[Special Feature: International Order from an East Asian Perspective] [Session 1] International Order as Seen by Authoritarian States

In today's first session of the symposium, "International Order as Seen by Authoritarian States," we will consider how China and North Korea perceive the regional and global order today and their outlook for the future.

We are currently living in chaotic and unpredictable times. The paradigm shift in the international order that has been pointed out for some time—in short, the retreat of the post-war order based on Western-style liberal democracy—has finally become apparent through the COVID-19 pandemic and the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East.

In such a period of turmoil, creating a new order requires a fundamental philosophical breakthrough rather than mere stopgap strategies or tactics. Personally, I believe that any new order must be based on the historical and cultural contexts of the world's diverse countries and regions. In that sense, I feel that the interdisciplinary and internal perspectives provided by regional studies are becoming increasingly important.

Today, we have gathered the finest experts to discuss this theme. Our first speaker is Professor Naoko Eto, who is active in the field of economic security with China as her research field. Professor Eto, the floor is yours.

Thank you very much for this valuable opportunity today.

I would like to speak about the diplomatic strategy of the Xi Jinping administration in connection with economic security. In addition to being a current issue, this is an area that China itself has begun to emphasize within its diplomatic strategy. Economic security—the overlapping area between economy and military security—will likely hold a major key in the future competitive strategy between the U.S. and China.

In particular, in the area of advanced technology, semiconductors are already a real source of friction. Furthermore, regarding dual-use technologies, China strengthened its regulations last year; technologies that directly relate to military security but can also be applied to civilian use will become the next major key to economic security.

Discussions on economic security began with how to prepare for economic coercion from other countries, moved to technological competition, and now a broader understanding is spreading that the ultimate goal—the revitalization and development of the national economy—is the greatest lever for a country's own economic security. The concept of economic security itself is currently evolving to match reality.

Furthermore, the reason why China emphasizes economic security is directly linked to the discussion of how to form China's image within the international community. This is because the debate over where to seek the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party's one-party dictatorship—a defining characteristic of China—is the basis for China's current discourse on international strategy. Therefore, after first confirming the discussion on securing legitimacy, which is the Communist Party's ultimate goal, I would like to talk about the characteristics of the Xi Jinping administration.

The Communist Party has put forward a vision called the "Community with a Shared Future for Mankind," outlining how the ultimate international society should be. I will talk about this structure, followed by the reality of economic security and the strategic narrative—what kind of discourse they use to appeal their ideas to the international community.

This forms China's perception of the world while simultaneously shaping the discussion on how to involve the countries called the Global South—developing and emerging nations—within the competitive strategy against the United States. At the same time, it leads to taking an advantageous position in the competition over who is telling the truth regarding current issues like Gaza/the Middle East and the war in Ukraine. The Communist Party regime has begun to put forward such meticulously crafted strategies. After explaining these, I would like to discuss the outlook for U.S.-China relations in 2025.

First, regarding the logic of legitimacy, to put it simply, in China, it is explained that the Communist Party has legitimacy in maintaining a one-party dictatorship for three reasons: "past achievements," "present achievements," and "future achievements." Past achievements refer to history. It is the theory that the Communist Party is the one that defeated the invasion of the great powers and founded the nation. This is not necessarily wrong, and a characteristic of the Xi Jinping era since 2012 is that this discourse is being increasingly reinforced within historical education in China.

This ultimately affects Japan-China relations, but at present, the emphasis is not so much on criticizing Japan as an aggressor as it once was. Rather, the emphasis is placed on the idea that China won against the "century of humiliation" suffered under Japan, highlighting a strong China that overcame adversity. The current situation is that while issues of historical perception exist between Japan and China, they have not surfaced.

In contrast, "present achievements" involve more complex issues. As a reason for maintaining the system where the Communist Party governs the country, there is the logic of economic development—that everyone becomes wealthy if the Communist Party governs—and this resonates most with ordinary people. If told, "Remember 30 years ago; you are definitely living a better life now," many Chinese people would agree. This has become a narrative that people can empathize with through their actual living conditions, and it still holds great influence.

However, the current generation of Chinese people is perhaps facing for the first time a situation where the assets they hold might decrease in value. Until now, real estate prices naturally rose, and assets increased. For the first time, they are in a situation where values are steadily decreasing and losses are mounting. On top of that, there is anxiety about employment. Regarding social security, local government finances are also under strain.

While life has become more convenient, anxiety is growing that there is no guarantee things will get even better in the future. This is the reason why, even though the government hopes to transition the Chinese economy to an internal demand-led model, that effort is currently stalling.

