[Special Feature: International Order from an East Asian Perspective] [Session 2] International Order Shaken by Domestic Politics

In the second session, we welcome two experts to discuss how the domestic political fluctuations currently occurring mainly in the United States and South Korea are affecting, or could potentially affect, the international order.

In the first session, there was also a discussion regarding the reappearance of the Trump administration, so I believe there are many parts where the two are closely linked. First, I would like to ask Professor Mori to speak about the Trump administration's foreign policy.

I would like to present on the topic of "The Trump Administration—The Future of the International Order."

The first point is "What does Trump's reelection mean?" The key point is that the Trump administration pursues a dual transformation of order, pushing forward initiatives to change the existing status quo both domestically and in the international arena. I will talk about how voters actually expect this.

The second point is the main subject: "What impact will the next Trump administration have on the international order?" How will the role the United States has played in the world change as the Trump administration takes office and advances various policies? What impact will it have on the U.S.-led international order, often called the liberal hegemonic order? I would like to consider the implications of the Trump administration.

First, regarding the election results, as you all know, the media often calls it a landslide victory, but the vote difference was 2.7 million, or 1.7% of the total. Looking at it as a whole, it is not a situation where Trump won by a landslide. The United States is split right down the middle, with each side holding different ideas about the nature of the federal government and America's role in the world. The number of seats in the Senate and House is also close, showing that ideological polarization is progressing within America.

This ideological polarization is generally defined by two attributes. The first is that the distance between party ideologies is widening. There are contrasting views on directions and ways of thinking regarding various socio-economic and political issues, and this distance is constantly growing.

The second is that ideological cohesion and unity within each party are increasing. These two situations are occurring, and the ideas about government or the exercise of power are diverging significantly between the two major parties. When a change of government occurs, the party that becomes the minority feels the world is heading in the wrong direction, while the governing party feels the world is moving in the right direction.

In last November's election, on the surface, even though the U.S. macroeconomy was performing well, the pressure on household finances due to high prices was a major issue. Furthermore, a significant number of immigrants entered the U.S. under temporary parole measures during the Biden administration, and the resulting social anxiety drew attention.

Harris appealed for the defense of democracy and the protection of abortion rights, adopting a mainstream campaign tactic that, in a sense, catered to the interests of Democratic supporters. In contrast, Trump appealed to dissatisfaction and distrust regarding the economy and immigration, saying that the economy was better and the world was more peaceful when he was president, and that illegal immigration had led to crime and social problems.

When the results came in, about 40% of voters prioritized economic and household issues, and the immigration issue was also of very high importance, so Harris's campaign strategy missed the mark. What I have just mentioned would be the superficial explanation.

As for a deeper explanation, I believe a desire to transform or break through the current situation in which America finds itself had been accumulating among ordinary American citizens.

Looking at the results of public opinion surveys conducted periodically by the Pew Research Center, trust in Washington's central politics peaked at about 78% in the mid-1960s and has basically been on a downward trend, now standing at around 22%. In short, a sense of distrust has been accumulating—a feeling that the current political, social, and economic systems are wrong, that what the government is doing is incorrect, and that there is something untrustworthy.

In this context, when voters are asked "What qualities do you seek in a president?", the top answer is "the ability to lead the country," and the second is "the ability to achieve change." In exit polls, 65% of voters who prioritized leadership voted for Trump, and 73% of voters who prioritized change voted for Trump.

What can be said from this is that Trump often said there was fraud in the (2020 presidential) election. On the other hand, Harris said she would defend democracy. The defense of democracy was, in short, received as a message of maintaining the status quo. Meanwhile, the message of election fraud—while some people certainly took it literally—served as a message to those dissatisfied with the current system, feeling that something is wrong and that proper budget allocation is not being realized. In other words, I think Trump was able to establish an image as a candidate for transforming and breaking the status quo.

Trump is aware of this and appears to be aiming for a "dual order transformation" in effect. That is, one is the mandate to break the vested interests in Washington. Some people refer to this as the "dismantling of the deep state."

On the other hand, regarding today's theme of "international order," Trump has been speaking about anti-globalism since his first term. This is the view that Washington's pursuit of so-called "liberal internationalism" without regard for cost has led to the exhaustion of American national power. He believes that unless America pushes back against liberal internationalism and shakes off this traditional American foreign policy line, there will be no revival of American national power; to make America great, the conventional posture of foreign engagement must be rejected.

This liberal internationalism can be understood as a kind of ideology that dictates America must support the liberal international order.

The first major initiative is the deterrence of large-scale regional conflicts through alliances. However, Trump criticizes that as a result of doing this, economically developed allies have been allowed to free-ride. In short, he believes America is being taken advantage of.

