[Feature: The Presidential Election and the Future of America] Roundtable Discussion: Structural Changes in America and the Impact of the Trump Administration

As you know, in the U.S. elections held in November 2024, former President Donald Trump succeeded in returning to the presidency, and the Republican Party secured majorities in both the House and Senate of the federal Congress.

In this roundtable discussion, we would like to look back on this election and examine what U.S. politics, society, and its engagement with the world will look like under a second Trump administration.

First, I would like to consider the November election. A very unusual situation occurred in this presidential race. While Trump won the Republican nomination as expected, on the Democratic side, incumbent President Joe Biden sought re-election and had secured the delegates necessary for the nomination in the primaries. However, following a lackluster performance in the June candidate debate, he ultimately withdrew his candidacy, and the candidate was swapped to Vice President Kamala Harris.

This created an unprecedented election dynamic: a former president versus the vice president of an administration whose leader had declined the re-election nomination. I believe the change of candidates is a very important factor when considering the election, but first, even if Biden's advanced age was viewed as a problem, how much had the Biden administration actually achieved over its four years?

The early stage of the administration was in the midst of COVID-19, and while I think COVID measures were an achievement, crisis management doesn't often leave a lasting mark on history.

The "Build Back Better" bill for inflation reduction, which Biden campaigned on, also feels somewhat low-key. I think he handled things solidly from a practical standpoint, but more than that, because of his age, there was always a fear that something could happen at any time, and there were doubts from the beginning about whether there would be a second term.

The failure of the June debate was the deciding blow, but even before that, there were many instances where his words and actions caused unease. Personally, I found it rather surprising that he aimed for a second term in the first place.

There is talk that the election defeat was Biden's fault, but Biden originally stepped down due to pressure from those around him. Why was the candidate only able to be swapped in that manner, and how did the change ultimately turn out? Mr. Iida, what are your thoughts?

First, why was Biden pushed as the Democratic candidate? He is someone who is never passionately supported by anyone. The biggest reason he was put forward as a presidential candidate was the belief that he was the one who could win the election.

The reason Trump won in 2016 was that the white working class in the Midwestern battlegrounds moved to support him, and he won those areas. Therefore, to beat Trump, the votes of the white working class in the Midwest were needed. At that time, being a "white male" was an important characteristic to be liked by the white working class; age wasn't seen as much of an issue, and Biden became the only candidate who could win.

Every other major candidate was clearly too far to the left and would lose votes. So, I think Biden was the compromise. However, his performance in the June debate was so poor that people finally moved to remove him, realizing it was impossible. Ultimately, by the time of the convention, the Vice President was the most logical compromise for a replacement candidate, and so it became Harris.

Then, the liberal media hurriedly joined in to hype up Harris. In truth, she didn't have many achievements to boast of as Vice President, and even from the liberal side, she had been a faint presence. Furthermore, in terms of the concerning white working-class demographic, her attributes were seen as hopeless. As a woman of color, there were concerns about whether she could get white working-class votes, which I believe is why Walz became the vice-presidential candidate.

Mr. Karasutani, you have been observing America from the perspective of conspiracy theory research and the role of the media. Is there anything you have noticed?

I am not a specialist in American politics like the rest of you; my specialty is political communication research, and I have been thinking about media and politics while conducting sociological research. My primary area of interest is the theme of symbols and politics, and in that connection, I have studied conspiracy theories as a type of symbolism.

I was staying in the U.S. during the first Trump administration, and I was surprised that the liberal media didn't reflect on anything even after losing the election. They just kept attacking Trump relentlessly. When I asked a researcher working at an American think tank, "Why doesn't the liberal media reflect?" they got angry and said, "It's offensive to be told to reflect on Trump now" (laughs). For people living in New York who had been shown his gossip for years, their perspective seemed to be different.

As just mentioned, there is talk that the liberals haven't reflected, and some are saying that the liberals destroyed themselves in this election.

So, how do we evaluate Harris, who took over? Ms. Mimaki, in your book published in 2023, you wrote that there were critical views of Harris even among liberals, especially among young people. Overall, what did you think of Harris this time?

There is a debate over whether this result was a Trump landslide or a close race. Trump won all the swing states and also won the popular vote by a narrow margin of 1.6 points. In the 2016 presidential election, Hillary won the popular vote. Harris fell considerably short of Biden's vote count in the 2020 election. Considering these factors, shouldn't we see it as a landslide or a complete victory for Trump? Within the Democratic Party, there are opinions that they could have won if the candidate swap had happened earlier and through a more legitimate process like a mini-primary, but facing the harsh reality that supporters are leaving is what will lead to a recovery in the next election. If they stick to tactical talk like "we could have won if we did this," they risk turning a blind eye to the root causes of the defeat.