In other words, consumption is not growing. Because people have anxieties about the future, they believe it is better to save to protect their lives rather than buy things. Although newspapers report achieving 5% growth, this is partly due to policy-driven front-loading of consumption, so the economy might cool down even further this year. The Communist Party regime has not been able to implement effective policies so far, and the achievement of economic success is beginning to waver.

Consequently, there is a desire to emphasize the anticipation of "future achievements." This is the explanation that "things will get better than they are now." In 2021, as the Communist Party reached its 100th anniversary during the pandemic and compiled its historical resolution, it announced that after achieving sufficient economic development, it would enter the stage of "Common Prosperity." It proclaimed a society where not just those with economic power, but everyone in China would become wealthy.

But recently, the Xi Jinping administration does not say this very often. In the midst of the current economic slowdown, it is difficult to feel prosperity, making it hard to capture people's hearts. Instead, they are putting forward narratives intended to guide domestic public opinion.

The Chinese Communist Party has always had a Propaganda Department, a specialized department for forming narratives that stir people's emotions. Recent reports suggest that tightening has become stricter, with instructions not to point out the negative aspects of the Chinese economy. When things do not go well domestically, the Communist Party guides the narrative to suppress people's dissatisfaction so it does not surface.

There is a risk that dissatisfaction might explode if suppressed too much, but for now, they continue to successfully guide and control public opinion using surveillance cameras and technology to monitor discourse on social media.

The concept put forward as an international vision is the "Community with a Shared Future for Mankind." What is the intention behind this? The Community with a Shared Future for Mankind suggests that all people in the world share a common destiny. For example, if global warming progresses, everyone will share that hardship, so let us develop together. This is constructed as a theory that is particularly easy for people in developing countries to accept. The point here is: who will lead this Community with a Shared Future for Mankind?

Of course, inwardly, China wants to exercise leadership. Publicly, China says it never intends to become a strong country that goes ahead of the United States and does not expect to catch up with the U.S., but if the possibility of catching up arises, they want to be the leader and make it a China-centered Community with a Shared Future for Mankind.

To that end, they have put forward the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, and the Global Civilization Initiative. China's grand blueprint for international strategy is to hold up the vision of a Community with a Shared Future for Mankind on top of these three pillars.

These three pillars of economy, security, and values are, so to speak, a re-explanation in China's own words of the overwhelming power in the three domains of economy, military, and values possessed by a hegemonic power. In addition, what China emphasizes now is the initiative in science and technology.

In terms of becoming a game-changer in the modern world, the intention to exercise initiative in rule-making and technological development has emerged. Three initiatives have been announced: the Global Data Security Initiative, the Global AI Governance Initiative, and the Global Cross-Border Data Flow Cooperation Initiative.

However, the first one, the Global Data Security Initiative, was announced a bit earlier in 2020 and is not mentioned much. While Foreign Minister Wang Yi announced this data security initiative, all the other global initiatives were announced by Xi Jinping himself at international conferences, giving it a slightly lower status.

The key as a concept is international strategy; in particular, AI governance and cross-border data flow cooperation are also communicated in English, making it clear that these are messages for the international community, not just for domestic audiences.

Another key is that within these initiatives, they state they want to form rules based on the standpoint of developing countries and strengthen cooperation with user countries.

China is an AI superpower alongside the United States and is a provider of platforms. In any economic activity, the side providing the platform has an overwhelming advantage. The same applies to AI; in particular, the system provider gains an advantageous position in data collection. However, while being an AI superpower, China is putting cooperation with the Global South—the users—at the forefront. This aim has the meaning of appealing the importance of technology while simultaneously sending a message that involves other countries.

Current Xi Jinping diplomacy clearly shows the intention of how to form narratives of economy, technology, and military security while involving other countries. This is also part of the strategy toward the United States. When competing with the U.S., who will join their team? They are communicating this in a way that is as unobvious as possible, yet suggests that partnering with China is definitely beneficial. This is the characteristic of their current international strategy.

So, what specific diplomatic tools are they using? The largest is the appeal of a massive market that no one can deny. Every country wants to sell goods to China. However, for companies that have entered the market, they also extract technology by making them follow rules or business practices within China. Making corporate personnel follow domestic rules has become one tool.

Furthermore, they apply export controls to companies. They impose export restrictions on critical minerals such as gallium, germanium, and graphite. Between 2023 and 2024, China clearly demonstrated that it can exercise influence worldwide in this way. By being told that China will not provide the critical minerals for which it has the most production capacity, other countries are coming to recognize that they must follow China's rules.

In using such tools, China has organized its domestic laws. Since around 2020, it has created various laws such as the Foreign Trade Law, the Export Control Law, the Dual-Use Items Export Control Regulations, and the Customs Law. The last two came into effect on December 1st last year, and regarding the Customs Law, it feels as though it was launched at a well-timed moment as the Trump administration's tariffs become an issue.

