[Feature: America "After Trump"] Regime Change in America as Seen from the Middle East

The U.S. presidential election was a focus of attention in the Middle East as well. Throughout the campaign, Middle Eastern media, including Arabic-language outlets, reported daily and in detail on the movements of incumbent Republican President Trump and Democratic candidate Joe Biden. This is, of course, because it is believed that changes in U.S. policy toward the Middle East actually have a profound impact on Middle Eastern countries.

U.S. Middle East policy has evolved through various eras: starting with the post-World War II policy of protecting Israel and the supply of Middle Eastern oil; the two-pillar policy (Over-the-Horizon policy) of the Cold War era; the Carter Doctrine, which declared U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf region to be of vital importance; the dual containment policy to suppress Iran and Iraq after the Gulf War; and the War on Terror following the September 11 attacks. In U.S. Middle East diplomacy, friends and foes have frequently swapped places depending on the transition of the regional situation, and the regional power map and correlation diagrams have been as ever-changing as the Warring States period.

On the other hand, Middle Eastern countries also believe that the Middle East region occupies an extremely important position for the United States. In particular, many people in the Middle East shared the perception that the U.S. would never leave the region in order to protect Israel, its greatest ally in the Middle East, and to secure oil, the lifeblood of the economy.

Furthermore, from the perspective of Middle Eastern countries, the U.S. presence in the region was meaningful. Especially for the sparsely populated Gulf Arab states, a presence like the United States—which possesses formidable military power but lacks territorial ambitions—was indispensable for security to protect themselves from regional powers with territorial ambitions.

Paradoxically, the same can be said for anti-American countries. For anti-American nations, the presence of the U.S. (and Israel) in the Middle East served as a convenient excuse to justify their own non-democratic and inhumane authoritarian politics. Additionally, for countries that adopted a wartime footing and built various military organizations for that purpose, the existence of an enemy was necessary; the presence of a powerful enemy like the U.S. was essential to maintain and develop such organizations.

However, by the 1990s, the arch-enemy Soviet Union had already disappeared, a relaxation of tensions was seen between the rival nations of Iran and Saudi Arabia, and signs of a resolution to Middle East peace appeared with the Oslo Accords. Consequently, the necessity for the U.S. to be involved in the Middle East was decreasing, and the American public was losing interest in the region.

On the other hand, the September 11 attacks occurred in 2001, leading the U.S. to declare a War on Terror and overthrow the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which harbored the terrorist organization Al-Qaeda. Furthermore, the fact that the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks were from pro-American countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) was a shock to the U.S. administration. The so-called "neoconservative" faction began to play a major role within the White House, and a foreign policy emphasizing ideals—such as prioritizing Israel and expanding democracy—gained influence, leading to the fall of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003. The U.S. was once again dragged back into the Middle East. Moreover, as a result of the Iraq War, a pro-Iranian Shia government was born in Iraq, which conversely expanded Iran's influence in the Middle East.

Regarding Iran, suspicions of nuclear weapons development surfaced in the early 2000s, and the confrontation between Iran and the U.S./Israel intensified to a hair-trigger situation involving the international community. This was also true for the Gulf states, which are Iran's neighbors. Due to nuclear suspicions and the expansion of Iranian influence in the Arab world, Gulf Arab states like Saudi Arabia suddenly reverted from the detente of the 90s back to a Cold War era. However, it was the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), concluded in 2015 during the Obama administration, that eased that state of tension to some extent.

Nevertheless, with the so-called "Arab Spring" starting in late 2010, long-term dictatorships in the Middle East collapsed one after another. When power vacuums were subsequently created, the terrorist organization "Islamic State" (IS) began to run rampant not only within the region but also in countries worldwide. Furthermore, during this time, many pro-American Arab countries developed a strong sense of distrust, believing that the Obama administration sat idly by and watched the collapse of pro-American regimes like the Mubarak administration in Egypt.

On the other hand, dissatisfaction grew because the U.S. did not take a hardline stance against the Assad regime in Syria, which had fallen into a state of de facto civil war and was oppressing its own citizens; voices from Gulf Arab states criticized the Obama administration as weak. At the same time, they became increasingly wary of Iran further extending its influence into Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq by taking advantage of the instability in the Arab region.

Furthermore, triggered by the start of the shale oil industry in the U.S. around 2003, the importance of Middle Eastern oil to the U.S. economy began to decline. As the critical element of oil connecting the U.S. and the Middle East weakened, cracks gradually emerged between the U.S. and pro-American Middle Eastern countries (many of which are oil producers). Meanwhile, pressure against fossil fuels as the culprit of global warming intensified, which also affected U.S.-Middle East relations mediated by oil.