This time, the departure from the Democratic Party by minorities, young people, and groups that the party had considered its bedrock support base became visible. In addition to white workers, Trump built up votes from minorities, particularly Hispanic workers. While Gen Z (the generation born from the mid-1990s to around 2012) supported Harris overall, a majority of men voted for Trump. This generation is seen as a liberal one with high interest in the environment and human rights, and until a few years ago, there was even a view that the Democratic Party would enter a golden age as the Gen Z voter population increased, but this expectation was betrayed.

Immediately after the election results became clear, Senator Bernie Sanders, a heavyweight of the Democratic faction, posted on X: "It should come as no great surprise that a Democratic Party which has abandoned working class people would find that the working class has abandoned them." This statement needs to be taken seriously. Fundamentally, workers are becoming disillusioned with the Democratic Party. It's not necessarily that the Republican Party is putting forward better labor policies or has a record of protecting workers.

However, if the Democratic Party has indeed faced the hardships of workers more properly than the Republican Party, then all the more reason to ask why that wasn't communicated to or appreciated by voters. Thinking about that from the voters' perspective will be the key to a recovery.

When Biden and Harris were asked about inflation, they replied, "The macroeconomy is good." Furthermore, in the September debate with Trump, Harris boasted that "Nobel Prize-winning economists and Goldman Sachs support our economic policies." The strength of the macroeconomy is a fact, and expert knowledge is important. However, in this election, voters were concerned with the fact that "it might be so statistically, but our lives are factually difficult."

Initially, Harris said lowering the cost of living would be her top priority and proposed several specific measures, but when criticism arose regarding their feasibility or effectiveness, she stopped talking about them much. As huge donations came in from corporations, her criticism of big business also faded. In the latter half of the campaign, she pushed the threat to democracy and abortion rights to the forefront. Those are certainly important, but to people struggling with daily life, they sounded somewhat abstract.

Mr. Iida, your specialty is voting behavior theory. Looking at the results of exit polls and other data, how do you perceive this election compared to four years ago?

First, I agree with Ms. Mimaki's point that this was not a close race but a Trump landslide. Everyone thought Trump might win the electoral vote but had no chance of winning the popular vote, and I thought so too. In that context, the Republican Party won the popular vote for the first time since Bush won in 2004 (if we look at the period since the 90s), so I think we can say Trump won by a landslide.

As for the cause, as Ms. Mimaki also mentioned, it is clearly the Hispanic vote. There is no other possibility. Looking at CNN exit polls and such, the group whose voting behavior shifted most toward Trump between 2020 and 2024 was Hispanics, moving by 14 points. In 2020, only 32 percent of Hispanics/Latinos voted for Trump, but this time, 46 percent did. Also, the Catholic vote grew significantly, which is also an effect of Latinos and Hispanics moving to the Republican Party.

As for why they moved to the Republican Party, the cause is probably not the economy. Nor is it an aversion to Harris being a woman. Among whites, aversion to feminists is one factor for not voting for Harris, but for Hispanics, it's different. So what is it? It's the immigration issue.

Until now, it was said that Hispanic people were sympathetic to immigrants and critical of Trump. But the situation has changed. When caravans of immigrants started coming from Central America, such as Honduras, in 2018, the Biden administration let them all in. The Governor of Texas, angered by this, sent them to New York by bus, and New York State ended up renting out hotels in Manhattan to house immigrant families. Hispanic people who were sympathetic to undocumented immigrants from Mexico and elsewhere feel resentment toward these newcomers, thinking, "We worked hard to build our status, and yet..." Such things likely drove Hispanics toward Trump.

So in a sense, it feels like the election result was decided a long time ago. When Trump won big in Florida in 2020, the voting behavior of immigrants from Cuba drew attention, and there were signs of a tectonic shift even then; Florida had already completely become a red state.

On the other hand, I believe the economy didn't have that much to do with it. The inflation rate rose by more than 20 percent under the Biden administration, but it's not as if states with high inflation rates didn't vote for Biden. Among Hispanics, there is actually a trend where those who feel more anxious about their current economic situation tended to vote for Harris. In other words, economically vulnerable Hispanics might have felt that Trump was scary.

Conversely, I think it was the Hispanics who have established their status in American society who grew resentful of the Biden administration's preferential treatment of immigrants from Central America.

Listening to the discussion as a whole, it seems the argument is that medium-term structural changes were at play.

To change the subject slightly, conspiracy theories and fake news were again frequently seen in this election. I'd like to ask Mr. Karasutani from your professional standpoint: on one hand, regardless of East or West, old media is becoming unable to form the election narrative. On the other hand, biased information, including conspiracy theories and fake news, flows from SNS, and people are influenced by it.

