[Feature: On "On the Imperial Household"] Yukichi Fukuzawa and Shinzo Koizumi in the Postwar Intellectual Space: With Reference to "On the Imperial Household"

Image: Yukichi Fukuzawa (left), Shinzo Koizumi (right)

One of the intellectual spaces in which the symbolic Emperor has been discussed since the war is the community of constitutional law. This is a space where work is done to consistently explain that the Emperor's various activities are those of a "symbol" (Article 1) as defined in the Constitution of Japan. Because this space involves the method of legal interpretation unique to jurisprudence, it was almost exclusively occupied by constitutional scholars. It could be said to be a discussion leaning more toward "technique" than "thought." Constitutional scholars tend to lean forward into issues of legal interpretation, and while there is an abstract consensus on the Emperor's non-political nature, the substantive part of "how the Emperor should face the people" was left to the "preferences" of individual commentators. Amidst the confusion of defeat, it became necessary to speak of an image of the Emperor as a non-political symbol different from the pre-war and wartime periods, and the perspective of the discussion was exclusively critical (negative). Partly because Article 4, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution of Japan stipulates that "The Emperor shall perform only such acts in matters of state as are provided for in this Constitution and he shall not have powers related to government," commentators who preferred to think negatively about the Emperor's existence itself criticized even so-called "messages" (okotoba) as acts that were constitutionally questionable.

The other is an intellectual space that, while taking the Constitution of Japan as its starting point, is not bound by the technical method of legal interpretation, but speaks of the nature of the symbolic Emperor as a political and social (or historical and cultural) concern that more broadly questions the relationship between Japan, the Japanese people, and the Emperor and the Imperial Family. In this intellectual space, there are virtually no barriers to entry, and regardless of the genre to which the commentator belongs, their envisioned image of the Emperor has been spoken of directly. This space includes Tetsuro Watsuji, who argued for the immutability of the national polity by deliberately focusing on the symbol and clashed fiercely with constitutional scholar Soichi Sasaki; Sokichi Tsuda, who argued for the consistency between the Emperor as a symbol and democracy; Shinzo Koizumi, who found the essence of the symbolic Emperor in the thought of Yukichi Fukuzawa; and Yukio Mishima, who resisted the Emperor as a symbol moving toward an "open Imperial Family."

Postwar Japan started from the negation of pre-war and wartime Japan, and the "Emperor (system)" was placed at the forefront of that. The fact that political powers were concentrated in the Emperor under the Meiji Constitution was negated, and he was replaced by a non-political existence called a "symbol." The draft constitution (Matsumoto Draft) prepared under the direction of Minister of State Joji Matsumoto, Koizumi's brother-in-law, was not accepted by GHQ because it did not change the basic principle of the Constitution of the Empire of Japan that the Emperor combines in himself the rights of sovereignty. The condition for the further continuation of history, which has been passed down continuously in Japanese history, was the "Emperor as a symbol" included in the GHQ draft.

The fact that Marxists, who were thoroughly suppressed before the war as dangerous elements seeking to subvert the state system, flourished in postwar discourse is a major factor in the trend of negating the past system, but many intellectuals without commitment to Marxism were also sympathetic to this trend. The Emperor system was understood in connection with "past mistakes" that became objects of reflection following the defeat. Masao Maruyama, author of "The Logic and Psychology of Ultra-Nationalism," was a representative figure. The Emperor system, which was able to survive by being written as a "symbol" in the Constitution of Japan, appeared to many intellectuals only as an object of limitation and restraint.

The majority of constitutional law scholars held a similar stance, and their work became to interpret the provisions regarding the Emperor in the Constitution of Japan more strictly so that the Emperor, deprived of political power, would not regain it, to understand the Emperor's activities with restraint, and to watch whether related provisions or factual activities created inconsistencies with that non-political nature. Criticizing even the non-political aspects of the Emperor became a mannerism for gaining influence in discourse, and such mannerisms became the platform of this space.