This legal framework was developed based on the experience during the first Trump administration, and it also allows for sanction cases. The Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law and the Unreliable Entity List serve as messages of what they recognize as problems while simultaneously being laws that inflict pain on the opponent. The development of such laws also keeps the strategy toward the U.S. in mind, making a clear stance on emphasizing rules. China is making it known both internally and externally that it is competing on a rule-based basis.

Emphasizing rules is precisely part of the international public opinion war, and in China, this is called strengthening "International Discourse Power." "Discourse power" is often translated as such, but in addition to the right to speak, it refers to a state of having the power where those who hear what is said follow it. Since the mid-2010s, China has been actively promoting the idea of increasing this discourse power in the international community.

International discourse power is also incorporated into Chinese-style modernization; China will explain China itself, so the international community should accept this. They are putting effort into how to get the international community, including the West, to accept the image of China they explain, asserting that the China the U.S. talks about is wrong. They appeal this by using the economy as a lever, using laws, and sending various messages.

This was clearly reinforced by the anti-dumping investigation against the EU launched last year. China says it investigated based on domestic requests that dumping was coming from Europe, but the world, including Europe, understands this as a retaliatory measure against the EU's tariffs on Chinese-made electric vehicles (EVs). By conducting anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations against tariff measures, their stance is that they are taking retaliatory measures based on rules. However, since calling it a retaliatory measure would put it outside the rules, they take the stance that they are acting based on domestic requests, in accordance with domestic law, and in a form that does not deviate from WTO rules.

This is a positioning that China does not deviate from the international economic order. For example, Canada announced last August that it would impose a 100% tariff on Chinese EVs. In response, while they did anti-dumping and anti-subsidy against Europe, they conducted an anti-discrimination investigation against Canada for the first time. The anti-discrimination investigation is only included as one item within Article 7 of the Foreign Trade Law, and no one expected them to use it.

When the EU imposed EV tariffs on China, it issued a thick investigation report of over 200 pages, properly explaining that subsidies were involved in certain areas and that they were imposing tariffs as a countermeasure. In contrast, Canada imposed EV tariffs on China with little evidence of such an investigation. China then pointed this out as an anti-discrimination measure, asking, "Has Canada conducted a proper investigation?" Externally, China has taken a more consistent approach than Canada.

In this context, they will confront the Trump administration. Looking at the personnel, people called China hawks are entering the administration. While there are nuances of difference—whether they are realists or essential China hawks—there is a consensus among Chinese experts that they are basically tough on China.

Trump has already announced an additional 10% tariff on China and a 25% tariff on Mexico and Canada (officially announced on February 1st). From Congress, there is also a legislative proposal that PNTR (Permanent Normal Trade Relations) should be revoked. A discussion has emerged that China's Most Favored Nation status itself should be ended.

Regarding both tariffs and PNTR, China has clearly stated in its Customs Law that it will take countermeasures, making it possible to respond with domestic law. Regarding Most Favored Nation status, they have newly written in things that were not included in previous tariff-related laws, preparing in response to the emergence of such discussions.

Regarding financial sanctions, a financial sanction plan against Chinese high-ranking officials related to actions toward Taiwan has been revived. Various moves that ripple through technology, economy, and even finance are being prepared.

However, I interpret that in Xi Jinping's New Year's address, it was put forward that China's diplomatic strategy basically remains unchanged. Although there are various changes in the international situation, China's own response will not change. Regarding Taiwan, the discourse has not changed significantly, nor has the volume of discourse increased. In other words, I think China is in a posture of steadily putting into execution the things they have set as goals and prepared for.

Interestingly, at the beginning of this year, a Research Center for the Community with a Shared Future for Mankind was established under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Foreign Minister Wang Yi gave the opening speech, saying that the idea of a "Community with a Shared Future for Mankind" is China's answer to the challenge of what kind of world to imagine and how to construct it. I think this means they are entering a stage of theorizing this at the research center and approaching the world more strategically. In terms of discourse as well, preparations for competition with the United States are progressing. In this context, the current state of East Asia is one where there are concerns about the relationship between the Trump administration and Taiwan, while on the other hand, Japan-China relations are reaching a momentum of reconciliation.

So, what will Japan choose in this? I believe we must not make a fixed decision. We must consider appropriate actions from time to time as the situation changes moment by moment. However, a strategic blueprint of where we should head is necessary. We should not sail without a nautical chart. I believe we are now required to have a strategic theory regarding the situation in East Asia, including China.

Thank you very much. As you discussed, when China proceeds with increasing its power, it attempts to secure its legitimacy not only through military, economic, and technological power but also by increasing its "discourse power" in the formation of international norms.