Setting aside whether it influenced the result this time, in what form did such things appear as a phenomenon, and what kind of impact do you think they had on the election?

Regarding Biden's withdrawal, I think the trigger was the televised debate. The footage exposed Biden's "aging" to a cruel degree through his unnatural movements, way of speaking, and choice of words.

In the conspiracy theory communities of Trump supporters, like QAnon, there had been constant slander against Biden. Finally, the issue of his aging appeared even in the liberal media and was immediately shared; moreover, Democratic leaders felt a tremendous sense of crisis. To me, it looked like they dragged him down very quickly, but it reaffirmed the power of television imagery.

Regarding interest in conspiracy theories, Trump's own conspiracy theory about the 2020 election being stolen is, from my perspective, impossible, and I wonder why someone already facing four indictments can come forward so boldly as a presidential candidate. However, 60 to 70 percent of Republican supporters have continued to support his stolen election conspiracy theory, and it never drops below 60 percent no matter what happens. That ultimately pushed him to the general election and he eventually won.

From the standpoint of conspiracy theory research, it was said that if he lost, he would activate conspiracy theories and there would be chaos across the U.S., but since he won the election, the stolen election conspiracy theories that might have been prepared had no chance to appear.

As a topic, conspiracy theories also appeared on the left, and some journalists called them "Blue Anon" after the Democratic color. But in the end, the leftist conspiracy theories were not seriously weaponized and ended after spreading momentarily on the internet.

Therefore, regarding how the use of conspiracy theories as a political weapon affected the presidential election, while there were various topics, my personal conclusion is that there wasn't as serious an impact as anticipated.

The January 6, 2021, attack on the U.S. Capitol arose precisely from Trump's defeat, yet even recently, more than half of Republican supporters answer in polls that Trump actually won. On the other hand, it also feels like many Republican supporters know Trump is saying outrageous things but support him anyway.

In short, what do most Republican supporters think of Trump and the conspiracy-like talk surrounding him? How should we understand this?

What can be said is that there is the same root cause, which manifested in one way as the act of voting for Trump and in another way as the spread of conspiracy theories.

For example, the story that "Haitian immigrants are eating pets in Springfield, Ohio" spread and was whispered as if it were true; it wasn't so much that people truly believed it, but that the ground was already prepared for them to believe it. In other words, resentment toward immigrants existed among Republican supporters, and that manifested on one hand as a vote for Trump and on the other as the spread of the conspiracy theory about eating pets. Because of that, I don't think the spread of conspiracy theories itself actually influenced the voting. I agree with what Mr. Karasutani said.

Regarding the Capitol attack, it's not as if every Republican supporter believes the election was stolen. They are merely saying the election was stolen as an expression of their support for Trump.

Ultimately, whether it's resentment toward the Democratic Party or resentment toward American society, one side of that manifests as a vote for Trump and the other as the spread of conspiracy theories. I don't think American society is going crazy because conspiracy theories are spreading. Conspiracy theories have been a staple of American politics for a long time.

I agree. Currently, there is an increase in people driven by "affective polarization," where the feeling of hating the opposing party comes first. They listen to conspiracy theories with a grain of salt, but they find them interesting, and if it damages the opponent, they might as well jump on board.

Also, I don't get the sense that Trump himself is telling a systematic conspiracy theory. He probably just jumps on whatever is most interesting and convenient at the moment; Trump will use anything that can earn him political points.

I'd like to move into the discussion of what is happening to America in the medium term, and the issue there is likely the problem of political or social division.

Affective polarization was just mentioned, but what kind of backlash exists at a certain pole of the conservative side? It's the idea that the liberal side's claims are extreme, or that lately the Democratic Party only talks about the rights of women and non-whites and doesn't look at the lives of other people.

On the other hand, among Gen Z, which Ms. Mimaki has focused on, I think there are quite a few people at the very far end of the liberal spectrum. How should we perceive structural changes on the liberal side, especially among young people?

Certainly, considering that Biden's aging was shown in the televised debate and led to his withdrawal, we cannot say television has lost its power, but this presidential election demonstrated the importance of podcasts. Trump appeared on many programs of influencers with influence over men in particular, such as Joe Rogan, who is called the "world's highest-earning podcaster." Furthermore, based on advice from his son Barron, Trump approached influencers popular with Gen Z men and appeared on their shows. The intention to capture the votes of Gen Z men was clear.

