[Special Feature: Thinking About Energy Security] Fumiaki Inagaki: The Ongoing Reorganization of the Former Soviet Space—From the Perspectives of Resource Geopolitics and Energy Security

Nearly two years have already passed since the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Unfortunately, it is still not clear how this tragedy will end. However, the invasion of Ukraine by Russia did not happen suddenly; it can be seen as a continuous movement to recover lost territory following the 2014 Russian invasion of Crimea. Furthermore, Ukraine and Russia had been in conflict over the supply of natural gas even before then. However, conflicts over energy supplies, such as natural gas in the former Soviet sphere, are not limited to the bilateral relationship between Russia and Ukraine but are cases seen elsewhere as well. Combined with Russia's movements to recover lost territory, this indicates that the reorganization of the order in the former Soviet space has continued without end since the dissolution of the Soviet Union (late 1991).

Here, I would like to examine the reorganization of the order in the former Soviet space from the perspectives of resource geopolitics and energy security, but first, I want to briefly organize the geopolitical perspective.

Halford Mackinder, often called the father of modern geopolitics, presented the "Heartland Theory" in the early 20th century, viewing international relations through the axis of conflict between continental states (land power) and maritime states (sea power). The Heartland described by Mackinder is the interior of the Eurasian continent, consisting of the Arctic region and the rivers that flow into it. Navigation in the frozen Arctic Ocean is difficult, and it is impossible to access the interior by traveling up rivers from the open sea. In other words, the Heartland is a region without direct access to the open sea, and he considered it to be in conflict with sea powers that conduct trade through the open ocean*1. This Heartland is almost identical to the territory of the former Soviet Union. The Russian Empire and its successor, the Soviet Union, as a land power, clashed with Britain, a sea power that controlled India and the Arabian Peninsula, and the spheres of influence for both were established at the borders of Central Asia, Iran, and Afghanistan.

Thereafter, based on the Heartland Theory, the United States replaced Britain as the sea power resisting the southward expansion of the Soviet Union, the land power. The Soviet "invasion of Afghanistan (December 1979)" was a challenge by the land power Soviet Union against the sea power United States. Due to concerns over this Afghan invasion and prior Soviet intervention in the "Iranian Islamic Revolution," the United States announced the "Carter Doctrine" in 1980, stating a policy of using military force to counter Soviet intervention in the Middle East. In this way, Russia, a Heartland state with no exit to the open sea, moved southward in search of an exit and clashed with sea power. The territories gained through this Russian southward policy were institutionalized as states under the Soviet communist system and incorporated into Russia.

The Soviet Union was formally a union of 15 republics, but in reality, it was a unitary state with a centralized system. Mackinder pointed out that nomads and horse-riding tribes traveled through the southern part of the Heartland—namely, the Central Asian region—posing a threat to Europe, but as the "Silk Road" indicates, this land has been an East-West trade route since ancient times. However, under Russian rule, the role of the East-West trade route was closed, and a North-South vector formed the order of the Heartland. The dissolution of the Soviet Union meant that the Heartland was once again released to the East and West, and a reorganization of the order began. China's "Belt and Road Initiative" can be seen as one such movement.

On the other hand, the energy infrastructure developed as domestic infrastructure under the Soviet system organically linked the constituent republics and strengthened its unitary state nature. For example, while Kazakhstan is an oil-producing country, its refineries did not process Kazakh oil but rather oil from Siberia. Kazakh oil was sent to Russian refineries via pipelines. The same was true for power infrastructure. During the Soviet era, northern Kazakhstan was integrated into the Russian power grid, the "Unified Power System (UPS)," and was supplied with electricity from Russian power plants. Although there were power plants in Kazakhstan, there were no transmission lines between those plants and northern Kazakhstan, and southern Kazakhstan was integrated into the "Central Asia Power System (CAPS)" along with four other Central Asian countries. Within CAPS, power plants and consumption areas were linked across national borders. For example, Tajikistan's power plants are concentrated in the southern part of the country, but transmission lines from those plants to the northern part of the country were not developed, forcing electricity to be transmitted via neighboring Uzbekistan.