The second is the promotion of trade liberalization through a multilateral trading system. Regarding this, in Trump's unique worldview, he sees it not only as an outflow of jobs but also as a situation where foreign countries are running trade surpluses and America is losing out.

Furthermore, diplomacy and military intervention were used to promote democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. The prime example of this is the Iraq War, where Trump and his supporters say unnecessary sacrifices were made. Additionally, he blames the intake of immigrant vitality through open political and social systems for the massive influx of immigrants, particularly during the Biden administration.

He believes that if this progression is allowed to continue, America will keep being exhausted. Systems that were originally supposed to enhance America's power have resulted in a paradoxical situation where America exhausts itself by pouring strength into supporting them. Therefore, the basic awareness of the problem in Trumpism is that this must be changed.

Then, how should America engage with the world without exhausting its peace and prosperity? This becomes the baseline upon which the thinking of those entering the Trump administration is built. It is observed that there are about two lines of thought there.

One is held by people with a way of thinking called unilateralism, which suggests that America's external obligations and burdens should be reduced as much as possible, and America should become unburdened. While it is natural for any country to prioritize its own peace and prosperity, in America's case, it bore considerable obligations and costs for the peace and prosperity of countries other than its own, so the idea is to shake those off and focus on its own affairs.

The second is the idea that America's limited power and resources should be redirected from Europe and the Middle East toward dealing with China, its greatest rival and challenger. These two approaches represent the ways of facing the world.

Originally, within the Republican Party, there were about three ways of thinking about how America should engage with the world. The first is conservative internationalism, the second is conservative realism, and the third is conservative unilateralism. Among these three, those entering the Trump administration are the so-called "prioritists" who hold a worldview of conservative realism, and the so-called "restraintists" who hold a worldview of conservative unilateralism.

Conservative realism basically views the world through power rather than rules. It counters a China that is catching up through power. Since it emphasizes the balance between ends and means, it is very conscious of the constraints on means. And it does not impose ideals or values on other countries, basically not considering the exercise of power based on them.

Specifically, to strictly counter China, the greatest challenger, it prioritizes the Indo-Pacific over Europe and the Middle East. It also emphasizes anti-China coalitions. In other words, it seeks to actively strengthen alliances of that sort. However, while it may criticize the Chinese system, it does not aim for regime change.

However, what is interesting is that when conservative realists are asked under what conditions they think the strategic competition with China will end, they give two possibilities. One is when China loses the power to compete with the U.S. and becomes weak. The other is when the nature of the Communist Party's governance fundamentally changes. If either of these happens, the strategic competition will end. There, power and political systems still matter.

In reality, for the time being, they will not actively initiate regime change themselves. However, from a long-term perspective, the conflict is likely to continue until a situation is reached where the U.S. becomes decisively superior in terms of either the system or power.

On the other hand, conservative unilateralism emphasizes national sovereignty. It views the world on the premise that America's peace and prosperity can exist independently of the peace and prosperity of other countries. No matter what happens in Europe, the Middle East, or Asia, the view is that America is secure as long as it has the military strength to deter attacks on its own country and runs a trade surplus through commerce.

The concept of the "divisibility of security" contrasts with that of the Democratic Party. While the Democrats have a global view of security where everything is related to America's peace and prosperity, this view holds that America's peace and prosperity exist separately from the world's. It thinks in terms of practical interests rather than ideals or principles.

Unilateralist restraintists prioritize military buildup for national defense and trade surpluses in bilateral commercial relations, and the defense of allies is not self-evident. Since there is no premise that allies are indispensable to America's peace and prosperity, questions arise such as "Why do we need to defend allies?", "Why must we protect Ukraine?", or "Why must we protect Taiwan?" If regional conflicts occur in Europe or Asia, the effort to deter them should primarily be undertaken by the countries in those regions.

Regarding Ukraine, the thinking of restraintists, including Trump, is: "Why should America, on the other side of the Atlantic, bear 70 to 80 percent of the support for Ukraine? The European countries right in front of Ukraine should do more."

If we break down the specific policies of the Trump administration into the three pillars of security, economy, and diplomacy, security would be a "security policy of selection and concentration." They want to end conflicts in Europe and the Middle East as quickly as possible. At the same time, they will likely proceed with efforts to counter China. Against China, there will likely be military buildup, including nuclear and conventional forces, the expansion of forward deployment of U.S. forces, and most importantly, the expansion of the defense industrial base will be a major agenda item.

Regarding Taiwan policy, the impression is that it will proceed steadily. When I spoke in Tokyo last autumn with someone who was in charge of Taiwan policy in the first Trump administration, they said that continuity would likely be prominent across the first Trump administration, the Biden administration, and the second Trump administration. They said they would likely steadily support the strengthening of Taiwan's asymmetric defense capabilities.