These programs are not overtly political; they involve chatting for as long as three hours, mixing in talk about martial arts and sports. Even listeners with no interest in politics can listen casually and feel a sense of familiarity with Trump. In other words, the aim and appeal lie precisely in that apparent "non-political" nature.

Harris also appeared on podcasts in response, but she couldn't compete with Trump on this level. According to polls, while Gen Z women are increasingly awakening to feminism, an increasing number of Gen Z men perceive feminism as something that "sacrifices men" and feel resistance to it. Trump skillfully called out to those men, saying, "You are not wrong" and "You don't need to give up being manly."

I see.

A noteworthy aspect of this election is that it took place while the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip, where Israeli military action continues, was deteriorating by the moment. Around the spring of 2024, polls showed that the majority opinion was that "Israel should stop its military action" and "weapons and ammunition should not be sent to Israel."

Such opinions were particularly strong among Democratic supporters. In August, when the candidate swapped from Biden to Harris, there was a poll (YouGov) in which nearly 80 percent of Democratic supporters answered that the transport of weapons and ammunition to Israel should be stopped.

While Republican supporters are united in support of Israel, Democratic supporters are split between pro-Israel and pro-Palestine. To win the election, they had to take an ambiguous stance that wouldn't decisively anger either group. I think Biden and Harris thought that way, and I understand the difficult political situation, but I question whether it was a wise choice, not only humanitarily but also politically. Even if they expressed sympathy for Palestinian lives and human rights in words, the Biden-Harris stance of continuing to send weapons and ammunition failed to hold onto the hearts of those who were angry and grieving over the massacre of Palestinians. America's credibility in the international community was also greatly damaged.

Harris was attacked by Republicans for being "too liberal," but I believe this view, whether positive or negative, misses the essence. Many of Harris's statements about Gaza were opportunistic attempts to please every supporter and did not convey a commitment to human rights or liberal convictions. In July, when Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu visited the U.S., Harris spoke sharply, saying "many innocent civilians are dying" in Gaza and "I will not be silent." In her acceptance speech for the presidential nomination in August, she asserted, "I support the lives and right to self-determination of the Palestinian people." However, she clearly stated she would "not consider" stopping the transport of weapons and ammunition to Israel and maintained that stance. Talking about human rights and lives while continuing to send weapons—because of this deceptive stance, there were likely votes that were lost.

We've moved from domestic issues to Gaza, but the situation seems to be that the Democratic Party is divided between the traditional mainstream and the left, and on one hand, it was difficult for those on the left to commit because Harris was non-committal and didn't make her stance clear.

On the other hand, from outside the Democratic Party, even though the mainstream is reasonably moderate, does it feel like they were seen as much more radical liberals than they actually are, which led to people distancing themselves?

The Democratic mainstream is more "old guard" than "moderate," and that relatively made Trump look like a candidate who would bring "change." The prime example of this was Harris's alliance with Liz Cheney. They even toured swing states together. Since the Capitol attack, Cheney has broken with Trump and clearly criticized him. In this regard, she is a figure who should be called the conscience of the Republican Party.

However, this presidential election took place while many people in Gaza and even Lebanon were being killed by Israel, supported by American weapons. Liz Cheney, along with her father, former Vice President Dick Cheney, was a figure who supported the "War on Terror" as an official in the George W. Bush administration—a war that caused hundreds of thousands of casualties in the Middle East and around the world.

America spent 8 trillion dollars on the "War on Terror" over 20 years, but during that time, the Lehman shock and the COVID-19 crisis occurred domestically, making the contradictions within America visible. This situation became the background for the rise of Trump, who advocates "America First" and explicitly emphasizes domestic priorities.

In a sense, Harris allied herself with a politician who was part of the cause that created Trump. Even people who don't feel a particular charm in Trump wouldn't find a future in a Bush-Cheney style interventionist path.

In my view, it feels like the Democrats and Republicans of the 80s have swapped places. The Democratic Party has become too decent and refined. In the two major parties that had put a lid on all the dirty parts of America, Trump's strength was that he let all the muddy dissatisfaction that had accumulated at the bottom burst out at once.

If you ask what that burst-out material was, in a sense, it was a racial consciousness. Since the time of the Tea Party movement (from 2009), dissatisfaction among the grassroots conservative base toward people of color had been accumulating among whites, but the 2012 Republican candidate Romney didn't represent those opinions at all. He was the representative of the decent, refined Republican establishment, and many people in the grassroots conservative base didn't know who to vote for. I think Trump is the one who came out and won in that context.

Looking back, the party that used to be like the Trump Republican Party was the Democratic Party of the 1980s. Back then, there were union workers in Texas who were smashing Japanese cars. Those kinds of Democrats are gone, and it has become a place where there are many highly educated people.