It was in this context that President Trump appeared. From a position of rejecting the Obama administration, he overturned Obama's legacies across the board, withdrew from the JCPOA in 2017, and began applying "maximum pressure" on Iran. Furthermore, to reinforce this anti-Iran policy, the Trump administration involved Arab countries that shared an anti-Iran stance. By turning a blind eye to human rights violations and exporting state-of-the-art weapons, he kept Saudi Arabia and the UAE in his camp, brought them closer to their arch-enemy Israel, and attempted to build a new anti-Iran encirclement. It is symbolic that President Trump's first overseas trip after taking office was to Saudi Arabia.

In response, although physical evidence is insufficient, Iran is said to have used various pawns to carry out attacks targeting the interests of the U.S. and regional pro-American countries in and around the Persian Gulf. Behind this was the Quds Force, responsible for external operations of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. In January 2020, the U.S. military assassinated the commander of the Quds Force, Qasem Soleimani, in Iraq. This increased the possibility of a military conflict between Iran and the U.S., but it was somehow avoided.

On the other hand, the Palestinian issue, which had long been a pillar of U.S. Middle East policy, gradually lost the interest of the U.S. administration after Palestinian autonomy began with the Oslo Accords. Particularly under the Trump administration, the stance became unilaterally pro-Israel, and consideration for Palestine was lacking. During the Trump era, it is said that presidential aides—notably Senior Advisor to the President Jared Kushner, who is a son-in-law and an Orthodox Jew—were at the core of Middle East policy planning. Kushner is said to have played a major role in moving the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem, the "Deal of the Century" regarding Middle East peace, and the normalization agreements between Israel and Arab countries, starting with the UAE.

Regardless of the evaluation, it cannot be denied that the Trump administration brought about significant changes regarding Middle East peace. However, these "achievements" do not seem to have been very useful in President Trump's election campaign. In fact, Middle East issues were hardly ever a point of contention during the presidential election.

Biden also rarely mentioned Middle East issues during the campaign. As can be inferred from the fact that Biden himself once called himself a Zionist despite not being Jewish, he is an ardent supporter of Israel; therefore, he likely will not completely overturn Trump's achievements regarding Middle East peace, such as the embassy move to Jerusalem. Nevertheless, as actual policy, there is a high possibility he will take a policy that considers the Palestinian side to some extent, aiming for the realization of a negotiated "two-state solution," which is the official Middle East peace policy of the Democratic Party.

The shift in the weight of U.S. Middle East policy from the Israel-Palestine issue toward the Persian Gulf is a long-term trend, and even in the Biden administration, Gulf policy is what is most likely to change visibly. For example, while the Trump administration took a hardline policy toward Iran with regime change in sight, Biden has clearly stated a return to the JCPOA. Both Secretary of State Antony Blinken and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan in the new administration were involved in Iran policy during the Obama era, and the personnel structure for a U.S. return to the JCPOA is in place. However, for that to happen, in addition to abolishing the "maximum pressure" imposed by Trump, the nuclear development that Iran pursued by ignoring regulations after the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA must also be returned to its original state, which is a considerably high hurdle. In fact, the Iranian side is attempting to raise uranium enrichment to 20% in defiance of the nuclear deal.

There will also likely be backlash from the most important allies in the Middle East during the Trump era, such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, which are in conflict with Iran. There are also reports of the possibility of involving Saudi Arabia and others in a new JCPOA. In any case, it is unlikely that the Biden administration will tolerate Iran's "intervention in Arab countries." It is hard to imagine that the U.S. will immediately begin moving concretely toward improving relations with Iran.

On the other hand, what Arab countries are wary of includes the fact that President Biden is interested in human rights and the environment. Most countries in the Middle East have non-democratic political systems. During the Trump era, they could hope for leniency by purchasing large quantities of weapons or investing vast sums in lobbying, but it is unclear whether that will work under the Biden administration. In particular, the Gulf Arab states that had built a solid friendly relationship with the Trump administration may be trembling with fear.

Perhaps in anticipation of the Biden administration, Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar have already launched policies that, while not exactly democratization, show consideration for the human rights of foreign workers, relax religious regulations, and expand political participation for citizens.

However, this does not mean that these measures are sufficient. Regarding Saudi Arabia in particular, President Biden, with the murder of a Saudi journalist in the fall of 2018 in mind, asserted, "I am not going to sell any more weapons to (Saudi Arabia), and I will make them pay the price (for the journalist's murder)," and also said, "I intend to end support for the Saudi-led war in Yemen."