There is a possibility that they will demand increased defense budgets from other countries, including Taiwan. Regardless of the timing or who they ask for what, fundamentally, from the perspective of unilateralists and restraintists, regional countries must make more defense efforts; they inherently hold demands for allies to increase defense budgets, increase defense burdens, and expand their security roles. In Europe, the policy that European countries should bear the costs for European defense will likely emerge quite clearly. At the NATO summit in The Hague in June, the Trump administration will probably demand such increases in defense spending by European countries.

In contrast, in the Indo-Pacific, the argument that defense cooperation with allies should be promoted will likely come to the fore, and I anticipate at this point that it will not cause as much friction as in Europe.

The second is trade policy. They will proceed with initiatives such as high-tariff policies, the denial of the legitimacy of the WTO system, the application of security exceptions to various trade policies, and the pursuit of energy dominance.

The third is de-valued diplomacy. It can be said that they do not impose values such as democracy, the rule of law, and human rights, or it can be said that they do not hesitate to deal with leaders of authoritarian states and feel no barriers.

Biden spoke of democracy versus autocracy, but in Trump's de-valued view of foreign affairs, special treatment for democratic allies will disappear. Allies that are liberal democracies will no longer receive privileged treatment. Therefore, additional tariffs will be applied relentlessly, placing them alongside China, and countries with large trade surpluses with the U.S. will be targeted. I don't think restraintists have the perspective of providing warm hospitality just because a country is an ally.

Until now, the liberal hegemonic order of the post-Cold War era had a hierarchy, and being a market-economy-type liberal democratic state was a status. Such states were at the top layer because they were close to the United States at the pinnacle and shared various values and norms. Below them were groups of non-democratic states that shared certain behavioral norms, and at the very bottom were "rogue states." Order was conceived under this normative structure of hierarchy.

アメリカが、今お話ししたような世界における安全保障と経済と外交における役割を変えていくと、この階層構造は変わってきます。例えば安全保障分野ではセキュリティープロバイダーとしての信頼性が揺らいでくる。そして、開放的経済システムの推進勢力としての役割はすでに減退しています。これはもう超党派で、民主党もそうだと思います。脱価値的な外交をやるようになれば、民主主義、法の支配、人権といった価値が埋め込まれたルールの推進勢力としての信頼性も低下していくことになります。

同時に、国家資本主義型の権威主義国家としての中国の大国化はもう現実化しています。リベラルデモクラシーで市場経済型でなくても強国ないし大国になれるということを証明した。同時にグローバルサウスの存在感が高まり、かつ民主主義国家で政治的な混乱が起こり、ポピュリズムが台頭する。このようになると、かつて縦に並んでいたグループがどんどん横に倒れていく。そして秩序の多元化みたいなことが起こってくるということが、一つの見立てとして言えるのかと思います。

ただ、アメリカではトランプ的な外交が未来永劫一貫して続くわけではなく、また民主党政権がそのうち誕生するかもしれない。すると、アメリカ外交というのは、もっぱら利益や取り引き、そして力による威嚇に基づく外交と、価値や信頼を強調する外交との間で振幅を繰り返すことになります。もちろん、どの政権もこの両方をやるわけですが、民主党政権と共和党政権で比重が変わるわけです。そのような一貫性のなさが出てくるので、その結果、様々な約束、コミットメントの信頼性を高められない事態が増してくると思います。

中国であれロシア、北朝鮮であれ、アメリカとディールをしても次の政権がまたそれをどう変えるかわからないと、外交で何か約束をして均衡をつくる取り組みが非常に難しくなってくる。すると、国際政治、国際関係が流動化し、秩序が希薄化していきます。政治体制が異なる国の間で安定をもたらすような、あるいは均衡をもたらすような協定や了解をつくることが非常に難しくなってくると思います。

さらに力の行使を抑制的にやることが超党派的になってくると、合意やルールを下支えして、裏付けるその担保となるアメリカの力が期待できないということになる。するとますます新たな改革、新たな均衡みたいなものを支え、それを持続化させていくような取り組みが非常に難しくなるので、多くの場合はせめぎ合い、不信感を拭えないような大国間関係、あるいは国際政治が続く可能性があるかと思います。

有り難うございました。トランプ政権発足後の国際秩序というセッションのテーマに見合ったお話をいただきました。

第1セッションでは、中国とロシアが多極化という言葉を使って秩序を語っているという議論が出ました。森先生の報告では多元性という言葉が出てきました。いわゆる米中戦略競争が続いていく中で中国・ロシア側は多極化を目指す。アメリカはトランプ政権の下で政策が推進され、多元性というものが実現していく。となると、この権威主義の中国ロシア側と、アメリカが目指す秩序の折り合い、落ち着きどころはどういうところになるのか。森先生のお考えを伺いたいと思いました。