As Sanders says, the Democratic Party may need to return to being more like Trump's base.

I have something I'd like to ask the experts in American politics. When I think about the background that created people who fall for conspiracy theories, my background is in sociology, so I tend to accept things like the theory of a stratified society quite straightforwardly. Reading Hirotsugu Aida's "Why is Trump Still Supported?", I was struck by the question of where Trump's Godzilla-like vitality comes from.

What's interesting is that data can be confirmed in various places showing that the factory worker class, who have low educational backgrounds and couldn't ride the wave of the so-called New Economy, have been steadily leaving the Democratic Party.

I think this is related to the survival strategy of the Democratic Party, called the New Democrats or the Third Way, which tried to bring the party back to the center after it had leaned too far to the liberal left.

This path ultimately tried to balance fair distribution with neoliberal economic policies but didn't work very well, and as a result, it encouraged a stratified society. I wonder if that created the so-called "forgotten people" and led to the Democratic Party being abandoned today.

How do you experts evaluate the so-called New Democrats or the Third Way?

I actually wrote my doctoral dissertation on the New Democrats. First, to put it differently from Ms. Mimaki and Mr. Iida, I think calling the result of this presidential election a "landslide" might be an exaggeration. In the medium to long term, the two major parties are neck-and-neck, and within that range, he won clearly. A much bigger landslide was in 1984.

At that time, Reagan took the electors of 49 states, and the origin of the New Democrats was actually the Southern Democrats who reflected on that. They started saying, "Why can't we win anymore when the South used to be a Democratic stronghold?" and formed a centrist policy group called the DLC (Democratic Leadership Council). The DLC was successful to an extent, and the DLC pair from the South, President Bill Clinton and Vice President Al Gore, won the '92 presidential election. Biden was also a long-time member of the DLC.

However, saying centrist things honestly didn't go over well. They were pushed by the liberals and called "big government" by the Republicans. While saying such things, they were able to compromise in the 90s, but the misfortune for the New Democrats was the 2000 election between Bush (the son) and Gore; Bush didn't say things that were much different from the New Democrats during the campaign, yet Gore lost. And eight years later, the more leftist Obama appeared.

Once Obama won the 2008 presidential election, the New Democrats completely lost momentum, the DLC organization was closed in 2011, and its remains are now housed in President Clinton's library. That is the history, but as a structural factor, we have entered an era where speaking seriously from the center doesn't go over well and you get attacked from both ends. I think that is a universal phenomenon today.

Regarding the economy, it is also said that both the Republican and Democratic parties have become parties led by the wealthy elite, and within that, an increasing number of people, such as white workers, are choosing the Republican Party as being "at least better."

However, if the trend of the more socio-culturally conservative layers among white workers flowing to the Republican Party has continued, the question becomes "how far will it go?" Since most have already turned to the Republican Party this time, will the outflow from the Democratic Party stop there, or will it continue? I think this issue will be the dividing line between whether we should see Trump as having won by a landslide or whether the neck-and-neck situation will continue.

Ultimately, the result of this election showed that the percentage of white non-college graduates voting for Trump was almost unchanged from last time. Therefore, I think the growth of Trump's vote among whites has stopped to some extent here.

The relationship between education and voting behavior didn't have such a linear relationship until around 2012, and even in polls, accuracy didn't particularly suffer even without weighting by education. However, in the 90s, the New Democrats appeared, the dot-com bubble occurred under Clinton and Gore, the IT industry expanded, coal mines in West Virginia were closed, and the Rust Belt in the Midwest grew wider.

Even in that situation, they managed to hold onto white workers through labor union mobilization, but in 2016, Trump appeared and sent the message that the interests of white workers were being lost, and here the correlation between education and voting behavior suddenly came to the forefront. Now, a clear relationship has been established where those with less than a college degree are Republican/Trump, and those with a college degree or higher are Democratic. The reason the 2016 election predictions were so far off was precisely because they looked at poll results without educational correction and concluded that Hillary would win with 80 percent probability.

However, I think this trend among white workers has reached its limit. The slight increase in Trump support among non-college graduates this time is, I believe, linked to the growth of Trump support among people of color, Asian Americans, and Hispanics.

Now, while facing such structural changes, the Trump administration is coming back once again. What is drawing attention is, of course, the appointments for key cabinet positions, which have been reported on quite extensively in Japan. Some very controversial selections have been announced, but compared to the first term, what are the characteristics?

As a researcher, it's scary to say "I don't know," but I will venture to say I don't know. The reason is that Trump's behavior has very low predictability. Trump himself seems to intentionally try to create surprises.

