offensive, so I think he was pleaded with by the People's Republics. However, if he sent troops saying "we will only protect the Donbas region" and took only Donetsk and Luhansk, it is obvious that Ukraine would shift further to the right and become more pro-NATO.

Therefore, it was inherently difficult to reconcile protecting these People's Republics with keeping Ukraine out of NATO, so he likely decided that there was no choice but to overthrow the regime. However, there seems to have been considerable conflict even within the military between the full-scale invasion faction and the Donbas-limited faction, and in the end, the full-scale invasion faction won.

However, it was almost clear even before starting that they lacked the troops to completely occupy Ukraine, so there was likely a delusion that they could take Kyiv quickly with a small force. That didn't go as planned, and the current situation is that it is gradually becoming something closer to the Donbas-limited plan.

Before the war, I think Russia's plan was to make Ukraine accept Minsk II, push Donbas onto Ukraine to federalize it, and since Donetsk and Luhansk would have veto power, prevent it from joining NATO. But Ukraine had no intention of accepting this, and in fact, the People's Republics side also had no intention of accepting it. Since it was an agreement that neither party had any intention of accepting, I think it was extremely difficult to make them swallow it.

Therefore, even if the subsequent order is created by Germany, France, and Russia, I think it will likely be difficult to implement unless it is something the parties involved can accept.

Furthermore, from Russia's perspective, NATO expansion looks like the containment of Russia, but in reality, Eastern European countries want to join because they are afraid of Russia. When the U.S. hesitantly lets them in because they have no choice, Russia perceives it as "this is containment." I think there was a kind of unfortunate chain of events.

Even if there had been a choice other than NATO expansion, I feel it would likely have been difficult unless it was something the Eastern European countries involved could accept. That makes it sound like "the war was bound to happen," but...

As a result, they went ahead with the war, and there is no doubt that this has become a massive own goal for Russia. For the current international order, the fact that Russia is not succeeding despite doing all this is probably still the better outcome. If Russia were to profit from this in some sense, as Mr. Hosoya said, other countries might start imitating them.

On the other hand, as mentioned, there is surprisingly no support outside of the so-called advanced nations. Looking at it from that perspective, no matter how this war ends, the rift between the West and other countries has become quite clear through this war and will likely remain for the time being.

Regarding the 19th-century international order that Mr. Hosoya mentioned, I feel that whether it was the Soviet Union or Russia, their view of order has been consistently 19th-century. During the Soviet era, Eastern European countries were within their sphere of influence, which is why they suppressed the Hungarian Uprising and sent troops into Czechoslovakia. I feel that the invasion of Ukraine is an extension of that same thinking. When the Cold War ended, it looked as if the Western order had covered the entire world, but in reality, the Russian side's view of order had hardly changed. I think there is also a part where this distortion exploded at this stage.

Speaking from the Chinese perspective, when considering the future of the international order, the perspective of what China is learning through the invasion of Ukraine will be important.

One thing China confirmed once again is, as I mentioned earlier, that the international community is not monolithic regarding sanctions against Russia. If we look at Southeast Asia, the fact that no one except Singapore has agreed to the sanctions means that, from China's perspective, a world of various possibilities is opening up.

Another thing is that I feel China itself might be learning how to use nuclear weapons through Russia's way of fighting. In the end, from China's perspective, it might look as if Russia's nuclear weapons are effectively deterring intervention by U.S. and NATO ground forces. I think how China uses nuclear weapons is a point that the international community, including Japan, should reconfirm now.

On the other hand, what about the United States?

Regarding the nature of U.S. military support in response to Ukraine this time, I think one important theme will be what the U.S. strategy for defending the status quo will look like in the "post-primacy" era.

To put it somewhat exaggeratedly, the U.S. approach to defending the status quo during the era of primacy (the era of preeminent dominance) was for the U.S. to step out as the world's policeman wherever there was a rule violation, impose necessary economic sanctions on the violating country, and in some cases, use force to sanction them. I think this was the image of the U.S. from the elder Bush to the younger Bush.

