[Feature: The Future of the Entertainment Business] Tami Yanagisawa: The Religion of Consumer Society, Fandom Culture

"Oshi culture," which is now seen daily in Japanese media, is referred to as fandom culture in the English-speaking world. From idols, athletes, and anime characters to YouTubers and underground idols who are almost indistinguishable from amateurs, people "push" (oshi) various things and speak of them as if they were their own identity. The maniacal consumer activities that were ridiculed as otaku culture in the late 20th century have become the "oshi culture" practiced by everyone in the 21st century. Similarly, in the West, nerd culture has gained mainstream acceptance as fandom culture. It was in 2016 that Barack Obama, then President of the United States, called himself a nerd and people accepted it as cool.

"Oshikatsu" (oshi-supporting activities) by fandoms is also driving the economy. Economic activity surrounding oshikatsu is extremely vigorous, with fans checking their oshi's activities on social media, buying oshi merchandise, visiting collaborations between their oshi and other companies, and applying for multiple tickets to their oshi's performances. As symbolized by the concept of the fandom economy, marketing has come to aim for the formation of consumer groups called fans. Whether it is an artist or a brand, the key has become how to lock in fans, attract their attention, and make them consume more. The fandom-based economy led by K-pop has amplified in all genres along with the expansion of social media, and the daily flood of fan services such as Instagram Live and TikTok now seems to be reaching a saturation point.

In my view, oshikatsu is a kind of religion in consumer society. However, this view itself is not original to the author at all. In the first place, people who engage in oshikatsu explicitly state that their activities are a pseudo-religion, calling their oshi "God," calling conflicts between fans "religious wars," and calling shelves lined with oshi merchandise "altars." Furthermore, many people must know from experience that when looking at enthusiastic fans objectively, they appear to be a kind of cult religion.

There are many other pseudo-religions in consumer society besides oshikatsu/fandom. These include "spiritual" (formerly "the world of the spirit") and self-help, which look very religious, various conspiracy theories that expanded during the COVID-19 pandemic, and nostalgia for the past. This is because nostalgia is not a longing for a real past, but a faith in an idealized "past" from a current perspective—a fiction, so to speak. In Japan, before "oshikatsu" became a boom, there was a trend of "Showa nostalgia" and "Showa retro," represented by the film "Always: Sunset on Third Street" (2005). These broad religions of consumer society are all set against the backdrop of the decline of traditional religions and the deadlock of the myth of the progressive view of history that supported the modern era. These new religions are thought to supply people with the meaning and value of living in a way that replaces former traditional religions and myths*1. In that sense, "oshikatsu" can be blind and harmful just like so-called religion, but at the same time, it is deeply involved with the urgent issues of human life—namely, the meaning and value of living—and therefore cannot be ignored.

Fans often appear cult-like because they spend an almost insane amount of cost to support their "oshi." Whether it is time or money, they are so devoted that they are truly worthy of being called believers, trying to dedicate as much as possible to their "oshi." However, the mindset that supports such "oshikatsu" is by no means abnormal for a human being.

People can become very devoted to objects they consider sacred. The "sacredness" mentioned here is not necessarily an extraordinary sensation. For example, while you might have no resistance to reselling a high-end fountain pen you received as a prize, wouldn't you feel a pang of guilt about reselling a ballpoint pen a close friend gave you for your birthday? Also, don't you feel a sense of disgust toward calculated romance, or a resistance to the buying and selling of organs or babies? Psychologist Philip Tetlock and anthropologist Scott Atran explained that such emotions are based on "sacred values." There are various values such as "good/bad," "right/wrong," and "pleasant/unpleasant," but they argue that "pure (sacred)/impure" is also important in human value judgments. According to Atran and others, humans regard specific things as sacred, feel that those sacred things should never be traded economically, and feel that reducing them to money defiles their sacredness.