Regarding appointments, the Republicans have 53 seats in the Senate this time, so if four people vote against someone, it's a no-go. This number is quite tight. Additionally, what we learned in the first term is that even if someone is a "yes-man" now, you never know when the relationship might sour. I think the second term will also continue to be something like a Trump private shop.

The most unknown factor among them is Elon Musk. It is completely unpredictable when things might sour with Musk and how that would affect the administration as a whole. I think the relationship with Musk is what we need to watch most closely.

It is clear that in the first Trump administration, things ended up in a state where he couldn't do what he wanted because he fell out with those who became cabinet members, or people without expertise took office. I thought that if he had learned from that, he would appoint people with at least some professional ability. However, looking at the appointments so far, there isn't much of that atmosphere.

And under the American constitutional system, if you want to realize full-scale policies, legislation is absolutely necessary. Therefore, the relationship with Congress becomes an issue, but in a situation where the two major parties are so ideologically and emotionally polarized and so closely matched, what do you think the next four years will look like?

This is my specialty, but I think if Trump had truly won a landslide victory this time, the Republicans would have won more in the congressional elections. However, they lost seats in the House. I think it might be better to view Trump's election this time essentially as the reelection of an incumbent president. If so, it is consistent with how the seats in Congress increased or decreased.

Also, a big difference between the first and second terms is that, at least under the current Constitution, there is no third term. In the second term, once the midterm elections are over, there is a high possibility of becoming a lame duck for the remaining two years. That means there are only the first two years left.

I don't know what Trump will do regarding legislation. The reason is, first, even if you read Trump's campaign pledge "AGENDA 47," you don't know how he plans to realize it. It goes without saying, but Trump has absolutely no interest in procedures, jurisdictions, or legal matters. He is someone who thinks of leadership as an extension of being a one-man company president.

At the very least, he is likely to do tax cuts, but tax cuts naturally have to go through legislation. The most likely scenario is that, just like the way the 2017 tax cut bill was passed, he will use a method called budget reconciliation to avoid the Democratic filibuster in the Senate and pass it in the House with the power of a razor-thin majority.

However, there is actually a possibility of losing the majority in the House. The election result was 220 to 215, but it is expected to decrease by three people due to appointments in the Trump administration and so on. If they lose three consecutive special elections, the majority and all authority over floor proceedings will go to the Democrats, so they won't be able to pass legislation even through budget reconciliation.

Another reason I think it's better to view Trump as an incumbent president is that for the past four years, he has essentially dominated the House Republicans. Regarding the current Speaker of the House appointment, after former Speaker McCarthy was removed, Trump tweeted this and that on social media, and it finally settled on Mike Johnson as about the fourth person.

So for now, a master-servant relationship where Johnson works under Trump is completely established. However, we don't know when this relationship might sour. Johnson is not a member of the Freedom Caucus, the most hardline caucus in the House. That's because he is a Speaker of the House born of compromise.

The Freedom Caucus is the one that gets the best deal with such a narrow seat margin. In other words, they can make threats like, "Do you want us to do to you what we did to McCarthy?" Trump can also egg on the Freedom Caucus to make Johnson do what he says.

Even after considering various things, it seems that prediction is difficult after all. I agree. In particular, this election had no Trump coattail effect (the effect where a presidential candidate's popularity increases the seats of their party in a presidential election year) at all. I can't think of a recent case where someone won the presidential election but lost seats in the House.

In this situation, if Trump does not coordinate to make legislation and results that supporters expect do not come out, what will he do?

One way is to bypass as much as possible the means that require passing legislation. That's where executive orders come in. However, if a policy that must be legislated and passed through Congress fails, he will likely take actions to avoid blame. In short, he'll talk about how it's the fault of the Congress that didn't pass it, and that's how he lets the voters vent their frustration. Trump is good at that kind of thing.

Conversely, if it passes, even if it's a bill that's a product of compromise, he'll talk as if "I did it." In the first Trump administration, nothing much was built for the border wall, but he could shamelessly insist that it was a "great achievement." I think that is Trump's strength.

Earlier it was said that Biden is not enthusiastically supported by anyone, but Trump is the opposite; there is a bedrock support base of about 30% who will follow Trump no matter what. That is indeed Trump's strength. Furthermore, since it's his second term, he doesn't need to aim for reelection, and in a sense, he can do anything, so I think he's in a state of invincibility, which is scary.

On the other hand, right now as appointments are being made, death threats are coming out against the people whose names are being mentioned. This means that people opposing Trump are doing this. Earlier, Mr. Karasutani mentioned something like "Blue Anon." Until now, conspiracy theories have mainly emerged centered on the right wing, but can we consider that movements involving violence are spreading considerably, not just on the right wing?