Under U.S. leaders in the "post-primacy" era—Obama, Trump, and Biden—it appears, to put it somewhat extremely, that they are making judgments based on the idea of dividing foreign countries into two groups and changing how they are protected. In other words, they seem to respond with the "Ukraine model" idea: directly defending allies important to U.S. peace and prosperity, and responding to other countries with a combination of military aid and economic sanctions against the aggressor. In short, the U.S. is dividing allies from others based on the question of for whom it will shed blood.

However, regarding Taiwan, which is attracting attention, although it is not a so-called ally, it is becoming positioned like West Berlin during the Cold War. National Security Advisor Sullivan explained that "because there is the Taiwan Relations Act, Taiwan is different from Ukraine." President Biden has also clearly stated that if Taiwan is attacked by China, the U.S. will defend Taiwan. In other words, even if it is not an ally, if it is a partner the U.S. deems vitally important, the U.S. will defend it directly even without an alliance.

I would like to point out two implications of what the emergence of this "post-primacy" America means for foreign countries.

One is that countries in the West that want to protect the current order need to change their awareness that the U.S. is the primary sustainer of the order, realize they must protect the order at their own cost, and actively take on the roles and responsibilities as sustainers of a rule-based order.

The other is that the fact that the U.S. is stopping being the "world's policeman" does not immediately mean it is abandoning its allies, so there is no need to overreact. The will to protect allies from aggressors was strong even for Obama. Reading Obama's memoirs, his judgment when responding to the Ukraine issue in 2014 was the cold assessment that Ukraine was not a country the U.S. could protect through direct intervention.

If it were to come to a direct fight with Russia over Ukraine, comparing the importance of Ukraine to Russia versus its importance to the U.S., it is naturally higher for Russia. Therefore, in a game of chicken through an escalation battle, the U.S. would be the one to eventually back down, so he judged that they should not get involved in a way that would invite a spiral of escalation from the start. He responded with extremely Obama-like, scholarly, and logical criteria.

On the other hand, it is known that immediately after the moves surrounding the annexation of Crimea emerged, Obama told his aides, "We must make Putin clearly understand that if he touches NATO countries, the U.S. will go to war." In short, just because the U.S. does not choose the option of direct intervention to defend Ukraine does not mean its defense commitment to its allies is wavering. Trump had some quite precarious moments, but the recognition of defending allies even at the risk of war has been passed down to President Biden.

When the U.S. exercises self-restraint in the use of force, extreme reactions immediately appear, such as saying the U.S. is finished because it is turning inward, but such impressionistic or emotional arguments lead to an inaccurate understanding of the U.S. and can cause overreaction.

I think Biden's decision not to intervene militarily directly in Ukraine this time was largely due to the possibility of it leading to nuclear war and the fact that a consensus to fight Russia had not been formed among NATO countries. Also, looking at U.S. public opinion, in response to the question of whether they could fight even at the risk of nuclear war, about 60% answered that they should not fight. I think these three factors are stopping direct U.S. military intervention.

Precisely because it is an administration that considers the risk of nuclear war, domestic public opinion, and allies, the brakes are applied there. I understand there is a slight anxiety toward a U.S. that tries to respond with a strong awareness of domestic public opinion, but it is also important to understand that they do not decide their response based solely on trends in domestic public opinion.

I believe what Professor Hosoya mentioned regarding the European security framework over the 30 years since the Cold War is extremely important.

Europe has also tried many times to determine what kind of order could transition stably and how Russia should be handled within that. During that time, there were attempts to make NATO compatible with Russia's coexistence, and periods where intermediate solutions were strengthened, such as enhancing the EU's strategic autonomy to build a European order. However, I feel we have entered an era where it is difficult to define institutions in a unified way.

From late March to early April, there was a period when Ukraine was open to accepting neutrality. In other words, they took a negotiating position that they could start discussions from the premise that there would be no future NATO membership, just as Russia demanded.

And while there was certainly a period of seeking multilateral security different from NATO, since the discovery of the Bucha massacre and the failure of negotiations in Turkey, talk of those unique security models has vanished. It is difficult to establish a new multilateral "security guarantee" for Ukraine involving Western countries and Russia.