第2期トランプ政権の人事ではルビオ長官、ウォルツ補佐官、そしてコルビー防衛次官という、いわゆる対中強硬派と言われている方々が布陣することになると思います。そうなると、中国との対抗という中でアメリカの同盟、あるいはいわゆるミニラテラリズム（小数国による協力枠組みを重視するアプローチ）と言われる、日米韓、あるいはAUKUS（米英豪）、QUAD（日米豪印）という枠組みが持続していくのか。それとも何らかの形で変質、あるいは衰退していくのか。このあたりをどのように見ればいいのでしょうか。

実は、森先生のアレンジで昨年10月ワシントンに一緒に行かせていただいた時、コルビーさんにお会いしました。その際、これまでの日米韓協力というのは対北朝鮮中心であった。しかし、今後も日米韓協力を強化するのであれば、中国に対抗するための枠組みとしてでなければ意味がないという趣旨のことをおっしゃっていて、大変興味深かったです。

これまでバイデン政権下で、あるいは日本も韓国尹政権も目指していた多国間あるいはミニラテラルの枠組みがどういう運命を辿る可能性があるのかという点について、ぜひ後ほどお伺いできれば有り難く存じます。

Actually, for the past year or two, I have been struck by a fairly strong sense of nihilism. This is because part of my research was about how North Korea is trying to reconcile the two aspects of security and the unification issue in its relationship with South Korea, but at the end of the year before last, North Korea said that unification is no longer necessary and that South Korea is a hostile state.

実は私はこの1、2年、かなり強い虚無感に襲われています。なぜかと言うと、北朝鮮が韓国との関係で、安全保障、統一問題の2つの側面をどのように整合させようとしているかということが私の研究の一部だったのですが、一昨年末に北朝鮮が、もう統一はしなくていい、韓国は敵対的な国家であると言ってしまったからです。

北朝鮮が分断の現状維持に傾斜していることは、私だけでなく多くの専門家が認識してきたと思うのですが、「統一をしなくていい」と言ったことは少なからぬ驚きでした。

そして昨年末の韓国の戒厳令、これもまた一種の失望を感じました。民主化以降、韓国の民主化過程を見てきました。それほど韓国が直線的に上手くいくとは思っていなかったのですが、紆余曲折はあるにせよ、徐々に民主主義が制度化されていくと考えていたら、あの戒厳令です。まさにもう先祖返りしてしまったわけですよね。

冷戦終結直後、私の恩師の一人が言った言葉を今反芻しています。それは「北朝鮮の不安定性を過大評価してはいけない。そして韓国の安定性も過大評価してはいけない」ということです。

北朝鮮が冷戦終結後、「苦難の行軍」だとか飢餓の問題などありながらもサバイブして今日に至っているということを考えると、様々な不安定要因があるにせよ、やはりあの国には体制の強靭性がある。他方、韓国は安定しているようで実は不安定要因がいくつかあって、それが今回の戒厳令にもつながっていったのだと思います。

では、この戒厳令に導かれるような要因がどこにあるのかというと、全部が全部ではないですが、韓国の中の理念の対立だと考えています。それをあえて最大公約数的なもので区別すると、韓国型リアリズムと韓国型リベラリズムに分けられるのではないか。その2つの勢力はあらゆる面で対立しているわけではなく、いろいろなグラデーションがあるのだけれど、対立の局面というのが今回、戒厳令の発動まで至らしめた一つの大きな要因ではないかという問題意識を持っています。

リアリズムというのは力関係を最重要視し、国と国との関係に理念や道徳、価値観を持ち込むことを抑制するという特徴がありますが、韓国のルーツを遡るとこれは朝鮮解放直後に辿り着きます。1945年に朝鮮が解放された当時、連合国は国際信託統治構想を発表し、5年を限度とする国際的な枠内で朝鮮半島を単一の朝鮮にすることを考えた。しかし、そんな枠組みには反対だと言った一人が李承晩です。

李承晩は、国際信託統治構想は受け入れられず、まず南朝鮮だけで単独政府を樹立する、自由な韓国を作るという構想を発表したわけですね。そして、南朝鮮で単独政府を樹立した後、北に攻め込んで解放するんだというのが「北進統一論」です。その「北進」は武力行使を含むわけですが、単独では無理なのでアメリカを巻き込んで南を拠点として統一する構想をもっていました。それが朝鮮戦争と休戦を経て、再び戦争をしてまで北進統一するのは現実的ではないので1960年に「北進統一論」は公式に否定されます。

以降、朴正煕の下でむしろ北朝鮮の南進にどう備えるかということで、米韓同盟で北朝鮮の南進、再び朝鮮戦争が起きることの抑止が考えられ、今日の韓国的なリアリズムの原型ができたと解釈しています。