In the case where Jamal Khashoggi, a Saudi journalist based in the U.S., criticized the policies of Saudi Arabia's de facto ruler Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) and was murdered inside the Saudi Consulate General in the ancient Turkish city of Istanbul, the theory that MbS himself was involved remains strong in Western media. If the U.S. were to strictly hold MbS accountable, it is obvious that relations between the two countries would sour. For Saudi Arabia, a deterioration in relations with the U.S. is not a wise move, as it could have negative impacts both in terms of security and the reforms to end oil dependency led by MbS.

However, there are not many options Saudi Arabia can take that would likely satisfy the Biden administration. The most promising would be a breakthrough in the Yemen conflict, which Biden also mentions. If Yemen moves toward a resolution, the humanitarian crisis said to be the worst of this century (about which the West has expressed extremely strong concern) would likely improve, and relations between the Saudi-UAE coalition and Iran might also get a little better. However, the Yemen conflict is extremely complex, and it is hard to believe it will be resolved so easily.

Furthermore, with the expansion of shale oil development, the U.S. has already become the world's top crude oil producer. The "special relationship" based on the exchange of oil and security between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. since the 1940s has transformed significantly. However, many countries still depend on Middle Eastern oil, and if a giant oil producer like Saudi Arabia becomes unstable and the supply of oil is interrupted, the global economy could fall into chaos, which would then have a negative impact on the United States as well.

Gulf Arab states, led by Saudi Arabia, were concerned that if Biden became president, he would follow the policies of the Obama administration, which tried to deal with Iran in a conciliatory manner and distance itself from Arab countries. For the Biden administration to not desire an improvement in relations with Iran and to continue an unwavering commitment to Israel's security, a solid relationship with Arab countries is essential. To achieve this, Biden must convince Arab countries that his campaign promise of returning to the JCPOA and reconciliation with Iran are separate things, and that the U.S. will prevent Iranian interference in the Arab world.

When Biden's victory became certain, many Middle Eastern Arab countries immediately expressed their congratulations, but the expressions of congratulations from Saudi Arabia and Israel were delayed. Both countries eventually offered proper congratulations, but a sense of wariness toward President Biden can be glimpsed in this delay.

Furthermore, President Trump continued his involvement in the Middle East even after his defeat in the presidential election became almost certain. In November, it was reported that Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu secretly visited Saudi Arabia, and U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo was also said to be present (the Saudi side denied this). Already, with Trump's mediation, the UAE, Bahrain, and Sudan had agreed to normalize diplomatic relations with Israel, followed by Morocco in December. From Israel's perspective, whether Saudi Arabia—which considers itself the leader of the Arab and Islamic world—will follow suit is extremely important for Israel's diplomacy and is on a different level than the cases of other countries. It also remains to be seen whether this will be the final summation of Trump's diplomacy or be carried over into the Biden era.

On the other hand, in the so-called "Qatar Crisis," where Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt severed diplomatic relations with Qatar and imposed an economic blockade in 2017, the U.S., along with Kuwait, mediated the improvement of relations between Saudi Arabia and Qatar. In fact, at the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) summit at the beginning of the year, the four countries including Saudi Arabia announced the restoration of diplomatic relations with Qatar. It is unclear whether this will lead to a complete resolution, but such positive movements should continue under the Biden administration.

Furthermore, regarding the War on Terror, Biden himself has stated that most troops should be withdrawn from Afghanistan and the Middle East, and the mission should be limited to the annihilation of Al-Qaeda and IS. This policy itself is no different from that of the Trump administration. In fact, after his defeat was reported, Trump announced that he would reduce the number of U.S. troops stationed in Afghanistan and Iraq to 2,500 each by January 15, just before the inauguration, and he actually carried that out. While the withdrawal of U.S. troops stationed in Afghanistan and elsewhere was an important campaign promise for President Trump, in reality, it also brings the possibility that terrorist organizations and anti-government armed groups will revive, increasing the threat to the U.S. and the governments concerned. For this reason, voices of concern were raised not only by the military but also by the Republican Party and related countries. Suddenly executing a campaign promise that had been neglected for four years at a time when his term was nearing its end could also narrow the policy options for the War on Terror to be inherited by the next administration.

In 2020, the Gulf states suffered serious damage, such as the collapse of oil prices due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and China has been launching a diplomatic offensive by taking advantage of that gap. It is hard to imagine that they will change their pillar of security from the U.S. to China, but if the Biden administration takes a cold attitude, China's presence will grow even larger. For Japan, whose economic presence in the Middle East is shrinking, this point is not someone else's problem.