The remaining path is one where the order is defined in reverse, based on how the specific battle situation transitions and how that leads to the end of the conflict.

Within that, there is a swing between the so-called Versailles system type and the Munich type. The Versailles type involves making Russia decisively admit defeat, return all seized land, restore Ukrainian sovereignty, and imposing economic penalties including reparations. But considering the subsequent analogy, can we really build a medium-to-long-term relationship between Europe and Russia that way? I believe the nightmare of the rise of Nazi Germany persists within Europe.

The other is the Munich type, but recognizing the Donbas evokes the recognition of the Sudetenland cession during the Munich Agreement. In other words, the history of failing by compromising with the Nazis is ingrained in Europe as a kind of somatic knowledge. Therefore, I feel there is quite strong resistance to the idea of settling things with the Donbas.

In fact, considering that the possibility of a re-invasion of Kyiv is being talked about as plausible after Russia gained a military advantage in the Donbas, I feel it is very difficult to define a ceasefire, and the landing point for the European side supporting it is also difficult. This is likely why the outlook is that fighting will continue until the end of this year.

Finally, there is anxiety about whether the world order in a broad sense will truly continue in the future. Expectations for the UN Security Council were not high to begin with. However, there are many international organizations created over the past 10 or 20 years that involved Russia in an inclusive manner.

The G20, APEC in Asia, and the East Asia Summit were all intended for cooperation as leader-level multilateral frameworks. However, it is unimaginable for a leader who "fundamentally shakes the international order" to appear in a meeting hall and shake hands.

If that is the case, is it necessary to create new frameworks or adopt the idea of temporarily suspending the eligibility of countries that are parties to a conflict? I haven't reached a judgment on this yet, but I think it is an important point of discussion.

I was thinking exactly the same thing regarding the analogy between the Donbas and the Sudetenland that Professor Jimbo mentioned. This is very similar to the Munich era; at Munich, the intentions of Czechoslovakia were ignored, and the great powers reached an agreement and tried to impose it, which ultimately collapsed. While the logic of the collapse is different, as Professor Ogushi said, Russia and the Soviet Union have consistently held a concept of spheres of influence, and I completely agree that they have a 19th-century view of order.

I think the idea that liberalism, democracy, and capitalism would spread throughout the world, as envisioned after the Cold War, was an illusion. The countries and regions where these can be shared are very limited, and when considering the Global South, there is the cold reality that the forces currently cooperating with the West to criticize Russia are not necessarily the majority in the international community.

This includes Germany, but there is a mindset in each country that if they act under their own national interests, they may want to prioritize trade in natural resources with Russia, and the cost of sacrificing that is too great. Or, there may be intentions to avoid a full-scale confrontation with Russia over the issue of Ukraine, which is not directly related to their own national interests.

I believe that at the root of peace and order in Europe and Asia after the Cold War, there has been the difficult question of whether there are "legitimate interests" that should be recognized for Russia and China, and if so, what they are. As long as China and Russia are addressing security issues through diplomacy, a dialogue on "what are legitimate interests" is possible. However, when they stop negotiating and begin unilateral changes to the status quo or coercion of other countries driven by unilateralist great-power chauvinism, dialogue and negotiation become impossible. I think the relationship between Russia/China and Western countries since 2014 can be seen as following such a process.

In international politics, there are the terms "order" and "justice." One is the state activity that emphasizes order, which Professor Hosoya called a 19th-century view of order—prioritizing "equilibrium" backed by an understanding as a greatest common denominator that satisfies the security of major powers to some extent. It is an equilibrium built on sharing minimum rules, but it has a certain value-neutral aspect.

The other is the state activity that emphasizes justice, prioritizing liberal value norms that respect individual spiritual freedom and the like. This is the idea that if each country accepts liberal value norms by its own choice, other countries should respect that, and that this ultimately contributes to the development and progress of humanity; it has a universalist aspect.