なので、彼らにとって重要なことは抑止なんです。圧倒的な抑止態勢をまず固めてその下で南北対話をする。抑止が入口、対話が出口という順番なんですね。したがって彼らにとって米韓同盟が揺らぐことは避けなければいけない。でも実際には朴政権や他の政権において、在韓米軍が削減されることもあり、その過程の中で彼らは「自主」を捉えたわけです。

したがって、伝統的に韓国のリアリズムにおいては「自主」というのは強制された「自主」なのです。そのため、米韓同盟を犠牲にした「自主」というのは基本的にないわけです。

今の米韓同盟においても「戦時」作戦統制権というのがあります。戦争が起きた場合、韓国軍の作戦統制は米軍が持っているという垂直的な指揮統制関係になっている。韓国軍が従属的な立場にあることは甘受し、それを克服することはしない。実際、作戦統制権返還の問題は何度か出るんですが、抑止のためには垂直的な指揮統制関係でいいのだというのが保守政権の立場です。とはいえ、もしこれから先、アメリカが韓国の安全保障に責任を持たないという傾向が強くなれば、この「自主」の極致として核武装論が出てくると私は考えています。

過去の軍出身者政権下では米韓同盟とともに安全保障上、日本との関係が重要であるので、それを可能にすべく特に朴正煕政権は対日ナショナリズムを制御したこともありました。それができなくなったのが民主化以降です。対日関係、特に歴史問題、領土問題についてそういった制御が困難になっているのではないかと思います。

保守政権において、アメリカのように、市民的な価値を拡大するという傾向はあまりないのですが、彼らにとって守護すべき価値は民主的、市民的価値で、それは民族的価値よりも優先すべきであるということです。そして、市民的価値というものが極限に達した場合、北朝鮮に対して武力を使わずに体制転換を試みるといった「和平演変論」に辿り着くのだと思います。

I think the root of Korean liberalism is the ethnic line of Kim Ku, an independence activist, which is also an old story. He was also against the international trusteeship plan and thought they should reach a single Korea through their own power. At that time, he did not consider the use of force against North Korea but thought that the path to unification would open for both sides through dialogue, prioritizing unification over deterrence.

I think it was after democratization that this kind of liberalism surfaced. Let's consider in what context "liberal" emerged at this time.

このようなリベラリズムが表面化されたのが民主化以降なんだと思います。この時、リベラルというのが一体どういうコンテクストで出てきたのかを考えてみます。

In South Korea, liberal forces are also called progressives, and progressives are also referred to as the left wing. This "left wing" is indeed liberal in terms of domestic politics—for example, being more tolerant of gender equality and diversity, and emphasizing fair distribution—but that is not the case in foreign policy. To put it bluntly, these "progressives" should really be called "nationalists," and I feel quite a bit of resistance to calling them the "left wing."

In Japan, the liberal and left-wing forces evaluate pre-war nationalism negatively and distance themselves from nationalism, as seen in the textbook issue and the Yasukuni Shrine visit issue. However, in South Korea, it is the opposite. The more liberal someone is, the more they are a "nationalist," so they become integrated with nationalism. In Japanese politics, "nationalists" are quite far to the right, but in that country, they are called the "left wing." It is the reverse of the Japanese left and right.

Since democratization, these liberal people have increasingly entered the National Assembly—that is, the institutional sphere. These "nationalists" also advocate for "autonomy," but their "autonomy" is different from the "autonomy" of the "conservatives" I mentioned earlier. They advocate for "autonomy" in the sense of transforming the US-ROK alliance, where the US has high speaking power, to increase South Korea's speaking power and influence in relations with the North.

For example, they try to at least horizontalize the vertical command and control relationship between the US and South Korea. They argue that when a "wartime" situation occurs, the US and South Korea should fight on equal terms, and therefore, they demand the return of wartime operational control (OPCON). These kinds of arguments always come from the "progressives."

They are a kind of "Korea First," believing that their own ethnic/national values should be the top priority. The "Korea" they refer to has the nuance of including not only the Republic of Korea but also North Korea.

Unlike the "conservatives," they place ethnic/national values higher than civic values. Interestingly, although they are supposed to be liberal, they have rarely demanded civic values such as democratization or human rights from North Korea. Despite being liberal, they are incredibly insensitive to democratization and human rights in North Korea. There is this kind of twisted structure.

When this reaches its extreme, it leads to the idea of protecting the country with only the power of the nation/ethnic group, and seeking nuclear armament as a means of challenging the great powers. Therefore, in extreme terms, there is a structure where both "conservatives" and "progressives" head toward nuclear armament.

During the Cold War, because there were no democratic institutions, all democratic and progressive forces demonstrated outside the National Assembly, which was a factor of instability. However, I believe the martial law at the end of this year was a situation where ideological conflict was brought into the National Assembly through democratic institutions, and an attempt was made to crush it with the military from outside the assembly by declaring martial law.