People may regard something as sacred personally, as in the ballpoint pen example mentioned earlier, or they may share "sacred values" as a group. Regarding a country as sacred forms nationalism, and if a religion regards a specific place as sacred, it becomes a holy site (consider Israel, which is currently continuing irrational attacks on Palestine). "Love" and "life" are examples of common "sacred values" that the majority of humanity regards as sacred. While rational modern states may seem unrelated to such irrational psychology, France, which held up "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity" at a memorial service for the victims of the Charlie Hebdo shooting, seems to regard its founding principles as sacred, and about half of the citizens of the United States, who even refuse gun control, can be said to regard "liberty" as sacred.

People do not want to let go of their "sacred values" no matter how much money is offered, and they feel that the person who brings such a negotiation is a filthy violator of a taboo, causing a violent emotional backlash. The fact that fans pour money and time into oshikatsu beyond their limits, such as often going into debt for skyrocketing performance tickets, is expected to be due to the psychology that sacred things should not be economically traded off. One must not have the idea of saving money for something that cannot be reduced to money. According to my survey based on "Moral Foundations Theory*2," Japanese people have a high sensitivity to sanctity regardless of whether they are politically liberal or conservative. I speculate that this is not unrelated to the current situation in Japan, where few people belong to specific institutional religions, but spiritual, oshikatsu, and nostalgia booms are prevalent across generations.

Since oshikatsu based on "sacred values" is likely filled with a sense of fulfillment subjectively, the claim that it leads to well-being is not incomprehensible*3. However, just like religion, oshikatsu can also be harmful to individuals and society. In fact, there is evidence that religious believers are generally healthier and happier than non-believers for any religion, but just as that does not mean all religions, including cults, should be recommended, the same applies here.

Oshikatsu, in which a lot of time and money are spent, includes more active behaviors in addition to passive consumption. Besides so-called derivative works, there is "nuikatsu" (plushie activities), where fans make plushies that are alter egos of their "oshi," take photos of them, and travel with them; creating altars to display acrylic stands of their "oshi"; and making a cake on their "oshi's" birthday and feeling as if they ate it together. In short, grown adults do things like children's playing house or make-believe, but why on earth is this?

Anthropologist Luhrmann interprets evangelical Christians who pretend to drink coffee with God, as if "pushing" God, based on developmental psychologist Donald W. Winnicott. Winnicott stated that play occurs in an intermediate area between the mind and the world, and he thought this intermediate area exists between an external reality that does not change even if one wishes it to, and an emotional reality such as a child's internal hopes and fears. Humans experience "God" in this intermediate area. This is because "God" is basically nothing other than an emotional commitment that "the world is good," and believing that the world is good even though such goodness does not actually exist. Winnicott thought that an adult's ability to believe in a good world is similar to an infant's ability to believe that a mother who has gone away will return. He argues that the concept of God for adults performs almost the same function as a teddy bear or blanket for children, and both are similarly experienced as "emotionally real."

Could it be said that "oshikatsu" is also a grand game of make-believe seeking an "emotional reality"? Luhrmann points out that this tendency to seek reality in emotions, especially positive emotions, increased in the United States after the 1960s, citing charismatic evangelical Christianity combined with the New Age movement that spread rapidly during this period, and a counseling culture aimed at manipulating individual emotions. This American ideology, which idealizes having positive emotions for the individual, seems to be shared in present-day Japan, where the psychological concept of "self-esteem" (jikokouteikan) has become an everyday word (though the exact process is unknown). The pursuit of "emotional reality" in oshikatsu can be harmful, first, because it becomes limitless as it relies on the unstable thing that is emotion, and second, because it may lead to indifference toward objective reality. The cause of the addictiveness of "oshikatsu" also lies in their view of reality, which focuses on subjective emotions.

Furthermore, "oshikatsu"/fandom, just like religion, is not harmless to society. Just as different religions or people with different positions within the same religion often clash violently, there are many conflicts within groups of fans. This strong attachment and self-identification with an "oshi" that creates such emotional conflict can be explained by "sacred values," but it can also be explained from the perspective of social relationships.

