[Feature: America "After Trump"] The New "Coopetition" Between China and the Biden Administration

Joe Biden will take office as U.S. President in January 2021, but will the inauguration of the new administration bring significant changes to U.S.-China relations? This issue, which will influence future global affairs, is currently attracting attention and sparking debate worldwide.

In this context, the Chinese government's "official view" regarding U.S.-China relations under the Biden administration has been presented. A few days after the announcement that the transition process to the Biden administration would begin, an essay by Fu Ying, Vice Chairperson of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National People's Congress of China, was published in the New York Times. She stated, "Even if competition between China and the United States is unavoidable, it needs to be managed well by both governments. It is possible for the two countries to develop a relationship of 'coopetition' (cooperation and competition) while addressing each other's concerns.*1" Furthermore, in the same essay, while criticizing U.S. policy toward China, Fu Ying called for the establishment of mechanisms for strategic dialogue and the friendly management of potential crises, proposing that the two nations work hand-in-hand on global issues such as pandemic response and climate change.

Fu Ying has long served as a public face for the Chinese government's external communications and has experience as Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs. Considering the essay was written by a high-ranking official in such a position and the timing of its publication, Fu Ying's contribution is generally perceived as a message from the Chinese government to the incoming Biden administration.

In fact, since the publication of this essay in the New York Times, Chinese domestic media, including state-run outlets like Xinhua News Agency, began publishing commentaries and explanations of Fu Ying's essay en masse. Furthermore, early in the new year, Foreign Minister Wang Yi also emphasized the need to resume dialogue and cooperation between the two countries in an interview with domestic state media, stating that "U.S.-China relations have reached a crossroads."*2

In the series of messages from the Chinese government directed at the Biden administration, specific areas where the U.S. and China could cooperate were also indicated. The Xinhua editorial on December 23, 2020, provides the most specific and logical summary of the necessity and framework for U.S.-China cooperation. The editorial identified three challenges for the U.S. and China—"dialogue," "cooperation," and "management of conflict"—and listed COVID-19 response, stabilization of economic and trade relations, climate change, and people-to-people exchanges as areas where the two countries could coordinate. The editorial also stated that there is room for cooperation in the fields of weapons of mass destruction, the Iranian and North Korean nuclear issues, counter-terrorism, and disaster relief.*3

Of course, the dialogue-oriented path proposed by China comes with conditions. A common point emphasized in Fu Ying's essay, Foreign Minister Wang Yi's remarks, and the Xinhua editorial is that "U.S. respect for China's political system and the Communist Party of China is the bottom line for U.S.-China cooperation."

Under the Trump administration, relations between the U.S. and China continued to deteriorate, appearing to enter a New Cold War reminiscent of the former U.S.-Soviet Cold War. As bilateral tensions rose to the point of fierce exchanges not only in politics, diplomacy, and security but also in the realms of economy, technology, and ideology, the Chinese government proposed the construction of a new "coopetition."

Regarding the term "coopetition," whether in the English word or the Chinese "jinghe," it carries a somewhat positive image. Consequently, when reporting on this new "coopetition" proposed by the Chinese government, many media outlets discussed it with headlines suggesting that "it is an overture from China to America."

However, a careful observation of domestic reporting in China reveals that commentaries interpreting the new "coopetition" are by no means optimistic. In China, the new "relationship of competition and cooperation" is understood as "competition that does not lead to grave consequences*4" (emphasis by the author). During last year's U.S. presidential election, Fu Ying herself described the "coopetition" between the U.S. and China as a "better destination."*5 According to Fu, the U.S. side lacks the desire for cooperation, and China's only option is to "persuade" the U.S. to cooperate.

Thus, the new "coopetition" proposed by the Chinese government to the Biden administration is, in reality, nothing more than a best-case scenario envisioned by China. In other words, China does not have an optimistic outlook on U.S.-China relations under the Biden administration and believes that even if the best-case scenario is achieved, competition will remain the mainstream.

The Chinese strategy toward the U.S. glimpsed behind the proposal of "coopetition" can be summarized in one phrase, to borrow China's own expression: "fight but do not break." Looking at the history of U.S.-China relationship building, this strategy is not a novel initiative. In fact, expressions like "fight but do not break" or "fight to a degree that does not lead to a break" began to be used frequently in China during the early Obama administration. The Obama administration shifted its foreign policy focus to the Asia-Pacific and actively promoted a strategic hedging policy against China under the "Pivot to Asia" strategy. In response to these U.S. moves, the Hu Jintao administration at the time used the expression "fight but do not break"*6 to appeal to rising domestic nationalism, demonstrating that the administration's foreign policy was not weak-kneed.