Shinzo Koizumi, known as a leader in the critique of Marxism, was able to discuss the symbolic Emperor from a free standpoint in this suffocating intellectual space during the late 1940s and 1950s, without being bound by such platforms. In the postwar intellectual space, where people could only think negatively about the Emperor's existence and role due to the reaction to the defeat, it was Shinzo Koizumi who expected a more important role in the spiritual aspect—facing Japan and the Japanese people head-on—precisely because the Emperor was positioned as a non-political existence called a "symbol." It is no exaggeration to say that this was possible because he stood on a firm philosophical foundation as a leading authority on Yukichi Fukuzawa research and as one who inherited that thought at Keio University. As in any of his arguments, Koizumi never "pandered to influential discourse."

After the Matsumoto Draft failed, GHQ created its own draft constitution and required the Japanese government to follow it. Douglas MacArthur issued a memorandum and ordered the Government Section of General Headquarters of the Allied Powers to draft the Constitution of Japan. This was in early February 1946, and the GHQ draft was prepared by the middle of that month. MacArthur's presentation did not include the word "symbol," but stated, "The Emperor is at the head of the state. His succession is hereditary. His duties and powers will be exercised in accordance with the Constitution and responsive to the basic will of the people as provided therein." However, it has been pointed out that from confidential telegrams sent by MacArthur at the time, the "Emperor as a symbol" was already in his mind at this point.

The ones in charge of the "Emperor" chapter in the Government Section were junior officers George Nelson and Richard Poole. It is said they were conscious of the British Crown. One source is said to be the preamble of the 1931 "Statute of Westminster," which established the formation of the British Commonwealth, and the other was the description regarding the existence of the King as a "symbol" in Walter Bagehot's "The English Constitution." Both express the Crown as a "symbol" or state that it is possible to exist as a "symbol." The former was directed toward the formation of a federation among independent states for Commonwealth integration, but the latter directly discusses the relationship between the King and the people.

In Fukuzawa's "On the Imperial Household," published in 1882, the mention of Bagehot is limited to the section on "Imperial Household Finances," but it is easy to understand that Bagehot's description of the significance of the Crown runs through "On the Imperial Household." Fukuzawa brilliantly re-expressed Bagehot's assessment—that the King provides guidance to the people of the country precisely outside of politics—as his own theory of the Imperial Household.

Though the government of the Diet may see two parties contending like fire and water, like midsummer and midwinter, the Imperial Household alone shall be an eternal spring, and when the people look up to it, they shall feel a serene harmony. Though the laws and ordinances promulgated by the government of the Diet may be as cold as water and as thin in emotion as paper, the benevolence of the Imperial Household shall be as sweet as candy, and when the people look up to it, their anger shall be dissolved.

For Shinzo Koizumi, the provision of the symbolic Emperor by the Constitution of Japan—that is, the depoliticization of the Emperor—appeared as an ideal condition for the rebirth and reconstruction of Japan. Koizumi, who inherited Fukuzawa's philosophy of independence and self-respect, did not overlook the description at the beginning of Fukuzawa's "On the Imperial Household": "The Imperial Household is something outside of the political society. Anyone who resides in the Japanese nation and discusses or relates to politics must not, in their principles, abuse the dignity and sanctity of the Imperial Household."

The defeat brought about a reversal of past discourse, and the Emperor became the center of that reflection. Since the Constitution of Japan realized the depoliticization of the Emperor and presented the possibility of leaving the system itself to the judgment of future democracy, the symbolic Emperor system was able to gain an abstract consensus agreeing to its existence in the intellectual space of the time. However, the formation of thought regarding what lies beyond that depoliticization hardly developed in that space. Because reflection on the past became the de facto standard due to the reversal of discourse, pursuing the positive significance of the "symbol" was largely outside the scope of the intellectual space at the time.

Constitutional scholars were given the difficult task of how to achieve consistency between the activities of the Emperor—whether defined or not defined by the Constitution of Japan—and the "symbol," using the keyword "symbol" (which has no definition in the Constitution) as a clue, and they struggled to find an answer to this problem. Although 80 years had passed since the publication of Bagehot's "The English Constitution," perhaps because the word "symbol" was used only very sparingly, that discussion did not serve as a point of reference.