During the Soviet era, the distribution of electricity, oil, and natural gas resources was carried out through this infrastructure according to instructions from the central government. However, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, this energy infrastructure became international infrastructure requiring coordination between the states involved. Movements where supplying countries used energy resources as a diplomatic tool began to be seen. For example, in 1996, Russia stopped supplying electricity to Kazakhstan. This was triggered by Kazakhstan's refusal to accept electricity rate hikes accompanying power liberalization within Russia, but from Kazakhstan's perspective, it was perceived as diplomatic pressure. Additionally, Uzbekistan stopped supplying natural gas to neighboring Tajikistan in 2013. The reason was again unpaid fees, but the Tajik side perceived it as diplomatic pressure. This was because Tajikistan is located upstream of Uzbekistan, and the two countries were in conflict over the distribution of water resources. Furthermore, because the two countries were in conflict over historical perceptions and territorial issues, negotiations on resource distribution no longer proceeded smoothly.

In this way, the dissolution of the Soviet Union turned its massive domestic infrastructure into international infrastructure. While interstate cooperation was essential for its maintenance, each country prioritized reorganizing it as domestic infrastructure that would be self-contained within its own borders*2. However, this self-prioritization also became a cause of conflict with neighboring countries.

To begin with, the former Soviet states excluding Russia, particularly the Central Asian states, had no experience as independent states prior to the Soviet Union and were lacking in human resources; they were truly in a period of nation-building. While the EU was born in Europe and internal borders were becoming lower, borders appeared in the former Soviet space, and the role of the state along those borders began to be strengthened. For such nascent states, the instability of energy supply was something that could shake their legitimacy. The political change that occurred in Kyrgyzstan in 2010 was triggered by an increase in electricity rates, and the 2022 unrest that led to the loss of power for the first president, Nazarbayev, who had been the leader of Kazakhstan since the Soviet era, was triggered by an increase in LP gas prices. For resource-rich countries, energy security policy can be described as prioritizing domestic energy demand to strengthen public support while sometimes using those resources as a means of pressure against other countries.

On the other hand, Russia and the former Soviet states are international energy suppliers, and their energy security policies directly affect demanding countries such as Europe and Japan. Originally, the concept of energy security was a concept from the perspective of demanding countries. Its beginning is said to be when Britain changed the fuel for its warships from coal to heavy oil as a measure against German U-boats (submarines) during World War I in the early 20th century. Britain aimed to increase the speed of its ships by using heavy oil to counter U-boats, but at that time, the supply route for oil became an issue. In other words, unlike coal, oil had to be procured from locations far from the home country, and stabilizing that supply became a challenge. Focusing on this stabilization of energy supply is called "classical energy security." Classical energy security came into focus after World War II, particularly during the first oil crisis (1973), when oil had turned into an important energy source for the general public as well.

The oil embargo by Middle Eastern countries triggered by the Fourth Arab-Israeli War led advanced nations to form the G7 and establish the International Energy Agency (IEA). Advanced nations, which were the primary demanders of oil, created a framework for taking a coordinated approach to ensure a stable supply of oil. Meanwhile, Japan promoted the development of new energy (geothermal, solar, hydrogen, coal liquefaction, etc.) and energy-saving technologies through the Sunshine Project (1974). European countries also worked on developing new energy while approaching the Soviet Union to reduce their dependence on the Middle East. In this way, advanced nations sought stable supplies through the diversification of energy sources and supply locations. On the other hand, the Soviet Union used energy as a means to separate European countries from the United States, showing the supplier side's version of energy security where energy is used as a means for one's own national security.

However, today is a time when this energy security is changing significantly. European countries had strengthened their relations with the Soviet Union and its successor, Russia, for the sake of stable energy supply. However, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine destabilized that natural gas supply. Additionally, environmental issues, which were already a problem in the 1970s, shifted focus from pollution to global warming, and decarbonization also became a new target of energy security. Furthermore, as shown in Goal 7 of the "Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)" adopted by the United Nations in 2015, energy access also became an issue for energy security. This is the same problem seen in the political changes in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan mentioned earlier. In other words, energy security since 2000 has come to include new challenges such as global warming and providing an affordable and stable supply to ordinary people, rather than just the stabilization of supply. This is called "new energy security."

