[Feature: Confronting the Gender Gap] Aspects of "Familialism" Obstructing Gender Equality

In the "International Survey on a Declining Birthrate Society" conducted by the Cabinet Office in fiscal 2015, when asked whether they thought their country was a "place where it is easy to give birth to and raise children," the percentage of people in Japan who answered "I strongly think so" was only 8%, the lowest among the four countries surveyed. What lies behind this sense of "constriction" regarding child-rearing? In this article, I would like to consider this by focusing on the "familialism" that remains deeply rooted in Japanese society.

For a long time in Japan, it was believed that the rise in women's employment rates caused the declining birthrate. However, many international surveys have now made it clear that this common belief regarding the relationship between women's employment rates and the total fertility rate is incorrect. Based on EU data, Danish welfare sociologist Gøsta Esping-Andersen revealed that countries where women's employment is more widespread tend to have higher birthrates, and pointed out that there is even a correlation between employment rates and birthrates (Gøsta Esping-Andersen, "The Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies," translated by Masahiro Hayashi, NTT Publishing, 2008).

In modern society, a keyword when thinking about the declining birthrate is "familialism" in welfare. "Familialism" here refers to a system in which households are expected to bear the primary responsibility for the welfare of their members, and it is a concept used to critically view a society where the responsibility for care, such as childcare and nursing care, is forced upon the family both normatively and institutionally.

Ironically, family formation is stagnating in countries where "familialism" is strong. International comparative surveys show that countries with ultra-low birthrates include Japan, South Korea, and Southern European countries such as Italy and Spain; what these countries have in common is that "familialistic" norms and systems are deeply rooted. Familialism is suppressing both women's employment rates and birthrates.

In modern welfare policy, the "de-familialization" of care is a basic premise, and the question is how to reduce the dependence on families for care. Andersen also points out: "There is a widespread belief that externalizing family work will fundamentally destroy family bonds and damage the quality of home life. However, all data show exactly the opposite." In other words, in modern society, "traditional familialism" has become a hindrance to family formation. He presents the paradox that moving away from "familialism," which relies on the family for welfare, is precisely what strengthens "family bonds" (Gøsta Esping-Andersen, "The Incomplete Revolution: Adapting to Women's New Roles," supervised translation by Mari Osawa, Iwanami Shoten, 2011).

Japan is a society where familialism is particularly strong, in the sense that the roles of the state and the market are limited and there is little support from relatives. This is also reflected in the fact that the financial scale of family policy as a whole is significantly smaller than in European countries. The first condition for achieving gender equality is to move away from familialism in welfare.

Furthermore, Andersen says that "men's childcare" holds the key to increasing the birthrate. International comparative data shows that countries where men spend more time on housework and childcare, and countries with high childcare leave uptake rates, show high birthrates. Andersen emphasizes not only national welfare policies but also the improvement of relationships between couples, pointing out that in response to the "masculinization of women," the "feminization of men" is what is important. Anne-Marie Slaughter also states that for gender equality to be achieved, it is essential not only to support women's employment but also for "men to become providers of care." To achieve this, the value system of "masculinity" that emphasizes competition and the social significance of care work itself need to be re-evaluated (Anne-Marie Slaughter, "Unfinished Business: Women Men Work Family," translated by Miwa Seki, NTT Publishing, 2017).

What is important is the introduction of systems that allow for the balancing of work and childcare, and the creation of childcare leave systems to promote childcare by fathers. Many studies have already demonstrated that the degree of a father's involvement in childcare has a significant impact on the birth of children. For example, in Japanese households with full-time housewives, a second child is less likely to be born if the man's working hours are long, while in dual-income households, a second child is more likely to be born if the father's time spent on housework and childcare is long (Nagase and Brinton 2017). The key to the birth of a second child lies in men's working hours and their time spent on housework and childcare.

The rate of Japanese men taking childcare leave reached a record high of 6.16% in fiscal 2018, but from an international perspective, this level is extremely low, and the time men spend on childcare is the shortest among developed nations. The tendency to favor those who work long hours in the workplace remains strong, and the fact that men who take childcare leave are not valued is a major factor.

What is needed to make men providers of care? It goes without saying that appealing to the "ideal" of gender equality is important. However, we must also explore ways to "correct" men's awareness and behavior through institutional ingenuity. The number of men who wish to take childcare leave has increased significantly in recent years. Nevertheless, the reason the actual uptake rate remains low is that even if the system exists, the culture does not.

The catalyst for almost all men in North-Western European countries to take childcare leave was the introduction of the "Daddy Quota" system. This system was started in Norway in 1993, allowing for a maximum of 59 weeks of childcare leave per child, with a requirement that 10 of those weeks be taken by the spouse in rotation. In fact, the uptake rate, which was only 5% before the introduction, improved to over 90%, and the birthrate also rose. While the details of the quota system vary by country, it is effective to transform men's awareness and behavior by intentionally creating "role models" to correct disparities and designing systems and environments.

One factor hindering gender equality in Japan is a uniform and fixed view of the family. Let us call a view of the family that regards only a specific family form as "standard" and others as "deviant" or "pathological" as "standard familialism."

Looking abroad, partner relationships are diversifying. A symbolic phenomenon is the rise in the out-of-wedlock birthrate. As of 2012, the proportion of out-of-wedlock births in developed countries was 2.2% in Japan, whereas it accounted for more than half in countries like Sweden and France, and 30% to 50% in other countries. In other words, it is no longer self-evident that "married couples have children," and there are even countries where children born to married couples are now in the minority. Comparing developed countries, it can be seen that family formation is promoted in societies that recognize and support diverse partner relationships not bound by legal marriage, as well as the resulting births and childcare.