Now, regarding what will happen next, we must keep in mind that while "conservatives" and "progressives" are in conflict, they also share some common ground; both believe that the US-ROK alliance should be maintained. The issue is how it should exist.

An alliance is basically a status quo maintenance device, and concerns about being "abandoned" if the US does not take responsibility for South Korea's security led to the advocacy for "autonomy." For conservatives, the premise is that the US-ROK alliance and US Forces Korea (USFK) exist solely to deter North Korea's use of force. While the US has reduced USFK in the past, it has generally committed to South Korea in line with South Korea's concerns, and that framework was maintained until the end of the Cold War.

The phenomenon that occurred after the end of the Cold War was the US breaking the status quo with preemptive action. This led to concerns that the US would start a war and South Korea would be "entrapped" in it. In other words, a situation arose where the US's use of force had to be deterred before North Korea's use of force could be deterred.

Recently, with the current level of US-China conflict, there is a debate about what South Korea should do and whether USFK can remain uninvolved. There is a sense that both the South Korean military and USFK may have some role to play. South Korea has developed concerns about being "entrapped" in this US-China conflict.

Now, regarding how much difference there is between "conservatives" and "progressives" about being entrapped, there isn't a huge difference, though there are differences in degree. Under the Yoon administration, while it is necessary to cooperate with Japan and the US to deter North Korea, Japan and the US are also emphasizing deterrence against China. How South Korea cooperates with Japan and the US has become a major theme. In August of the year before last, the "Camp David Agreement" between Japan, the US, and South Korea was announced. Looking at President Yoon's statements, one can see a will for South Korea to engage with China independently so as not to be "entrapped" in the Japan-US deterrence against China.

I believe the concern about being "entrapped" in such US-China conflict is shared with the "progressives," but the concern about USFK or South Korea being "entrapped" in the Taiwan Strait issue is likely greater among the "progressives." In other words, progressive administrations are more critical than conservative ones regarding the debate over making USFK, which was a rigid force specialized in deterring North Korea, more flexible.

I shouldn't speak carelessly, but with the situation moving from martial law to impeachment and the potential detention of the President, I believe we must probably prepare for the return of a progressive administration.

A progressive administration would likely seek "autonomy" from the US. I think they will bring up the return of operational control, which ended halfway through the Moon administration—meaning that in "wartime," the South Korean and US militaries would be at least equal, or conversely, the South Korean military would command and control USFK.

Until now, when a war occurred on the Korean Peninsula, the US military took operational control over the South Korean military, so it was enough to consult with US Forces Japan and US Forces Korea. However, if operational control is returned to the South Korean military, consultations must be held not only with the US military but also with the South Korean military, which I think will make contingency response extremely difficult.

And since progressive administrations prioritize ethnic/national values, they will almost certainly reset the Yoon administration's policy toward Japan once again. In particular, they will reset the issue of forced labor and start over, which I believe will significantly shake the Japan-South Korea relationship that is the foundation of the Camp David Agreement.

And if they resist being entrapped in the Indo-Pacific strategy, deterrence against China, and the US-China conflict including the Taiwan Strait, I think a debate will likely arise over whether South Korea should participate in the Indo-Pacific strategy or not.

Thank you very much. You pointed out that while South Korea's so-called conservative and progressive forces are very different, they have common ground in their position that the US-ROK alliance should be maintained. However, you noted that there are differences in their thinking regarding what kind of US-ROK alliance it should be.

You mentioned that if a progressive administration takes power, Japan-US-ROK cooperation will inevitably be shaken. Nevertheless, at least for the past two years, the three countries have made considerable efforts to strengthen Japan-US-ROK cooperation. Given the current situation where the institutionalization agreed upon at the Camp David summit has progressed to some extent, I am curious about how much of a rollback there will actually be.

It is true that many among the so-called progressive forces in South Korea are basically passive or negative toward Japan-US-ROK cooperation, to the point where the initial draft of President Yoon's impeachment motion even included language saying he was conducting diplomacy biased toward Japan.

Furthermore, South Korean progressive forces tend to believe that the more Japan-US-ROK cooperation is strengthened, the more North Korea will deepen its relationship with the so-called Northern Triangle of China and Russia. They likely see strengthening Japan-US-ROK cooperation as leading to instability in the international situation surrounding the Korean Peninsula and increased military tension.

Considering the high possibility of a change in government between the ruling and opposition parties, I would like to ask Professor Kurata what kind of preparations Japan should make for such a possible situation, and I would also like to hear from Professor Mori from the perspective of Japan's response.

As you mentioned, polarization is progressing in South Korea between conservatives and progressives, or in terms of diplomatic lines, between the alliance faction and the nationalist faction. Another noteworthy rift in South Korean society that has often been pointed out in recent years is the generational difference. Specifically, those in their late 60s and older are conservative, while the 40s and 50s generations, who are currently at the center of society, are quite progressive. However, the 20s and 30s generations below them are said to be a so-called post-ideological generation.