In order to skillfully manage the conflict of interests between states with different political systems, these two ideas must be well-balanced. However, I believe the essence of the major trend in international relations over the last decade lies in the dynamics of international politics where, as China and Russia under leaders obsessed with unilateralist great-power chauvinism repeat actions to change the status quo and trample on liberal value norms, the justice-oriented mindset has strengthened in Western countries, to which China and Russia have reacted further. In Ukraine, this problem manifests as the question of where the exit for the war should be set, making the nature of negotiations extremely difficult.

Ultimately, the "legitimate interests" that countries that do not agree on a "legitimate status quo" might be able to recognize in each other are not determined objectively, but rather change significantly based on whether trust can be built through diplomatic processes and interactions. I believe that in the so-called post-Cold War period, the United States made considerable efforts to build a relationship of trust with China and Russia, such as supporting China's accession to the WTO and realizing Russia's entry into the G8, although there were various inadequacies. And the voices criticizing such efforts were an overwhelming minority.

However, the leaders of China and Russia pursued policies and actions based on unilateralism while superficially advocating international cooperation. As a result, they met with backlash from other countries, and the legitimacy of the interests they considered "legitimate" and tried to make the international community recognize has steadily declined.

Furthermore, there is another major problem with regional power leaders trying to realize their interests through military force. That is the "dictator risk," where a dictator commits an act of aggression based on their own beliefs, and I think that has become a reality in Ukraine this time.

In negotiations with a dictator, liberal value norms do not function as a common ground for conflict resolution, so provisional agreements reached as a result of power struggles become extremely unreliable. If that is the case, the idea that the regime itself must change "in the medium to long term" will inevitably emerge. Of course, this does not mean wishing for turmoil or chaos, but rather applying extensive sanctions while pushing back against the aggression toward Russia, which I believe will become a long-term containment. A major challenge for Western countries is what kind of thinking they should base their relationships on with countries that do not share the same ideas.

In this international situation of increasing uncertainty, what role should Japan play?

The joint statement after the Japan-U.S. summit on May 23rd included the sentence: "Regardless of the ongoing crisis in Europe, the two leaders reaffirmed that the Indo-Pacific is a vital region for global peace, security, and prosperity, and faces increasing strategic challenges to the rules-based international order." This is an extremely important point. It is a vital message for us to strongly recognize that this war in Ukraine is not just a problem happening in Europe, and then consider what kind of role Japan should play and within what kind of order the future East Asian order should exist.

More than a century ago in 1905, Józef Piłsudski, a leader of the Polish independence movement then under Russian rule, came to Japan during the Russo-Japanese War and requested Japan's support for Polish independence. What this means is that the situation in Europe and the situation in Asia have been linked since a century ago.

An analogy I thought of regarding this was how, during Finnish Prime Minister Marin's recent visit to Japan, widespread sympathy emerged in Japan for Finland's intention to join NATO and her criticism of Russia in strong terms. I believe it is very important for Japan to have the perspective that European issues and Asian issues are linked as matters concerning the international order as a whole.

Another point is that, while saying that, I believe Japan has actively engaged in autonomous actions over the past decade, such as the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" concept and order concepts where the U.S. is not a member, like the CPTPP (TPP11), taking the initiative to map out an order. We are seeing a certain level of sympathy toward Japan, which has demonstrated principles of action different from the U.S. toward the Global South. I think Japan needs to be aware that such autonomous diplomatic actions possess very great value.

Finally—and this actually contradicts what I just said—considering that the international community operates on power politics, Japan must ultimately rely on the Japan-U.S. alliance and act with deterrence and a sufficient logic of power against China and Russia; otherwise, it will end up being buried in the power games of great powers.

Therefore, Japan must possess sufficient national strength and strengthen deterrence based on the Japan-U.S. alliance. In other words, balancing the seemingly contradictory vectors of autonomous action in diplomacy and the strengthening of deterrence centered on the Japan-U.S. alliance will continue to be the key for Japanese diplomacy.

Regarding what role Japan should play, I believe the foundation should be the construction and promotion of an international order based on rules that we believe will guarantee global and regional peace and development.

The vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific is about spreading a network of cooperation and ensuring openness so that regional countries do not have to lean exclusively toward China. Within that, the major goal is to create an environment where each country can develop while its free will and independence are respected. While it is common in rhetoric to emphasize the former—the construction, promotion, and dissemination of a free and open rules-based order—and downplay the latter—preventing Chinese hegemony or regional dominance—I believe these are essentially two sides of the same coin.

Japan is currently advancing various regional initiatives in Asia together with the U.S., including the Quad. From the perspective of preventing war, strengthening a deterrence system centered on the Japan-U.S. alliance or the trilateral Japan-U.S.-Australia relationship in terms of security and military affairs is indispensable.

In relation to the increase in Japan's defense spending, there is an opinion that the figure of 2% of GDP should not come first, and I think that has some merit, but I believe these kinds of figures carry a political message. An international environment is already before us where Japan must go beyond homeland defense, play a greater role than ever in global security, deter the use of force, and serve as part of the status quo forces opposing changes to the status quo. We are required to clearly demonstrate through actions that we are taking on the role of a provider of security rather than just a beneficiary. Simply put, the measures necessary to guarantee peace are now changing significantly, and showing Japan's commitment to defending the status quo in units of the next 5, 10, and 15 years—not just with words but with concrete actions—will lead to peace and stability.

I believe a phase has come where Japanese pacifism must be redefined in a way that embeds internationalism, in the sense of protecting peace while cooperating with other regional countries. I think the recognition that the era when we could leave defense and security to the U.S. and avoid taking risks ourselves has already passed is a major premise for Japan to survive while protecting its freedom and independence.

I don't have much of a fixed opinion on what role Japan should play. In Japan, there seem to be people saying various things to Ukraine, like "fight harder" or "you should surrender," but specific faces come to my mind.

I have many friends there, and when I see posts on social media saying they made Molotov cocktails, I just think, "Please don't die." At the same time, since the person has made the resolve to fight, it is very presumptuous of me to say anything about it. But then I think about what I would feel if I said "good luck" and they died, and I lose my words and become unable to say anything.

Regarding the exit for the war, I have a feeling that the ownership of the Donbas and Crimea will only be decided militarily.

First, regarding the Donbas, Ukrainian national sentiment is to "take it back," but I think it would be a huge problem if they actually took it back. In other words, the local residents don't have the slightest desire to return to the Ukrainian government. Rather, the voices of the residents are, "How could you put us through such a terrible ordeal?"

Since the Ukrainian regular army entered in 2014, their way of fighting was quite one-sided, which led to the Donbas region seeking help from Russia and the Russian regular army entering. If it were taken back, a massive number of voters who are extremely critical of the current Ukrainian government would be born.

To counter this, the Ukrainian government would also likely suppress them with force. So, I think there is no choice but to take other methods, such as granting independence under international monitoring, but ultimately I feel it will only be decided by the outcome of the war.

Crimea is even more difficult. Since Russia annexed Crimea and made it "domestic," if the Ukrainian army were to enter, it would be a case of invading Russian territory from Russia's perspective. The Russian government has said many times that it "will not use nuclear weapons outside of Russia," but an intrusion into Crimea would, by Russian logic, mean entering the country, so it would become a target for nuclear deterrence. Then, if Ukraine were to take back Crimea in some form, it would be an even more difficult story than the Donbas.

In Crimea as well, setting aside the Crimean Tatars, it's not as if the local residents support the Ukrainian government. Rather, the annexation of Crimea happened because the political leaders at the time in 2014 asked Putin to "annex us." Ukraine probably cannot concede, but taking it back would be a major issue, so ultimately I think it will only be resolved by military force.

What does that mean for the international order in a broad sense? My assessment is that it will ultimately only become a world of the law of the jungle. Whether the Russian side pushes in to some extent or Ukraine ends up pushing back, a massive amount of weapons has gone to Ukraine, so I think a mini-military power will likely be born in that place. There is also the risk that people with weapons could become terrorists.

Regardless of which side wins, there is a very high possibility that making others recognize victory through force will become the standard, so I feel there aren't many happy elements.