If that is the case, could we see a situation where China, by strengthening its involvement in norm formation, becomes the defender of the international order, while the United States, which advocates for its own national interests, and its followers lose their external explanatory power in this regard? As a legal space led by China is being created in the world, the question has emerged of how Japan should maintain its national interests and increase its presence in the formation of the international order.

Our second speaker is Professor Shunji Hiraiwa. He is a leading expert who will internally elucidate the logic of governance and external behavior of North Korea, the neighbor most invisible to us. Professor Hiraiwa, please.

Today, I would like to speak about "International Order as Seen by Authoritarian States" with North Korea as the subject.

As you know, Chairman Kim Jong Un used the term "New Cold War" in 2021, but what does the New Cold War mean for North Korea? From the following year, the situation in Ukraine changed significantly, and in that process, Russia and North Korea have drawn closer. This is the timing at which the new Trump administration in the U.S. will start again.

So, from the perspective of the international order as seen by North Korea, there is a keyword for North Korea called "Juche" (self-reliance), so I would like to speak using this as a clue.

First, as an authoritarian regime, North Korea has seen power inherited over three generations—Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong Un—and I would like to consider this from the side of the regime. The most important thing is that it is a divided nation; this is predicated on the denial of South Korea, and being the only legitimate government on the Korean Peninsula becomes the basis for the legitimacy of their own regime. This concept of a divided nation is quite difficult to understand.

I once had the opportunity to speak with Mr. Jeong Se-hyun, who was the Minister of Unification during the Kim Dae-jung administration in South Korea. When I asked what was difficult about being the Minister of Unification, he said, "In diplomacy, there are long-term give-and-takes, but from South Korea's position in a divided nation, the relationship with North Korea is always questioned moment by moment as to which side is right. There is absolutely no yielding to the other side. That is extremely difficult. It is different from other diplomacy."

When North Korea faces South Korea, if conflict is the premise, they are denying the very existence of the other side, so they always face the question of which is right compared to the South Korean regime. At that time, the basis for legitimacy—though in reality there are many fictional parts—is their claim of anti-Japanese partisan activities and that they won Korea's independence by themselves.

Yoon Suk-yeol, who is currently facing impeachment proceedings in South Korea, is a conservative administration. When the people called progressives who oppose him were still in the student movement, their basic idea was that the South Korean regime had no legitimacy. Rather, they believed North Korea had the legitimacy.

The basis for this is the understanding that South Korea did not win independence by itself, but that it was brought about by the victory of the Allied powers. In contrast, there was a group called the Juche Idea faction that said extreme things like North Korea has legitimacy because they won independence through anti-Japanese partisans, and members of this group have even been part of the administration.

In this way, being a divided nation is a characteristic of both South Korea and North Korea. Those who studied at Keio are always conscious of being a divided nation, and there is a stance of considering South Korea and North Korea with a certain sense of unity, or as a single unit; I believe this is a tradition since Professor Masao Okonogi.

Regarding the power structure of North Korea, in terms of power, the Party, the State, and the Military are the three pillars of an orthodox socialist country. One characteristic is that the supreme leader holds the top position in all pillars. I think a characteristic of North Korea is that this basically never disperses. For example, when transitioning from Kim Il Sung to Kim Jong Il, Kim Il Sung was the top of the three pillars, but at the 6th Party Congress in 1980, Kim Jong Il was the number two in everything. Therefore, it was said since then that Kim Jong Il was the successor. I think this remains unchanged today.

In addition to that, the issue of authority is deeply involved. As North Korean authority, Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong Un are called the "Paektu Bloodline." What is this Paektu Bloodline? Kim Il Sung's great-grandfather, Kim Ung-u, is said in North Korean history to be a person who was active in the General Sherman incident, and his father, Kim Hyong-jik, is also supposed to have been active in the Korean revolution. The Paektu Bloodline in North Korea—specifically, why Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong Un can be the supreme leaders—is because inheriting something like a soul called the "Revolutionary Tradition" from generation to generation constitutes the succession of authority in North Korea.

Now, his sister, Ms. Kim Yo Jong, and his daughter, Kim Ju Ae, have appeared, and it is often said that Kim Ju Ae will be the successor in the future. While there is no discussion at all about how to inherit Party, State, or Military posts, authority can be fully explained through the flow I just mentioned.

As a way of thinking about the power base, I think one characteristic of North Korea's external stance is that the external environment and domestic politics are closely linked. This is the concept of "Juche."

The word Juche appeared in December 1955 when Kim Il Sung gave a public speaking and said that the time had come to create our own style, no longer Soviet-style or Chinese-style. This was an idea that emerged within the power struggle with domestic groups connected to the Soviet Union and groups connected to China. The domestic power struggle in North Korea inevitably had to be conscious of international relations. I think this also greatly influences North Korea's current view of the international order.