Or, though it is only speculation, many intellectuals may have deferred to the Marxists who flourished in the world of discourse and never even reached the starting point of trying to find a motif in Britain, which had won an imperialist war they condemned as state monopoly capitalism. Alternatively, they may have recognized that the British monarchy deviated from the image of a depoliticized King they envisioned. In the constitutional law community shortly after the war, weight was placed on considerations and discussions such as whether the Emperor, designated as a "symbol," could be called a "monarch" or a "head of state." Whether postwar Japan was a constitutional monarchy or a republic—in an intellectual space where discourse had reversed, perhaps that kind of formal conceptual theory was a line that commentators could not concede.

However, Shinzo Koizumi's dimension of thought was different. He believed that the Emperor being "outside of the political society" was the condition for true modernization for Japan, and that therein lay the key to Japan's rebirth and reconstruction.

When the Constitution of Japan was being enacted, Emperor Showa asked Shigeru Yoshida about "the relationship between the Imperial Family and the people." Yoshida, at a loss for an answer, asked Taro Takemi, a graduate of Keio University, who replied that the answer lay in Yukichi Fukuzawa. Yoshida thought of entrusting the position of Minister of Education to someone from Keio University and approached Koizumi, but Koizumi reportedly declined. Koizumi held the position of President of Keio University until January 1947, but after the end of the war, he had not fully recovered from injuries sustained from incendiary bombs in the final stages of the war, and Sei'ichiro Takahashi was serving as Acting President.

After stepping down as the head of Keio University, Koizumi became deeply involved with the Imperial Family. In 1949, he was appointed as a regular advisor for the education of the Crown Prince—in other words, he became the Crown Prince's tutor and dedicated his life to supporting the Imperial Family. From 1948 to the following year, he gave several lectures to Emperor Showa. The themes were "Yukichi Fukuzawa," "Marx," and "Edward Grey." It is also well known that in preaching the symbolic Emperor to the Crown Prince, Koizumi used Harold Nicolson's "King George V" as a text in addition to Fukuzawa's "On the Imperial Household."

When discussing Yukichi Fukuzawa and Shinzo Koizumi in the postwar intellectual space, the existence of Masao Maruyama cannot be overlooked. Maruyama was a leading authority on Fukuzawa research alongside Koizumi, and academically, Maruyama is better known than Koizumi. However, Maruyama, known as a representative of the postwar liberal faction, had many conflicting principles and assertions, such as fiercely criticizing the theory of a separate peace treaty supported by Koizumi during the peace treaty issues. Perhaps the divergence between Koizumi and Maruyama lies in the difference in the scope of Fukuzawa's thought that they discussed.

Maruyama's discourse on Fukuzawa began with a short essay titled "Order and Man in Fukuzawa," published in the "Mita Shimbun" in 1942. Amidst rising nationalism, Fukuzawa's individualism was facing a storm of criticism. In response, Maruyama argued that if national order is actively formed by active individuals, then individualism and nationalism can be consistent, and he concluded that Fukuzawa was "precisely a nationalist in being an individualist." The depiction of an active image of the individual gives a sense of the starting point of Maruyama's postwar thought, but unlike Koizumi in the early Showa era, his discussion never reached pride in one's origins or identity while citing Fukuzawa's "Theory of Stubborn Endurance" (Yasegaman no Setsu) or "Teichu Kohron."

Maruyama, who became a star player in the postwar intellectual space after publishing "The Logic and Psychology of Ultra-Nationalism," was elevated as a leader of pacifism, as if riding the flow of reversed discourse. While there were descriptions and analyses of the (pre-war) Emperor as an object of criticism, there was no significant vision for the symbolic Emperor who would bear heavy responsibilities in postwar Japan. To simplify, unlike Koizumi, who positioned even the theory of patriotism and the theory of the Imperial Household within the circle of thought based on a series of philosophies of independence and self-respect, Maruyama found in Fukuzawa a "well-behaved" liberal philosophy based on individualism for the formation of a democratic state in the postwar intellectual space (and was therefore intensely criticized by some commentators). From that position in discourse (though it may not have been a positioning Maruyama chose himself), one could not have expected a discussion like Koizumi's from Maruyama.