On the other hand, this trend also affects the world view captured through geopolitics. The time when Mackinder put forward the Heartland Theory overlaps with the period when energy security was born, as mentioned above. In terms of energy trends, it was during the "Third Energy Revolution," when the shift from coal to oil began*3. Mackinder stated that the imbalance of growth between states changes due to differences in resource endowment and strategic advantages or disadvantages—namely, the arrangement of land and sea, natural resources, and natural transportation routes—but it is not difficult to imagine, considering the historical background, that the key resources at that time were oil and coal. Natural environments and geographical conditions, such as resource endowment and the arrangement of land and sea, can be called geopolitical conditions in terms of fossil fuel endowment and natural environmental conditions for access to them. And strategies based on those conditions can be called energy security.

However, Mackinder pointed out a lack of manpower as the reason why the horse-riding tribes and nomads who had ruled the Heartland could not build a permanent empire, and he did not necessarily focus on resources. Indeed, even if resources exist, if there is no technology to utilize them, they are merely minerals rather than resources. It is technology that gives value to those resources, and the human resources that create it. Furthermore, the nature of geopolitics will change depending on whether those human resources and technologies are classified as natural environment or strategy.

To begin with, what are resources? In international politics, resources are viewed as the source of power to change the policies of other countries to one's own advantage, and not only natural resources such as energy and materials but also military power, economic power, and cultural elements such as norms and values are considered resources. Naturally, the endowment of fossil fuels is a resource that serves as this source of power. That is precisely why OPEC, an international organization of oil-producing countries, has maintained a certain superiority by controlling oil production. Additionally, the technology to develop and utilize the resources mentioned earlier, and the human resources that create that technology, can also be called resources. Perhaps resources are the raw materials and means (= technology) for creating a comfortable living environment. And 100 years ago, when geopolitics and energy security theory were born, the utilization of energy that could provide more heat was considered essential for a comfortable living environment, leading to the Third Energy Revolution. However, current comfort requires low greenhouse gas emissions, and the required resources are shifting from fossil fuels to decarbonized resources.

The author thinks of geopolitics, which organizes the natural environment and geographical conditions, as the OS of a computer or smartphone, and energy security as an app that runs within that OS. Resource geopolitics as an OS has been built around fossil fuels such as oil and natural gas, and energy security can be described as the thing that performs optimal resource procurement and utilization on that resource geopolitics OS. However, as the required resources change within the trend of decarbonization, the OS is inevitably updated, and energy security, the app, is also required to update. For example, China is a major producer of mineral resources such as rare metals and rare earths necessary for renewable energy, and aspects of energy security policy naturally enter into strategies toward China.

On the other hand, if one asks whether the importance of the former Soviet sphere as the Heartland will decrease, it can be said that its importance is increasing more and more, as the former Soviet sphere is blessed not only with oil and natural gas but also with base metals (copper, zinc, tin, etc.), precious metals (gold, silver, etc.), rare metals, and rare earths. For example, China is actively developing resources in Central Asia. Western countries are also showing interest in resource development in Central Asia, but the problem is the transport routes after development.

Transport routes from the former Soviet Union as the Heartland, especially Central Asia, have been via Russia or China, partly due to the situation in Afghanistan and US-Iran relations, which are remnants of the competition between land power and sea power. Looking at it in that context, the outcome of the Russia-Ukraine war, which is a movement to reorganize the order of the former Soviet space, will leave a deep impact on energy security in terms of securing resources. It is said that the Japanese government is seeking cooperative relationships with Central Asian countries in the field of renewable energy, but the development of transport routes is essential for importing mineral resources from Central Asia. In other words, relations with China are naturally important, but will Russia after the Russia-Ukraine war be a state that can build cooperative relationships with the US, Europe, and Japan? This is an important issue from the perspectives of resource geopolitics and energy security. And it can be said that the shift to renewable energy will exert new influences on the reorganization of the order in the former Soviet space.