Humans can form social relationships with invisible entities, even if they are fictional characters. As television became established in many homes in the 1960s, a phenomenon arose where viewers built intimate relationships with characters appearing on TV. Sociologist Donald Horton and others called this relationship "parasocial." "Parasocial" literally means a "pseudo-social relationship," but it refers to feeling a sense of familiarity toward someone you have never actually met, as if you were actually closely involved with them. People "push" not only real people such as idols and celebrities but also non-existent 2D characters from manga, anime, and games, and fans form parasocial relationships by frequently interacting with their "oshi" through consumer activities. According to the aforementioned Luhrmann, this parasocial relationship acts powerfully on that person.

If we understand that people have not only beliefs but also relationships, we can understand the intensity even more. After all, beliefs seem to be things that can be picked up or let go like a one-cent coin. You can change your mind about what you believe. (...) However, relationships change who you are*4.

Donald Trump's supporters (Trumpians) are a perfect example for understanding the parasocial relationships these fans form with their "oshi." Trump, who is currently challenging the presidential election again, failed in COVID-19 measures in 2020, leading many Americans to their deaths, was involved in the United States Capitol attack in 2021, and is currently being sued on multiple charges including involvement in the attack and fraud. Yet, as of April 2024, he is leading the race for the Republican presidential nomination. The impression that lawsuits and criticism are counterproductive and are instead expanding support to prevent him from returning to the presidency is likely because his supporters are none other than fans who have formed a parasocial relationship with him. Just the other day, television broadcast an illegal immigrant joyfully calling out "Trump!" to Trump as he inspected the border between Mexico and the United States. Trump himself smiled wryly, saying, "They seem to like Trump. Unbelievable," but this event can be seen as evidence that parasocial familiarity with Trump prevails over the recognition that he is a politician who advocates policies disadvantageous to them. Trump, who appeared on reality shows, formed parasocial relationships with many Americans, and since becoming president, he has expanded his fandom worldwide through social media. When the "oshi" with whom they have a relationship falls into adversity, fans try to support their "oshi" even more devotedly. The era in which those who have built a larger fandom control society has already arrived.

As described above, fandom culture is a culture based on the fundamental human craving for the value of living, positive emotions, and social relationships, and it has become a pseudo-religion of secular consumer society. Even if it appears at first glance to be nothing more than purchasing goods or indulging in a hobby, people are building an emotion-filled relationship with their "oshi" and their own reality through "oshikatsu," and the reality created there is often so solid that it can no longer be shared with others. Now that fandom culture has become mainstream and individuals are striving in "oshikatsu" devoted to completely different "oshi," there is a high possibility that we are living in completely different realities while being in the same society. Just as American liberals cannot understand Trumpians at all, someone next to you may be living a reality that you cannot understand at all.

In the American media, there has always been a certain amount of criticism of fandom culture, such as calling excessive fans "stans" [a portmanteau of fan and stalker]. In contrast, in Japan, the tone is overwhelmingly positive regarding fans and "oshikatsu," as if anything is good as long as there is an economic effect and the realization of well-being. This year, novels like Natsuki Murakumo's "Collector's High" have appeared, and criticism of fans being economically exploited in the name of love has finally begun to be seen here and there. I want industries that conduct economic activities on a fan basis to be aware that uncritically locking people into "oshikatsu" can have a serious impact not only on economic activity but also on the way people perceive cognition and reality, and by extension, on our society as a whole. As fandoms proliferate and interest in objective reality fades further, "living in the same reality" will become the greatest challenge for society from now on.

*1 Clay Routledge, Nostalgia: a psychological resource, Routledge, 2015.

*3 "The Reason Preventive Medicine Researchers Say 'Oshi is Important' for Happiness," Toyo Keizai Online The Reason Preventive Medicine Researchers Say 'Oshi is Important' for Happiness: The Existence of Someone More Important Than Yourself is Becoming Important | Health | Toyo Keizai Online (Accessed March 6, 2024).

*4 Tanya Luhrmann, How God Becomes Real, Princeton University Press, 2020. (Japanese translation "Real Making (provisional title)" translated by Tami Yanagisawa, Keio University Press, forthcoming)