[Special Feature: The Presidential Election and the Future of America] Ryo Sahashi: The Restart of the Trump Administration and the Future of U.S.-China Confrontation

The Donald Trump administration has begun once again.

The so-called Trump 2.0 will hold significant meaning for both the United States and the international order.

I do not wish to label President Trump as isolationist or a warmonger here. Rather, the facts differ from such impressions. Trump 1.0 remained involved in the world in its own way, engaged in diplomacy regardless of the counterpart, and occasionally secured agreements. While he mentioned military force as a threat, he was restrained in its exercise.

The problem lies in his goal-setting and administrative style.

Trump is a figure who does not seek unity within diversity as past presidents have valued. He has prolonged his political life by accelerating divisions in American society using themes such as religion, race, and inequality. Furthermore, in the international community, he shows no interest in increasing overall benefits through multilateral cooperation. He prioritizes only his own country's immediate interests. Skilled journalists quote Trump's words in their books.

"I don't believe in win-win. I believe in me winning." (Baker & Glasser, 2024)

These short words express his essence well. For him, victory is, above all, about self-preservation—nothing other than protecting the assets and honor of the Trump family. In addition, he reflects a self-centeredness in diplomacy that emphasizes American security and interests above all else. If it serves that purpose, he will engage in dialogue even with leaders of authoritarian regimes, while demanding major concessions from long-standing allies through threats.

Trump's administrative style is also unique.

In the previous Trump administration, many veterans—sometimes called "the adults"—initially joined the cabinet, but factional struggles among high-ranking officials were extremely fierce. Trump tried to maintain his superiority by making subordinates compete. Eventually, having developed a taste for gripping power through the exercise of personnel rights, Trump fired high-ranking officials one after another, until finally, only those chosen for their loyalty remained.

Expertise was often disregarded by the president. What mattered was the image of Trump, an outsider to Washington politics, fighting against the traditional vested interests known as the "deep state." Those who entered the administration then sought to realize policies reflecting their own desires—policies that could never be achieved under other administrations. The "greatness" and American interests implied by the phrases "Make America Great Again" and "America First" were, in the end, left to Trump's judgment.

Trump 2.0 is characterized from the start by the concentration of authority in the president seen in the final stages of the previous administration; it is better viewed as an extension of Trump 1.0.

Of course, even if the Trump administration pursues foreign and security strategies self-righteously, as will be discussed, it may often yield favorable results for challenges the world must face, such as a tough response to China. Some might argue that, after all, every country is ultimately "self-first." Nevertheless, the narrow-mindedness visible behind Trump's diplomacy and the shock brought to the international order by unprecedented and unexpected policy methods are immeasurable. And even if favorable results are obtained, whether they will continue is, after all, uncertain.

The U.S.-China confrontation is likely to be a major focus in Trump 2.0 as well.

The previous Trump administration left various marks on international politics, but the most important was likely the full-scale intensification of the U.S.-China confrontation. While the U.S. and China can now be called two superpowers, the first Trump administration removed the framework of the relationship that had been maintained for nearly half a century and sent a clear message that it would not tolerate China's growth. This was the abandonment of the so-called engagement policy toward China.

The succeeding Biden administration followed the policy of shifting the approach toward China. Maintaining a worldview of an era of U.S.-China competition, it worked to refine its economic security posture beyond just military and political responses. While it was also eager to engage with President Xi Jinping and other high-ranking Chinese officials due to the need for crisis management, it was an administration that did not change its view of China as a rival and did not loosen a wide variety of economic regulations on China.

So, what will the China strategy of Trump 2.0 look like?

In Trump 1.0, particularly in the final stages, extremely harsh criticism of the Chinese Communist Party was carried out, and a series of economic sanctions related to Xinjiang and Hong Kong were imposed. I have already argued that Trump 2.0 is an extension of 1.0; will the China strategy be the same?

Certainly, Secretary of State Marco Rubio has continued to view ideological aspects, such as China's system of governance, as problematic. As a senator, he introduced bills as recently as last year to block Chinese companies from moving manufacturing bases to Mexico or Southeast Asia to evade tariffs, as well as the CCP Prohibition Act. He also showed interest in increasing taxes on profits from investments in China and strengthening the resilience of critical mineral supply chains. Rubio's movements have the momentum to lead a hawkish executive branch, making him worthy of being called an "ultra-hawk."