"Juche" specifically consists of three things. The first is "Independence in Politics." Our view is that this was established at the "August Plenary Meeting Incident" in 1956 and the First Conference of Representatives in 1958.

The second is "Self-sufficiency in the Economy." This involved being pressured by the Soviet Union to join COMECON and refusing it. The logic at that time was the theory of an independent national economy. The logic for refusing COMECON membership was that the Korean Peninsula was still in a divided state and joining COMECON would not be very helpful; they would join after unifying and becoming a single economic unit.

The third is "Self-defense in National Defense." Seeing the Soviet Union's response to the Cuban Missile Crisis, the idea that they must protect themselves even in national defense led to the strengthening of self-defense capabilities. These three constitute Juche, and in the 1960s and 70s, it was common for kindergarten children to sing "Independence, Self-sufficiency, Self-defense."

Expanding that to the external stance is the independent line, and the general view is that this was established at the Second Conference of Representatives in 1966. As "Independence toward China and the Soviet Union," the trigger was considering how to distance themselves from China in response to China's Cultural Revolution. This North Korean independent line dislikes the absolute influence of specific countries. By utilizing the conflict between major powers, they acquire their own independence within that balance. This would be what North Korea calls "Juche."

Recently, there have been points made that the use of the Juche era name as the primary calendar and the counting of years from Kim Il-sung's birth have disappeared, and mentions of Juche ideology itself are decreasing, suggesting a shift toward promoting Kim Jong-un himself rather than Kim Il-sung or Kim Jong-il. While it is likely true that the system is changing to center on Kim Jong-un, I still believe that the concept of "Juche" remains sufficiently effective when explaining North Korea's current politics, diplomacy, or international relations.

So, what is the specific international order of the Korean Peninsula? For North Korea, the international order was formed by the Korean War. Looking at the structure of the conflict at the time, North Korea launched a war of national liberation against South Korea. The UN forces intervened in response, and what initially started as a civil war became an international war. Furthermore, the Chinese People's Volunteer Army joined the war. The Korean War is considered an "international civil war," but the conflict structure on the Korean Peninsula has a multi-layered structure consisting of two conflicts: the ethnic conflict between North and South Korea and the conflict between the Eastern and Western blocs. After the armistice, North Korea concluded two Treaties of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance (with the Soviet Union and China) in 1961, further deepening this conflict structure.

It was not impossible for this structure to be dismantled during the process of the end of the Cold War starting in the late 1980s, but unfortunately, it did not go well. First, in September 1990, the Soviet Union normalized diplomatic relations with South Korea. Normally, it would have been North Korea's turn to normalize relations with either Japan or the United States next, but China, in response to the flexible diplomacy of then-Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui, rushed to realize the normalization of China-South Korea relations in August 1992.

From North Korea's perspective, they became isolated within the conflict structure. They did not know if the Soviet Union would continue to provide a nuclear umbrella as it had before. Their logic would be that they must possess nuclear weapons themselves to eliminate the situation of being unilaterally exposed to the U.S. nuclear threat.

The prototype of the New Cold War that North Korea imagines is how to face its adversary, the United States. North Korea is facing the United States, not South Korea, with China and the Soviet Union as its backers, while South Korea and Japan stand behind the United States. I think this is the rough image of the conflict structure for North Korea.

From North Korea's perspective, the United States is the only entity with the intent and capability to eliminate their regime. How to coexist with it or build a relationship becomes the most important task for maintaining the North Korean regime. From North Korea's perspective, since Russia exited the conflict structure of the Korean Peninsula during the dismantling of the Cold War, China became the sole backer. This situation has continued for decades and is the current state of affairs.

Considering North Korea's position from the perspective of Juche, this state is not very comfortable. China's influence is too strong, making it difficult to maintain a balance. They seem to have considered balancing between the United States and China temporarily, but that did not go well either. In that case, a comfortable conflict structure for North Korea would be to face the United States with both China and Russia as backers. This would be the desirable international order for them.

Thinking this way, the rapprochement between Russia and North Korea I mentioned at the beginning might have the significance of relativizing China's influence. Regarding Russia-North Korea relations, some viewed it as a rapprochement where North Korea is not that important to Russia, so North Korea would be discarded once the Ukraine situation ends, and North Korea approached them knowing that. However, I have come to think that North Korea may not just want short-term military technology or aid from Russia, but may be betting on its own survival strategy within a larger framework.

On the other hand, what about South Korea? Although the political situation in South Korea has become difficult to understand due to the current circumstances, I think it is meaningful to consider what the Yoon Suk-yeol administration's North Korea policy was.