In terms of the diversification of partnerships, an even larger global change is the legalization of same-sex marriage. Starting with the Netherlands in 2000, same-sex marriage is now recognized as being exactly equivalent to opposite-sex marriage in more than 30 countries and regions worldwide. In 2014, the United Nations also clearly issued a statement that "same-sex marriage should be given the same rights as opposite-sex marriage." Child-rearing by lesbian and gay partners through adoption and assisted reproductive technology is also becoming common. The common sense of the "heteronormative family," which treats only opposite-sex couples as the foundation of family life, is heading toward disappearance.

In Japan as well, there is a need to move away from "standard familialism" and shift toward laws and policies that focus on the reality of care relationships regardless of their "form." Not limited to the partner relationships mentioned above, countries that recognize and institutionally guarantee diverse forms of family formation and childcare, including single parents and non-biological parent-child relationships such as foster parents, tend to have higher birthrates.

In order to resolve the "constriction" surrounding family life and provide diverse opportunities for people's life courses, it is also necessary to re-examine the "way of living" that dictates people's awareness and behavior.

In recent years, it has been pointed out that "familialism" regarding co-residence is related to the birthrate. Until now, research on late marriage and the declining birthrate has accumulated mainly from the perspectives of labor market instability and changes in individual family views and awareness. However, there is data showing that policies and culture regarding housing have a major impact on family formation, and the importance of "residential welfare" has been pointed out.

Let us refer to comparative data from OECD countries regarding household formation among young people (aged 25–34) (Japan Housing Council ed., "Give 'Housing' to Young People!" Iwanami Shoten, 2008).

In North-Western European countries, where a high proportion of young people form independent households as heads of households or their spouses (including cohabitation), there is a strong norm of leaving home, suggesting that one should leave the parental home upon becoming an adult. In Sweden and Finland, more than 95% of young people live independently from their parents. Countries with low parent-child co-residence rates are characterized by high birthrates and have substantial housing support, such as high public rental rates and housing allowances.

Conversely, there are countries where young people tend to stay with their parents even after graduation. In addition to Japan, this includes Southern European countries such as Italy and Spain. In these countries, approximately 40% of young people live in their parents' households. Behind this lies a tradition of viewing parent-child co-residence positively, but also the fact that mutual family aid is taken for granted and public housing support is poor. They also share the commonality of low birthrates. In societies like Japan and Southern Europe where mutual family aid is expected, young people who become economically unstable also have a strong tendency to return to their parents' homes.

While there can be various discussions regarding the declining birthrate and the pros and cons of parent-child co-residence, providing options for diverse "ways of living" and communal living and having society guarantee them has become an urgent task for maintaining and developing society. It is necessary not only to focus on partner relationships but also to re-examine common sense regarding co-residence and communal living.

A familialistic society is, in other words, a society where the people one can depend on are limited to family. In reality, despite the existence of various forms of mutual aid and possibilities for cooperative relationships, familialistic stereotypes may be narrowing the range of our imagination. Although there are various types of support such as single-parent support, childcare support, women's employment support, and elderly support, the difficulty in practices that connect these various types of support is because familialistic premises dictate our thinking. Even if we try to create a system where diverse generations and people with diverse difficulties cooperate, the institutional systems of society and administrative walls bound by the illusion of the "standard family" stand in the way. It is important to move away from the "familialism" that has permeated every corner of society and to envision new forms of communality and publicness.

At the same time, we are required not only to expand such public welfare but also to re-examine and reconstruct the "private connections" that we regard as common sense. In her critique of modern family policy, gender legal scholar Martha A. Fineman criticizes those who "assume that function is determined by form" and argues that policies should be established that emphasize the "functions we want the family to perform" rather than the "form of the family." She also states that "there is no doubt that one of the most important functions imposed on the family is care" (Martha A. Fineman, "The Autonomy Myth: A Theory of Dependency," translated by Nobuko Akita and Yoko Hayami, Iwanami Shoten, 2010). In modern times, we must idealize the family not as a "form" but as a "strong unit of care" and rethink relationships from the perspective of "function."

By moving away from a "familialistic" framework, ways to resolve various social problems existing in modern Japan will likely open up. In doing so, it will be necessary to focus on the "shortage" and "surplus" of resources that people possess and connect people based on their needs, without being bound by conventional common sense.

New attempts have already begun. Examples of such practices include communal living among single parents, shared living between single mothers and single elderly people, and home-sharing where single elderly people living in houses and students live together. Governments and companies are also gradually realizing the limits of policies and businesses targeted only at the conventional "standard family" and are beginning initiatives that look at diverse relationships.

Negative opinions such as "it's not realistic," "it can't possibly work," or "not everyone wants that" will likely be directed at these new forms of communal living and cooperative relationships. However, society cannot be changed if we take the existing "reality" and the "preferences" of people formed based on it as a premise. People cannot endure living with the disappointment that "preferences were not fulfilled," and they often adapt their preferences to the reality in which they are placed.

The fact that conventional methods are not working is the reason these proposals and practices are being born, and policies based on a long-term perspective are needed to transform the very foundation of individual "preferences" and "choices." By having society provide diverse options for connections for people to cooperate, new cultures will be created, and changes should also occur in people's preferences. What is required is the design of communal living and institutional support that are not bound by traditional gender roles and family functions, nor by legal marriage, sexual relationships, or blood relations.