To be honest, the extent of the spread is hard to gauge, but I think it is important to consider conspiracy theories together with the problem of extremism. Rather than capturing conspiracy theories as something like disinformation, I think they are the driving force that radicalizes current conservative thought while mutually influencing white supremacy, far-right militia ideas, and anti-Semitism.

One source when conspiracy theories surged during the Trump administration was the so-called "4chan" anonymous message board, where there were so-called misogynists, white supremacists, and it was like a stew of the worst elements of the political unconscious in American society, and that's where conspiracy theories grew.

The spread of conspiracy theories and the spread of political extremist ideas are quite synchronized. Also, in response to the Trumpist faction of the Republican party reaching into risky areas like conspiracy theories and white supremacy to increase supporters and send radical messages, the left wing also thinks, "If they're going to do that, we will too," and there is an aspect where extremism stimulates each other and expands.

Extremism is spreading more and more to both the left and right ends. How can such a phenomenon be stopped? I am also interested in what researchers of American politics think about this.

Barbara Walter's "How Civil Wars Start" and the movie "Civil War" became hot topics. Since they are a people with that many guns at the end of polarization, can we actually consider that there is a possibility of heading toward a civil war?

I actually have a part of me that thinks the United States Constitution is a masterpiece of humanity. In the end, the only time America was seriously in trouble was around the Civil War, and basically, it is stable. So while people say America is in crisis or divided, I've recently started saying that's an exaggeration and it's okay to look at it more optimistically. The late Professor Naoyuki Agawa, who passed away recently, also stated such things.

I also saw "Civil War," and it's a story with a very realistic setting; the reason a civil war is happening is that the president in DC is in his third term. In other words, if you break the Constitution, it becomes a disaster. I think it depicts how American loyalty to the Constitution is quite strong.

It's about time to move on to the topic of foreign policy. If there is this much uncertainty even in domestic affairs, where the president cannot move everything, what about foreign policy, where quite a lot can be done through the president's initiative?

Also, looking at the world, various things are moving in terms of security, such as the Israel-Gaza war, the Ukraine war, and the Syrian situation which has recently taken a sudden turn. Ms. Mimaki, who specializes in international politics, what do you think?

First, on the question of whether it was a landslide or a close race, I stated that the fact that the Democratic candidate this time fell significantly below the votes of the previous presidential election and lost even the popular vote means that there are parts of the party's line that are not supported, and it should be accepted as a complete defeat in the sense that they should take this fact seriously and rebuild the party. However, as you said, the reality was that the votes were close, so I don't think our perceptions are that different.

The next Trump administration is moving forward with unconventional appointments. For Secretary of Health and Human Services, Robert Kennedy Jr., a vaccine skeptic. For Director of National Intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard, who has defended the Assad regime in Syria. Concerns are rising about what will fundamentally happen to American diplomacy and public health, and voices are rising one after another from experts and former bureaucrats calling for them not to be confirmed.

However, there is deep-rooted support among the people. One background that brought about Trump's election this time was distrust of politics by the bloated bureaucratic organization and expert groups. Trump greatly stirred up these people's emotions. Experts point out that Kennedy and Gabbard lack experience and knowledge and are not appropriate appointments, but they are popular with the public precisely because they are "amateurs."

Regarding foreign policy, the Trump line of withdrawing from regions that do not directly involve American security or national interests appeals more to the current sentiments of American citizens than the Biden-Harris line of advocating for the defense of democracy and human rights around the world.

American power has limits, and America cannot respond to every crisis happening in the world. This idea is spreading across party lines. Since its founding, America, which had advocated isolationism, turned toward interventionism through two world wars in the 20th century. Even after the end of the Cold War, interventionism was kept alive because of the September 11 terrorist attacks. However, against the backdrop of exhaustion from the "War on Terror" and the deepening of domestic contradictions, we may be approaching the end of the long era of intervention after World War II. We might be at such a phase in time. I think it is also important to look at Trump's foreign policy from this historical perspective.

Even in an America that is strengthening non-interventionism, there is an important exception: Israel. Looking at the appointments of the Trump administration, the lineup is full of "Israel First" members who will stick to supporting Israel even if it damages American national interests or reputation.

For UN Ambassador, Elise Stefanik. She led the crackdown on Palestine solidarity protests that spread across university campuses nationwide starting in 2024, forcing university presidents to resign. She has already begun claiming that "the UN is no longer an anti-Semitic organization" and calling for a "halt to funding." For Ambassador to Israel, Mike Huckabee. He is an evangelical pastor who has said in the past, "There is no such thing as a Palestinian; they are a people politically created to take land from Israel." Regarding Israeli settlements in the West Bank, he also claims they are not a violation of international law and thinks they should be promoted more and more.