National Security Advisor Mike Waltz may not be an ultra-hawk, but he follows the average view of recent hardline stances on China. In his recent book, he lists basic policy guidelines for China, highlighting points such as approaching the China problem through strengthening the U.S. military posture, strengthening alliances, strengthening Taiwan, and economic security. His deputy, Deputy National Security Advisor Alex Wong, is seen as being close to a traditional security expert, and the announcement of his appointment was welcomed in Washington.

It is unclear whether ultra-hawk arguments like Rubio's will immediately gain Trump's support. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that hardline views on China are fully incorporated into this administration from its inception. In such thinking, alliances and economic security will likely be emphasized, much like in the Biden administration.

To be sure, even in Trump 1.0, hardliners such as Matt Pottinger (former Deputy National Security Advisor) and Michael Pillsbury (Hudson Institute) formed the China team from the transition period. Still, there were initially voices positive about solving problems through negotiations with China, such as Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, who came from the business world. Compared to that, Trump 2.0 has a "harsh" hardline stance on China from the start.

However, in Trump 2.0, another type of hardline stance on China may emerge. If the aforementioned hardline view was interventionist regarding China's internal affairs and based its overall strategy on American strength, this other hawkish view can be called a realist one that recognizes the limits of American power and believes that strength should be concentrated solely on achieving military preparedness against China.

A central figure in this could be Elbridge Colby, who is appointed as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. This post is the highest-ranking position for a civilian defense official and has been regarded as the most pivotal post for policy planning. In recent Democratic administrations, representative strategists such as Michèle Flournoy and Colin Kahl have served in this role.

In Trump 1.0, Colby led the planning of the National Defense Strategy as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense and put forward a force planning concept focused on war with a single major power (Fukuda, 2021). As clarified in works such as "The Strategy of Denial" (2023) and "Asia First" (2024), Colby believes that the U.S. should concentrate on China and leave the Russia-Ukraine war to Europe. He advocates for drawing out the efforts of various countries to build an "anti-hegemonic coalition" against China.

What is important for Colby is the restoration of the balance of power; he argues that if China exercises self-restraint within a new balance, there is no problem even if it has a different political system. From his perspective, at this rate, China cannot be stopped from establishing hegemony in Asia, and the U.S. and Asian countries must work together to prepare an overwhelming capability to "deny" China's aggressive acts.

Colby's argument deviates from traditional thinking in several points. First, his coldness toward the Russia-Ukraine war fundamentally shakes U.S.-Europe relations.

Second, despite having great concerns about China's ambitions and future power, the goals set are modest. China's political system is not a problem for him, and he dismisses issues like the TikTok problem as non-essential.

Third, he demands even greater efforts from U.S. allies such as Taiwan and India. For him, the preparedness of various countries is insufficient, and he strongly asserts that they should pour far more budget into national defense. Colby is by no means an isolationist. Precisely because he has a clear awareness that China's military power is a threat, he advocates for the formation of an anti-hegemonic coalition. Nevertheless, the idea that allies should shoulder an extremely large amount of responsibility to confront China could cause unrest among those allies.

From China's perspective, both types of hawks are hardliners. Especially in the military strategy overseen by Colby, the progress of a system concentrated on China is undesirable. On the other hand, pressure on allies may instead disrupt the alignment between the U.S. and various countries, and the indifference he shows toward things other than military power may appear favorable to China. Originally, the White House would play the role of bundling different policy theories, but this is the unconventional Trump administration. Depending on the president's stance, it is necessary to account for the possibility that the policy axis may shift.

In economic policy, appointments have been indicated for Scott Bessent as Secretary of the Treasury, Howard Lutnick as Secretary of Commerce, Stephen Miran as Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, Kevin Hassett as Director of the National Economic Council, and Jamieson Greer as Trade Representative.

Bessent and Lutnick are figures who represent the interests of the business community, differing from aggressive negotiator-type lawyers like Greer. While Lutnick, Miran, and Greer agree on utilizing tariffs as a policy tool, there is no consensus on decoupling the U.S. and Chinese economies regardless of the cost, as Robert Lighthizer, who served as Trade Representative in Trump 1.0, argued in various places during the election period.