When the Trump administration took office, China moved by inheriting the "fight but do not break" strategy. Therefore, after the two-day meeting between President Trump and President Xi Jinping in Palm Beach, Florida, in April 2017, mainstream Chinese media highly praised the clarification of dialogue channels as an achievement of the meeting, citing the agreement to utilize four dialogue mechanisms: "diplomacy and security, economy, cyber security, and social and people-to-people exchanges."

Under the Trump administration, the cooperative framework to prevent a break failed to function, and the mood of competition surrounding both countries only intensified. Nevertheless, the reason China has revived a strategy from ten years ago at this point is likely because Mr. Biden served as Vice President for eight years during the Obama administration and has a track record of launching many policy consultation mechanisms with China. However, unlike the Hu Jintao era, China's current strategy toward the U.S. emphasizes "competition," and the two countries will "fight to a degree that does not lead to a break."

While imbuing the term "coopetition" with positive connotations, China recognizes in its heart that U.S.-China relations will remain difficult even under the Biden administration. Nevertheless, toward this best-case scenario, the Chinese government took the initiative even before the birth of the new administration to send "proactive" signals, attempting to elicit a cooperative stance from the Biden administration. These government actions were driven by China's rising confidence and the need to buy time to build up its strength.

In the government work report issued at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (Fifth Plenum) held in November 2020, a numerical target was set to bring per capita gross domestic product (GDP) to the level of moderately developed countries by 2035. In the 1980s, then-paramount leader Deng Xiaoping set a goal to basically achieve modernization by 2050, but the Xi Jinping administration is attempting to realize the goal set by Deng Xiaoping 15 years ahead of schedule.

Regarding the future international order, the perception that the world is moving toward a U.S.-China bipolar system is becoming mainstream in China. According to Yan Xuetong, a prominent international relations scholar, in ten years, no country's GDP will reach even half or a quarter of that of the U.S. or China, and he predicts a world where the two superpowers, the U.S. and China, compete.*7

In line with this G2 theory, it is widely understood in China that while the international environment surrounding China is becoming harsher and U.S.-China confrontation is intensifying, this is a result of China's rising national power and a path that China must experience sooner or later. This point was proposed early on by Zhang Yuyan, Director of the Institute of World Economics and Politics at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Zhang Yuyan was the only expert from the field of international relations to attend a symposium of experts hosted by Xi Jinping, and it goes without saying that his remarks reflect the official views of the administration.

That said, China currently faces a situation where it is being "strangled" by the United States in fields such as science and technology. To escape this predicament, the Chinese government has presented three keywords for its future policy direction. Namely, catching up in advanced technologies such as semiconductors, centered on the 35 items under U.S. sanctions, and policies aimed at stabilizing industrial supply chains and strengthening competitiveness through the enhancement of technologies in which China excels.*8 Then, at the Central Economic Work Conference held last December, the policy of "self-reliance and self-strengthening in science and technology" was established, and enhancing scientific and technological power through a "whole-of-nation system" became a vital national strategy. The most important task was identified as focusing on areas that indicate the future direction of global scientific and technological development, such as artificial intelligence, quantum science and technology, integrated circuits (IC), life and health, brain science, genomic breeding, aerospace, and deep-earth/deep-sea exploration.*9

In short, as U.S.-China tensions rise, China is aiming to create supply chains in advanced technology fields that are not influenced by the U.S. and to become a scientific and technological powerhouse through innovation. Through these efforts, it seeks to create a G2 world order during a once-in-a-century period of transformation in the international order. This is the blueprint for China's national strategy. However, until China can stand on equal footing with the U.S., it needs time to accumulate strength, and for that purpose, a "coopetition" relationship with the U.S. is necessary.

On December 6, 2020, Xinhua News Agency published an article titled "We Must Correct the 'Soft-Bone Disease' (Weakness) of 'Worshipping America' and 'Kneeling to America'."*10 In the article, it scathingly criticized rhetoric that compromises with the U.S. as having "not a shred of Chinese integrity or spirit." The timing of this article's publication coincided exactly with the Chinese government's calls for cooperation with the U.S. This suggests that while China recognizes that U.S.-China relations under the Biden administration must emphasize competition, China itself is unlikely to compromise.