What options does Japan have within a fluctuating international order? In considering this, there is no doubt that diplomacy toward China is one of the important points of discussion. Over the 30 years since the end of the Cold War, China has achieved dramatic economic growth, led the global economy, and increased its presence as a major power. On the other hand, China did not choose to follow the path of democratic politics alongside economic growth, as had been expected. Furthermore, while China chose to actively participate in the global economy, including joining the WTO, to achieve its own economic growth, it grew not as a state oriented toward international cooperation through economic interdependence as expected, but as a state that believes the international community operates on power politics. The expectations held for China 30 years ago were far too optimistic.

Even if we are confronted with this reality, we must think about how to face China. How can we discipline China, which believes in power politics, within the rules of the existing law-based, free, and open international order? There are many international cooperation frameworks that Japan is currently involved in: TPP, RCEP, IPEF, the Quad, and AUKUS (U.S.-U.K.-Australia security cooperation). Numerous frameworks ranging from economic/trade frameworks to military security frameworks are unfolding—either with China as a member or to counter China—and the fact that Japan is a member of all of them likely means that Japan has the conditions to draw a blueprint for an international order with China in view.

How Japan involves itself in the formation of the international order that will progress from here seems to be a matter of how we position China within the international order we have chosen. That attempt will likely be long and painful, but we must maintain such a strong will.

Originally, I focus my research on Japan's role in international security, but I have fallen into a situation where it is difficult to say anything particularly sharp. I would like to talk about a few points that concern me.

One is that awareness of the solidarity of the U.S.-European alliance through the Ukraine war has increased in Japan, and a national consensus on increasing defense spending is higher than ever before. According to reports, 80% of people are in favor, a level of excitement unimaginable in the past, and the discussion has become almost inseparable from support for the alliance with the United States.

However, despite this trend of strengthening the so-called transatlantic and transpacific relationships, the United States, which should be the source of centripetal force, is not very proactive about intervention. I think this is quite a dilemma.

Of course, President Biden personally makes commitments to protect NATO institutionally or toward Taiwan and tries to hold things together, but I don't think the posture to respond to the changes in the balance of power currently occurring is that well-developed.

If that is the case, unless allies gain more resilient strength and the power to restore things when something happens, even the alliance beyond that will not function well. As Professor Mori said, I think it is very important for allies to work hard.

Another point relates to what Professor Hosoya said; I think Japan's strategy was characterized by jumping into various countries without making its colors too clear regarding values, while maintaining its diplomatic and security axis with the United States.

As a result, many options were born, and there was room for the idea of complicating China-Russia relations by advancing relations with Russia to a certain extent, and while the U.S. was hesitating on free trade principles, Japan managed to balance Japan-U.S. and Japan-China relations while advocating for an Indo-Pacific order. That posture also served as the foundation for creating ideals that involved much of the Global South.

However, the places where Japan was increasing its own interests in various ways and saying "I can talk to them"—such as Russia, China, Turkey, and even Myanmar—have become regions with far too much risk.

I believe the judgment to make one's colors clear and clarify Japan's position toward the international order in certain situations is very important, but on the other hand, that naturally constrains Japan's strategic flexibility. Before we knew it, while making China the main focus of threat and competition, Japan has fallen into a situation where it is forced to confront North Korea and Russia on three fronts, having to allocate vast resources to each, leaving little room to move.

As for how to break out of this, there is very little Japan can achieve alone, and various forms of cooperation with like-minded states are necessary. We have to endure with the Quad and link India in the medium to long term. I think we have no choice but to build up frameworks like AUKUS, or Japan-U.S.-Australia, Japan-Australia, and Japan-ASEAN, giving each a strategic meaning and letting them coexist.

Once the board is set, as Professor Kamo said, a foundation can be created to seek a stable relationship by showing China the room for shared interests and cooperation. I think the reality is that Japan is in an extremely harsh world, so I believe the starting point is first to resolve to fight through that competition.

That was a wonderful summary. I believe we had a very useful discussion today regarding the future of the international order. Thank you all very much.