For Trump 2.0, upholding "America First" and instrumentalizing tariffs is the basic line. However, it is quite difficult to easily allow the U.S. economy to bleed in order to eliminate economic dependence on China. Economic trends are actually an important issue for the Trump administration, which defends the interests of the wealthy, and tariffs and decoupling also place a heavy burden on the U.S. economy.

Therefore, even if the president uses the word "decoupling" frequently as a verbal threat—making "de-risking" and "small yard, high fence" obsolete—and even if he shows a stance of not shying away from a trade war with China, we may be able to find caution in the response of Trump 2.0's economic policy toward China.

Of course, since the economic security policy posture that has been sufficiently strengthened from Trump 1.0 through the Biden administration will be maintained, supply chains, including those of the U.S. and its allies, will gradually move toward separation from China. The movement of investment and people will also likely dwindle.

By the way, for some reason, one occasionally sees optimism regarding the Trump administration. The idea that because it is the second time, we have the experience to face the Trump administration is extremely dangerous. There is optimism in Japan, but it actually exists in China as well.

Yan Xuetong of Tsinghua University, in an essay titled "Why China Isn't Scared of Trump" contributed to an American magazine, even argued that Trump 2.0 would work in China's favor. According to him, "Beijing (having learned much from Trump 1.0) can successfully avoid conflict. Furthermore, Trump's commitment to allies is questionable, and those countries will seek to build relationships with Beijing to diversify risks and offset Washington's unpredictability. The possibility of military conflict with the U.S. is also low." (Yan, 2024)

There are also many views that a second Trump diplomacy will cause America's international status to decline and accelerate the reorganization of the international order. Jie Dalei of Peking University states that both Trump and Biden reflect a "deep-level strategic adjustment" in America that "could last for a considerable period," and predicts the arrival of a new era. Jie states that the movement of a United States that avoids interference abroad and is not so enthusiastic about pursuing universal values through diplomacy will lead the post-Cold War period into the next "post-post-Cold War period." (Jie, 2024)

Of course, in the short term, specific conflicts must be avoided. Last November, at the U.S.-China summit held alongside APEC in Peru, President Xi Jinping raised four red lines. In other words, he clearly indicated to the U.S. lines that must not be crossed: keep past promises on the "Taiwan issue," respect each other in areas where the two countries differ such as "democracy and human rights" and "path and system," and do not engage in trade wars or economic decoupling to protect China's "right to development."

It should be assumed that the Chinese government is facing the fear that Trump might cross these red lines very easily. The pessimistic outlook that the U.S. will press China hard regardless of the cost seems more dominant. While expectations that the shift in the international order as Jie argues will accelerate are spreading, there seems to be criticism that relations with the U.S. will not become as manageable for China as Yan says. Generally speaking, it can be said to be an outlook that while placing certain expectations on Trump 2.0 creating a situation favorable to China in the long term, there are many difficulties in the bilateral relationship in the short term.

The Chinese government will likely increase efforts to establish an autonomous economic zone and expand the world where its political influence reaches, while continuing to seek management of relations with the U.S. and the realization of dialogue. Furthermore, in recent years, China has increased means to impose sanctions on foreign countries, such as the "Unreliable Entity List Provisions," the "Export Control Law," and the "Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law." To what extent will it exercise so-called economic statecraft? If things go poorly, the U.S. and China could fall into a cycle of retaliatory economic sanctions. We should watch with vigilance.

The U.S.-China confrontation is not something that will end easily. And the United States remains the cornerstone of the global economy and possesses power that should be utilized for the security of Asia and the world.

Even if Trump 2.0 tries to take more self-righteous policies than before, we should not neglect efforts to correct them. Summit diplomacy will hold greater meaning than ever before. We should seize opportunities and repeatedly provide thorough explanations of how closely American interests are tied to alliances and order-building.

It will also be essential for Japan not only to remind the U.S. of the strategic importance of East Asia but also to convey the caution that America's long-standing Taiwan policy and Korean Peninsula policy possessed.

* Yan Xuetong, "Why China Isn’t Scared of Trump," Foreign Affairs, December 20, 2024