This hardline stance toward the U.S. is backed by the policy direction of the Xi Jinping administration. "Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy" is currently being studied and understood throughout China, and "cooperation through struggle" is emphasized as one of its key characteristics, stating that "we must fight thoroughly against any words or actions that harm China's core interests."*11 In remarks made during a visit to the Central Party School of the Communist Party of China in September 2019, President Xi Jinping reportedly used the word "struggle" 58 times.*12 Against the backdrop of this domestic political atmosphere, many Chinese diplomats have appeared on the international stage fighting with high spirits, often ridiculed as "Wolf Warrior diplomacy." This trend will likely continue after the emergence of the Biden administration, and the Chinese government will probably not compromise on important issues.

On the other hand, as mentioned, in the Chinese government's messages to the U.S., it proposed identifying areas for early cooperation with the new administration and establishing cooperation mechanisms as a way to stabilize bilateral relations. It suggests room for cooperation in COVID-19 response, stabilization of economic and trade relations, climate change, people-to-people exchanges, as well as weapons of mass destruction, the Iranian and North Korean nuclear issues, counter-terrorism, and disaster relief.

At the UN General Assembly held in September 2020, President Xi Jinping announced a goal for carbon neutrality, aiming to have carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions peak by 2030 and achieve net-zero CO2 emissions by 2060. Since the start of the Xi Jinping administration, China has placed importance on domestic environmental issues and has shown proactive efforts to demonstrate global leadership on climate change. If the Biden administration responds to cooperation with China, U.S.-China coordination in this field holds the potential to produce significant results.

On the other hand, the Biden administration has already made clear its policy not to immediately abolish the 25% punitive tariffs the Trump administration imposed on Chinese imports. It is also expected to be difficult to lower the high hurdles regarding people-to-people exchanges set by the Trump administration amidst the ongoing technology competition between the U.S. and China. Bilateral tensions are likely to continue even in the fields of trade and people-to-people exchange, which have historically played a role in stabilizing U.S.-China relations.

With significant attention on whether the WHO COVID-19 investigation team can enter Wuhan and to what extent the investigation can be conducted without the influence of the Chinese government, there are far too many challenges that both the U.S. and China must clear, such as the sharing of infectious disease data.

Early in 2021, it was revealed that Iran had injected gas into centrifuges to increase enrichment levels. The Iranian nuclear issue has rapidly emerged as a top-priority diplomatic task to be addressed after the inauguration of the Biden administration. In 2016, President Xi Jinping visited Iran, and the two countries established a comprehensive strategic partnership. Since then, negotiations have been underway for an agreement to promote cooperation in fields such as infrastructure, finance, information technology, and military affairs. China reportedly plans to invest a total of $400 billion in Iran over the next 25 years for nearly 100 infrastructure projects, port development, and the establishment of free trade zones.*13 As China and Iran rapidly draw closer, it remains to be seen how much of a concession the Biden administration can extract from the Xi Jinping administration.

In this way, U.S.-China relations under the Biden administration are based on "fighting," and even the areas deemed possible for cooperation show signs of a rocky road ahead. The relationship between the two countries will be one of "fighting to a degree that does not lead to a break," but the maneuvering is likely to be intense.

*1 Fu Ying, “Cooperative Competition is Possible between China and the U.S.”, The New York Times, Nov. 24, 2020. “Veteran Chinese Diplomat Fu Ying: Compete but also Cooperate”, Veteran Chinese diplomat Fu Ying: Compete but also cooperate - World - Chinadaily.com.cn

*2 "Wang Yi: U.S.-China Relations Have Reached a New Crossroads"

*3 "Xinhua Special Commentator: Only by Focusing on Cooperation Can China and the U.S. Move Toward a Better Future"

*4 "Fu Ying: Facing U.S. Provocations, China Should Consider 'Taking the Initiative'"

*6 "U.S.-China Leaders' Meeting in Seoul: 'Fight but Do Not Break'"

*7 "Yan Xuetong: Changes in the International Political Landscape in the Next Ten Years"

*10 "Xin Renping: The 'Soft-Bone Disease' of 'Worshipping America' and 'Kneeling to America' Must Be Cured"

*11 "Distinctive Characteristics of Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy"

*12 "'Struggle'! This Speech by Xi Jinping Has Great Meaning"

*13 “Defying U.S., China and Iran near Trade and Military Partnership”