In August last year, Yoon Suk-yeol announced a new unification policy as his North Korea policy, and at that time, he spoke of unification through liberal democracy. Since its inauguration, the Yoon administration has said it would pressure North Korea on human rights issues, and in response, North Korea has abandoned its theory of peaceful unification. When the Yoon administration put human rights issues at the forefront, North Korea naturally reacted, and there was no way inter-Korean relations would go well, so I wondered why they were doing such a thing. However, it seems one view was that South Korean society is currently undergoing major changes. In particular, the government is becoming unable to control the younger generation who are devoted to Hallyu (Korean Wave) content. The idea was to work on this and cause a collapse from within.

I don't know what the result was, but North Korea itself is sensitive to social changes within the country and is sounding the alarm, especially to the younger generation. Kim Jong-un has also mentioned the Socialist Patriotic Working Youth League and other organizations, saying that tightening of control must be done in various places.

Current North Korea considers its foreign relations based on such domestic conditions, but since they want to somehow relativize the overwhelming influence of China, I think they tried to strengthen relations with Russia. North Korea was excessively cautious about COVID-19 and shut down trade with China. Before COVID, 95% of North Korea's foreign economy was related to China, but even after COVID ended, China-North Korea relations have not easily returned to how they were before.

What I recall is something a Chinese expert told me a long time ago. China was trying to get North Korea to reform and open up. When the then-supreme leader Kim Jong-il visited, they would try to show him places where reform and opening were progressing, such as Shanghai. In Shanghai, during the Jiang Zemin era, the approval rating for the Chinese Communist Party was the highest despite reform and opening being the most advanced. Therefore, the intention was to convey to Kim Jong-il that reform and opening and the approval rating for the regime are not necessarily contradictory.

However, at one point, a Chinese expert on the Korean Peninsula told me that North Korea no longer needs to reform and open up. If they just open up to China, since China is reforming and opening up, North Korea is effectively doing the same. I thought that from this perspective, North Korea's position would be no different from a vassal state of China. The fact that such an idea came from the Chinese side must have been very unpleasant for North Korea.

North Korea is currently pursuing a five-year defense plan, and it is said that they may conduct a seventh nuclear test as part of it. There is an explanation that the reason they are not doing this is due to pressure from China, and I myself think that influence exists. However, from North Korea's perspective, this must be a very unpleasant situation. From the perspective of Juche, not being able to do what they want to do because of Chinese pressure is exactly a situation where Juche is not established. I believe the relationship with Russia is intended to relativize that.

North Korea has supported Russia's invasion of Ukraine from the beginning and has provided not only weapons and ammunition but also dispatched troops. They concluded the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with Russia, raising their military treaty to the same level as that with China, and also seeking Russia as an option for the economy.

What North Korea is thinking for the future is likely to normalize relations with the United States, have various sanctions lifted, and diversify trade. They probably want to revive trade with South Korea as well, and diversify trade to include Southeast Asia, Europe, and even Japan to relativize China's influence. While economic relations with China are overwhelmingly strong, how to achieve independence from China by maintaining a balance—this, I believe, is North Korea's international order.

Thank you very much. While listening to your talk, questions arose in my mind as to whether diplomacy for North Korea is simply positioned as something that should serve the maintenance and expansion of "Juche," or whether it is also a means to pursue some other national interest.

For example, in China, as mentioned in Ms. Eto's talk, national development, including the economy, is important as the basis for the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party's one-party rule. Such an orientation serves as a motivation to aim for a rule-based international order, at least on the surface.

In contrast, for North Korea, breaking away from dependence on China and maintaining Juche are important. Are the propositions of economic development and improving people's lives not a basis for legitimacy or a motivation for diplomacy for the Kim regime? I thought about these things while listening to your talk.

Now, I would like to introduce today's discussant, Professor Shinji Yamaguchi from the National Institute for Defense Studies, who is well-versed in modern Chinese history, the present, and security issues in East Asia in general. Professor Yamaguchi, please.

I believe that regional studies, especially research on the East Asian region, are becoming increasingly important today. This involves deepening academic research on the region and how to return the analysis of regional developments happening right before our eyes to society and policy.

What is happening before us now is, for one, the deepening of the U.S.-China confrontation. Furthermore, if I may say so without fear of being misunderstood, a trend toward bloc formation is becoming visible. In particular, the relationship between China, Russia, and North Korea is becoming a key point. I think that is an important point in looking at this region. Of course, looking at the actual situation in the region, it may not be such a simple bloc, but it is also a fact that something beyond our expectations is emerging as a major trend, and I think it is important to analyze this.

With that premise, I will first comment on Ms. Eto's report. In looking at the era of U.S.-China confrontation, especially from China's perspective, this confrontation is not limited to military security. It is a broad confrontation that also involves issues such as the economy and technology, as well as ideology, discourse, rules, and norms.