What is even more characteristic of this generational distribution is the so-called aging effect—that is, it is unlikely that those in their 40s and 50s will become conservative as they get older. Rather, it is seen that the cohort effect based on the experiences of each generation is strong.

The experience of economic growth during the Park Chung-hee era for the elderly, the experience of democratization and the birth of progressive administrations for those in their 40s and 50s, and the experience of growing up in a South Korea that has already become an advanced nation for the younger generation—it can be said that what each generation has experienced strongly influences their perceptions and behavioral patterns.

Given this generational distribution in South Korean society, while there may be major changes in foreign and security policy due to a change in government in the near future, I would like to ask Professor Kurata for his outlook on the direction of South Korea's foreign and security policy, or the width of the swing, when considered over a medium- to long-term span. Will it settle down, or will the situation of violent swings continue for the time being?

And from the perspective of the international order in East Asia, what should be noted in the future—this would be the Indo-Pacific rather than just East Asia—is the importance of regions and countries such as India and Southeast Asia. Coincidentally, the Yoon administration formulated an Indo-Pacific strategy, and the Moon Jae-in administration also formulated and promoted the New Southern Policy, which emphasized relations with India and Southeast Asia.

Looking at the development of such regional policies in South Korea, I would also like to ask about South Korea's role and positioning in the Indo-Pacific or East Asia in the future.

It is said that the Trump administration may not have much interest in Southeast Asia, but I would like to ask Professor Mori what changes can be foreseen in the order of this region from the perspective of US involvement. Professor Mori, could you please start?

First, since the concepts of multipolarization and pluralization of the international order were mentioned earlier, I would like to comment on them.

According to my understanding, the concept of multipolarization is used in the political and diplomatic context of the real world, and sometimes as an analytical concept in international politics. The former has an aspect where it emerged as a discourse from countries like Russia, China, and India as an antithesis to a unipolar world dominated by the US, arguing that a multipolar world is preferable. Another aspect, which is also abstract, is that the term is used to indicate that the distribution of power is not concentrated in the US, as the US no longer has the influence it once did and other major powers and regional countries are beginning to have influence.

On the other hand, as an analytical concept, it originally refers to power as a resource. In easy-to-understand terms, there is a debate about where the poles are when military and economic power are quantified using various indicators. Looking at power as a resource, US power still stands out. Representative scholars like Stephen Brooks say that when looking at various indicators, US national power still stands out even compared to China.

Even looking only at the region, there is an argument that it is at most bipolar between the US and China.

When looking at international society, there are spaces where relationships are built based on rules, there are interstate relationships based on transactional ties, and in fact, there are relationships of intimidation by force or coexistence where norms are not shared at all, and these are likely distributed among states in various forms.

In such a situation, blocks like the US and G7 emerge. And perhaps blocks like China and Russia, plus countries that voted against the UN General Assembly resolution on Russia's invasion of Ukraine. And blocks that voted in favor of the condemnation resolution but have not imposed sanctions. Several groupings are formed, and moreover, there is no hierarchical relationship where these countries recognize each other; rather, a situation is emerging where their respective morality and authority have become nearly parallel. This is completely different from the situation in the 90s, and I used the word "pluralization" to refer to that.

Regarding Professor Nishino's question about where the strategic competition between the US and China will settle, it probably depends on how you define "settling."

To give a rough answer, one point is that the US originally expected China to become more like the US and for relations to improve, but what might be happening now is a situation where US diplomacy is subtly becoming more like Chinese diplomacy. In short, it is a mode of forming various diplomatic relations based on interests and power. Relationships that incorporate values might change under the Trump administration.

However, such things are temporary and change every time there is a change in government. Therefore, it will still be impossible to create a "settling point"—that is, a sustainable equilibrium or stable relationship where both sides repeatedly fulfill agreed-upon settlements or understandings and foster mutual expectations that the other will keep their promises. In particular, as long as each side has a desire to prove they are superior to the other, I feel that an equilibrium will not be created there.

As was the case with the US and the Soviet Union, ironically, once a crisis is weathered, a sense that the relationship must be made more stable may emerge from both sides, leading to the creation of understandings and rules. I sometimes think that only after weathering a crisis that is one step away from armed conflict will the momentum to seek equilibrium emerge from both the US and China.

Secondly, regarding how minilaterals will be positioned while China hawks are present, generally speaking, as Professor Nishino mentioned while quoting Colby, I think they will be emphasized as frameworks to counter China.

On the other hand, when holding specific consultations beyond generalities, as Colby says, the issue of how to handle China will test what kind of balancing role those three countries can play against China within existing minilaterals. If they fail to play the role the US expects, a trend may emerge where that framework or the partner country is disregarded.