In the postwar intellectual space where Maruyama established the standard for Fukuzawa research, it might have been difficult for newcomers to arrive at Fukuzawa's "On the Imperial Household." At the point when the concept of "symbol" appeared in the Constitution of Japan, Koizumi was thoroughly familiar with every corner of Fukuzawa's writings from his experience as a leader of Keio University, and he was an old-generation figure who quickly developed an awareness of the issues in Fukuzawa's view of the state that could not be fully explained by individualism and liberalism, and who possessed the fortitude not to waver against the reversal of discourse. It can be said that this is why he was able to preach Fukuzawa's "On the Imperial Household" and make concrete interpretive proposals for the concept of "symbol." This was not just treating Fukuzawa as a mere object of research; because he was convinced that Fukuzawa's spirit of independence and self-respect was truly required for postwar Japan, which had lost its independence, he was also convinced of the importance of the existence of the Emperor who is "alone an eternal spring, and when the people look up to it, they shall feel a serene harmony."

There is a description regarding the symbolic Emperor in the Constitution of Japan in the writings of Jiro Shirasu. Shirasu, a Cambridge University graduate known for his activity as a close aide to Shigeru Yoshida during the occupation, was engaged in translating the GHQ draft and creating the Japanese government draft in February 1946.

I don't remember much about what happened during this translation work, but there is one thing. The original text said the Emperor is the symbol of the state. ... I looked up an English-Japanese dictionary nearby and said that this dictionary says "shocho" (symbol), and that is the reason why the word "shocho" is used in the current Constitution. As an aside, I must add that every time highly learned people later engaged in great battles of words over what a symbol is in the first place, I could not help but suppress a bitter smile. (From "Japan Without Principles")

In the intellectual space of the postwar generation, there was indeed an exchange of arguments at which Shirasu would smile bitterly. In an intellectual space where discourse had reversed between before and after the defeat, it may have been an inevitable phenomenon. However, Koizumi saw a way forward for postwar Japan in being a "symbol." Koizumi stood apart from the great battles of words at which Shirasu smiled bitterly and preached the practice of being a symbol inherited from Fukuzawa's "On the Imperial Household." His counterpart was the then Crown Prince Akihito.

After the war, it was of course Yukichi Fukuzawa who provided the essence of the symbolic Emperor that Koizumi preached, but it is the achievement of Shinzo Koizumi that he applied it to the postwar context, gave concrete form to its actual image while being conscious of British history, and brilliantly re-spun it. In the intellectual space of the time, where there was a strong trend toward trying to confine the Emperor to a "form," the fact that a relay of thought from Fukuzawa to Koizumi regarding the "symbol" took place is one of the histories that Keio University should be proud of.

What should be done for the rebirth and reconstruction of a defeated Japan, where the land was devastated and people were overcome with grief and disappointment? Just as Fukuzawa found a crisis of autonomy and independence in post-Restoration Japan and the Japanese people and preached the spirit of independence and self-respect, Koizumi found the same problem in postwar Japan. Unlike Fukuzawa's era when the country was about to lose its independence, Japan had lost its independence due to the defeat, and it was a start from there. Just as Fukuzawa found a role for the Imperial Household as a spiritual pillar for the Japanese people, Koizumi found an important role for the Emperor as a postwar "symbol" for the rebirth and reconstruction of Japan. It must have been a duty where "the responsibility is heavy and the road is long," as stated in the "Imperial Rescript on the Termination of the War." What did Shirasu, who smiled bitterly at the "great controversy," think of Koizumi, who preached the symbolic Emperor to the Crown Prince?

(Note)

As a supplement to this essay, please refer to Shigeki Kusunoki and Misako Kusunoki, "Shinzo Koizumi as a History of Showa Thought: Overcoming Democracy and Conservatism," Minerva Shobo (2017), and Shigeki Kusunoki, "Two Perspectives for a Theory of Shinzo Koizumi," Modern Japanese Studies, Vol. 33 (2018).