In that context, we used to think of the economy and technology more as safety valves. We thought that because economic relations were good, even if political relations were bad or there was a security confrontation, it would be possible to manage U.S.-China relations and Japan-China relations somehow. However, now, on the contrary, they have become a kind of weapon and a factor that further promotes division.

What was interesting was that China is not only aiming for a form different from the U.S.-led economic order in terms of ideas, but is actually preparing tools. I listened with interest to the explanation that they are also equipped with means to counter-attack against the other party's sanctions.

Based on that, I have two questions. One is, who is at the center of China's promotion of these economic security policies within the Xi Jinping administration? Is it something Xi Jinping thought of personally, or is there someone leading it?

The other point is, if it is in the form Professor Eto points out, a trend like a kind of split between the U.S. and China in the economic field will probably appear clearly in the future. In that, the U.S. side can be imagined as Western countries that have maintained the existing order, but what kind of countries would be the members of the China-led economic order that China envisions? That is my question.

Next, I listened to Professor Hiraiwa's report with interest as it clearly showed North Korea's logic. I will limit my questions to two points. One is a somewhat large question about how to view the relationship between China, Russia, and North Korea.

In the report, there was an explanation that it is important for North Korea to balance the countries that serve as its backers, China and Russia. It was mentioned that the rapprochement with Russia has started again, and it can be clearly seen that the relationship between Russia and North Korea has become close. Also, the relationship between China and Russia is generally considered good.

However, what is not clear is the relationship between China and North Korea. How is the relationship between China, Russia, and North Korea perceived? Currently, both China and Russia are deepening their confrontation with the United States. In that case, it would take a form that leans quite heavily toward the anti-U.S. side, but is this desirable?

Another point I would like to ask about is the point Professor Hiraiwa pointed out at the end. It was a very interesting story that South Korea is taking a strategy to break down North Korea from the inside using human rights and K-POP as policies. This is highly likely to be seen as a color revolution-style method that China and Russia dislike very much. I would like to ask if such movements are causing backlash or caution within North Korea.

Finally, I have a common question for both of you. As expected, the story of the Trump administration is a concern, and within that, the situation in Ukraine seems very significant. Regarding Ukraine, I think the basic foreign policy of the Trump administration is to make peace quickly and concentrate as much as possible on Asian issues, but how do China and North Korea view this? Please tell us how the Trump administration and the situation in Ukraine are thought to affect the situation in East Asia.

Regarding the first question of who is responsible for economic security within China, I have the same question myself, and to be honest, I don't know. Even if I ask people in China, they don't know. Thinking externally and comparing it to the case of Japan, it is probably the Central National Security Commission, but since we don't know what this commission is doing in the first place, there is no way to confirm it.

We don't even know who the person will be to serve as the U.S. counterpart for Trump 2.0. The position corresponding to Mr. Liu He during 1.0. This time, since Mr. Han Zheng is going to the inauguration, he may play a role as a messenger, but no one has emerged who has gained Mr. Xi Jinping's trust and will be the window for strategy toward the U.S. based on a good understanding of economic issues and the United States. Mr. Li Qiang is also a bit difficult. It's hard to imagine it being Mr. He Lifeng either.

I think one of the reasons for this is the issue of the downfall of people Mr. Xi Jinping had promoted. If they stand at the forefront, they don't know when they will be cut off, and everyone is afraid and cannot take that position. This domestic political constraint in China makes the policy-making process very difficult to understand. Unfortunately, the honest answer is that the key person for economic security is also unknown.

Regarding the other question, within the economic split between the U.S. and China, the three international frameworks that China has long emphasized most are the UN, BRICS, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Along with that, it is also certain that they place importance on Africa as a position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, such as going to Africa at the beginning of every year, and are actively engaging in discussions involving developing and emerging countries.

This also relates to the third question, but I think the key countries this year will be Russia, Iran, and North Korea. While the Trump administration is starting to move toward a ceasefire in Ukraine, Iran, which has influence in the Middle East, is approaching China. Russia's dependence on China has been increasing from the start. North Korea is in the state we discussed. Furthermore, Russia is also approaching North Korea and Iran. It is evident that all three parties need each other, so from China's perspective, I think they have in mind that these can be used as political cards against Trump.

Alternatively, in the Middle East and Ukraine, when the discussion of post-war economic reconstruction emerges as a practical issue, how to appeal to the international community regarding the role to be played by China's economic power will also affect the subsequent competition with the United States.

The exercise of influence in a ceasefire and the exercise of influence in economic reconstruction are both areas where China can use diplomatic cards. Since there is no direct damage and no out-of-pocket expense, I think they are thinking of successfully leaving their mark.

Before answering Professor Yamaguchi's questions, I would like to answer the question I received from Professor Kojima.