In the Japan-US-ROK framework, North Korea strategy and China strategy will likely become issues, and I think that theoretically, Japan and South Korea must align on what goals they should aim for and pitch this to the Trump administration.

For example, in the current situation where the relationship between Russia and North Korea is deepening, there is the very difficult question of what outcome is desirable for Japan and South Korea. Even if deterrence is the base, what can be done and to what extent? It would be good if some agreement could be reached, but they might not agree on everything.

However, in any case, it is necessary to align opinions on what kind of efforts Japan and South Korea should pursue as three countries toward North Korea, and the same can probably be said for China. If a temperature difference appears there, the role they can play in the context of balancing against China will be considerably limited.

Therefore, while they are emphasized in general terms, the Trump administration's view of those frameworks may change as specific consultations are repeated.

Finally, regarding Southeast Asia. As pointed out, Trump himself probably does not have a very high interest in Southeast Asia and pays almost no attention to issues like the South China Sea. Rather, prioritists will look at Southeast Asian countries or the South China Sea issue from a military or strategic perspective, so Trump's high-level engagement with Southeast Asia is expected to be very intermittent and irregular, just like in his first administration.

However, for existing efforts such as maritime security with Southeast Asia or cooperation over digital infrastructure—specific individual efforts that do not catch Trump's radar—cooperation will likely proceed steadily at the working level.

Thank you very much. Now, Professor Kurata, please.

These are all difficult questions, but first, regarding the degree of shaking and rollback of Japan-US-ROK cooperation.

Since the "Camp David Agreement," there have been various follow-up measures, and talk of joint training between Japan and South Korea has emerged, but if a progressive administration takes power, I don't think they will move that forward. I believe they will sabotage it, even if they don't break the framework. We must be prepared for at least that much.

Regarding what Japan should do in such a situation, the trend that has continued since last year regarding the relationship between US Forces Japan and the Self-Defense Forces—where the USFJ headquarters is gaining some operational control from being an administrative headquarters and is achieving results as a combat headquarters—will likely have meaning in relation to the Korean Peninsula as well.

US Forces Japan cannot replace US Forces Korea, but the fact that they can actually conduct combat operations instead of just being administrative will have great significance. Regardless of what kind of administration is formed in South Korea, I believe it is important to strengthen this trend.

You mentioned the generational gap. I don't have much interaction with "progressives," so I can't say anything definitive, but regarding "conservatives," for example, students from South Korean military academies come to study at the National Defense Academy of Japan. They can be considered quite conservative people within South Korean society. However, how are they at the National Defense Academy? They are quite liberal. In other words, they are quite sensitive to issues of gender and harassment. While they are conservative, they are tolerant of social diversity.

Now, does the reverse hold true? I don't know how many people are progressive and quite sensitive to diversity but think in terms of foreign policy that "the Japan-South Korea relationship is important, so it's better not to raise historical issues."

I explained conservatives and progressives using the greatest common denominator this time, but in reality, it cannot be simplified that much. In other words, even if someone is a "conservative" in foreign policy, they might be a "progressive" in gender and diversity; the axes of conflict are not as simple as they used to be. Therefore, I question whether this kind of division will remain valid in the future.

However, broadly speaking, if so-called conservatism holds the views I mentioned and progressivism holds the views I mentioned, the possibility of a conservative president being born will likely decrease. In other words, there is a trend where it will become harder to win presidential elections. The election Yoon won recently was also very close. Furthermore, given the series of events starting from this martial law, I think we are entering an era where it will be harder for conservatives to win.

Some might think that President Yoon obtained a 40% support rate and that conservatives are doing quite well, but that is not a simple support rate; it includes votes against the opposition party. There are many people who are progressive but just dislike Lee Jae-myung, so those people likely voted for Yoon as a protest vote. The 40% figure is quite suspicious.

I call the current situation an "insurrection without gunfire," and with power being so divided under the conservative forces, I think it will be a huge trauma for conservative forces and people, especially among the youth.

So, this doesn't quite answer the question, but I want to say two things. First, the axis of conservative/progressive is shifting or at least diversifying, so the generational gap is not that simple. And second, with the conservative forces split this time, I believe we are entering an era where it will be increasingly difficult for conservatives to win, especially in presidential elections.

Thank you very much. It was impressive to see Professor Kurata's expression gradually darken as he spoke about the harsh reality facing the conservative forces.

As you said, the fact that President Yoon was impeached following President Park Geun-hye, and the fact that there is little prospect of the conservative forces uniting, are important considerations not only for the future of South Korean politics but also when thinking about the international order in East Asia.

I would like to express my gratitude for your valuable talk today.

(Composed based on the public symposium held by the Keio Institute of East Asian Studies (KIEAS) on January 18)