It was about whether the economy does not become a motivation for national strategy. Of course, I think it would be a motivation, but North Korea is a divided nation, and furthermore, South Korea is overwhelmingly winning in terms of the economy. Therefore, if they make the economy the goal, it would lead to the story that South Korea has a better regime. That is why I think a characteristic of theirs is to seek superiority over South Korea in other areas.

Next is the question of whether they have shifted too much toward the anti-U.S. side in the relationship between China, Russia, and North Korea in Professor Yamaguchi's questions. They have experience in holding summit meetings at least three times during the first Trump administration. Therefore, I think they consider the relationship with the U.S. not just as a confrontational relationship but as having some kind of opportunity.

In doing so, while there is meaning for North Korea to keep China as a backer in a situation where China is in conflict with the United States, on the other hand, China's attitude can be unpleasant.

Immediately after the Biden administration started, the U.S. and China held a 2+2 in Anchorage, and Yang Jiechi and Blinken engaged in a war of words. The conclusion that came out at that time was that they could cooperate in four areas. The four areas were the environment, Iran, Afghanistan, and North Korea. From North Korea's perspective, there could be nothing more unpleasant than this. What do they mean by saying we are an area where they can cooperate in relations with the U.S.? I think how to keep a distance from China is important for North Korea.

During the first Trump administration, three U.S.-North Korea summits were held, but there were also inter-Korean summits before and after them. Kim Jong-un went to report to China every time there was a U.S.-North Korea or inter-Korean summit. He had to show maximum consideration to China, the sole backer. However, being treated unilaterally like a vassal state is very unpleasant for North Korea. I think this would be the answer to the first question.

The second point is Yoon Suk-yeol's unification policy in South Korea. To my memory, this is the second time South Korea has taken such a policy toward North Korea. The first was during the Kim Young-sam administration in the 1990s. At that time, they used money to break into the Socialist Patriotic Working Youth League (SPWYL), and the SPWYL fell apart as an organization. Since North Korea also has that trauma, their caution toward the SPWYL is particularly strong.

When I went to China last September for the first time in five years and spoke with experts, they called this "peaceful evolution" but said that peaceful evolution is not effective. On the other hand, when I discussed it with experts on the South Korean side, they said that in the 90s, North Korea was in a difficult economic situation and we won them over with money, but China provided a lifeline and as a result, North Korea held out. But this time it's not money. They say it's culture. They say that no matter how much China lends a hand, the devotion to K-POP and Hallyu dramas will not change.

I think there is no doubt that North Korea is very wary of this. For example, during COVID, North Korean defector groups and anti-North groups were sending various things to North Korea attached to balloons. The reason they overreacted to this is that their wariness toward things like Hallyu dramas on USB chips is very strong. In an official announcement, North Korea repeatedly said, "Do not touch the balloons sent from the South because they have COVID germs on them," but what North Korea definitely disliked was the USB chips attached to the balloons.

Regarding the third question of what North Korea will do under the Trump administration, there are voices within the United States saying that it's no use talking about denuclearization anymore and that there's no choice but to do it through arms control. Since IAEA Director General Grossi is also starting to say things like they must negotiate with North Korea as a nuclear-armed state, I think they will bet on that and face the Trump administration.

In Ukraine, I think North Korea is involved in a war between major powers with its own sense of determination. I initially thought they only wanted short-term technical cooperation in their relationship with Russia, but Professor Masao Okonogi told me, "Aren't you looking at it with the image of when the Chinese People's Volunteer Army joined the Korean War? Since a small country is involved in a war between major powers, it's better to look at it with the image of when South Korea was involved in the Vietnam War." He pointed out that I should consider that they are doing it with the determination of betting the national fate, and I realized he was right.

Regarding the Ukraine war itself, it is not something North Korea itself can influence the trend of, so they will likely respond based on the Russia-North Korea relationship. There may also be a way of thinking that if U.S.-North Korea relations go well, it would be better for Ukraine to settle down as well. Since the U.S.-North Korea relationship is the axis for North Korea, it is also not very desirable for the U.S. and China to be in conflict when that is going well. Since there are parts where they might be stopped by the Chinese side, I think they will act while watching the situation.

Listening to the discussion so far, I have reaffirmed that both the Xi Jinping administration and the Kim Jong-un administration are envisioning an order with the highest priority on maintaining the legitimacy of their rule, based on the history of their respective countries. Conversely, it means that only by internally understanding the position of each regime and social changes can we have a down-to-earth discussion about the formation of the international order. Thanks to the efforts of the professors who reported and the discussant Professor Yamaguchi, I think we were able to have a very substantial discussion. I would like to thank everyone here and close the first session. Thank you very much.

(Based on the public symposium of the Keio Institute of East Asian Studies (KIEAS) held on January 18)