However, the world is also changing. An overwhelming majority of countries at the UN support an immediate ceasefire in Gaza, Palestine's membership in the UN, and the end of Israel's occupation policy. By uncritically defending Israel's military actions, America's soft power is seriously shaken, and it could give a stamp of approval to moves by Russia and China to change the status quo by military force.

Regarding Trump's foreign policy, the point that he disregards allies is the most worrying. He is saying things like he won't fulfill defense obligations for NATO member countries unless they pay their fair share. He will naturally demand a lot of burden from Japan as well. In that context, what kind of actions will allies take? There are two possibilities.

There might be moves to strengthen alliances so as not to be abandoned by America. On the other hand, from the perspective of NATO countries and others, they might feel they can't expect anything from America, and a distancing from America will progress. In other words, there is a possibility that a situation will occur where America is abandoned by its allies.

So, while America tells Japan to bear more burden in the future, if NATO countries stop listening to what America says, I think the big question is what position Japan will take.

Whether to intervene if Japan is attacked. Or if there is an invasion of Taiwan, or if Russia invades a NATO member country, will America intervene? Naturally, it should intervene based on the alliance, but Trump supporters take a passive stance, especially toward Russia.

The exception, as you said, is Israel. Regarding Israel, Trump supporters like to intervene as much as or more than Harris supporters.

As Ms. Mimaki said, the America First way of thinking itself—that America should pursue its own interests even if it conflicts with the interests of other countries or international treaties—potentially resonates with Democratic supporters as well. In that sense, I have a feeling that Trump is unexpectedly evaluated well in terms of foreign policy.

The word "division" is used when talking negatively about the recent political situation in America, but in terms of foreign policy, I wonder why more "division" doesn't occur in America regarding the Israel issue.

While many countries in the world denounce Israel's Palestinian policy and citizens around the world strengthen Palestine solidarity, the US Congress still supports Israel on a bipartisan basis. In July, Netanyahu, for whom the International Criminal Court (ICC) is requesting arrest warrants for war crimes and crimes against humanity, visited the US and gave a public speaking in Congress. Members of Congress gave him a huge welcome. When the arrest warrants for Netanyahu were formally requested, both the Biden administration and Congress reacted fiercely against the ICC and began seeking sanctions against those involved. Even liberal papers like the Washington Post have a tone like, "The ICC is for judging politicians in countries like Russia and Sudan, and should not judge Israel." When it comes to the Israel issue, conservatives, liberals, Republicans, and Democrats are all one-sided in their defense of Israel, and there is no "division."

However, society is changing. Among Gen Z, support for Palestine has overtaken support for Israel. More people are also criticizing the "apartheid" against Palestinians by Israel.

Now, regarding future Japan-US relations, they have been relatively good at least on the surface, and what might be most important is exactly what Toshihiro Nakayama said about "Japan has no Plan B"—in short, the recognition that we basically have no choice but to stay on good terms with America is quite widely accepted.

However, as Mr. Iida said earlier, other American allies might reconsider how they deal with America in the future.

Japan may not have the option of suddenly leaving America, but while leaders of various countries are now starting something like pilgrimages to Trump, is it enough to just keep a line connected to Trump? Considering that structural changes within America are progressing, I feel like we are at a point where we finally have to seriously think about our relationship with America.

At the UN, Japan does not easily follow America and is showing some persistence. It voted in favor of Palestine's membership in the UN and also voted in favor of a resolution calling on Israel to end its occupation of the West Bank. The Japanese government has touted the "sharing of values" between Japan and the US, but by lining up such words, hasn't there been an aspect of continuing to avoid looking directly at an America that deviates from international norms? In Trump's second term, the phase of considering the option Mr. Iida mentioned—"we abandon them"—may finally come.

Expectations are rising for Prime Minister Ishiba to meet Trump early and build a personal relationship, using the former Abe-Trump relationship as a model. However, the idea of building a "honeymoon" relationship between the two leaders to somehow get through the demands for increased defense burden from America might soon reach its limit. The rise of Trump, who shamelessly advocates "America First" and repeatedly makes statements denying alliance relationships, can be seen as one phase of the end of a long era of intervention. It might not be something that ends if we just manage to hold on for four years. The imaginative power of Japanese diplomacy is called into question.

To summarize today's talk, there is a conflict between the two major parties today that is different from the conventional ideologically polarized "polite" conservative-liberal conflict, and Trump-like elements have come to the fore. We are now facing such structural changes, and I think we are at a timing where we need to seriously think about understanding and dealing with America while looking directly at that to some extent in both domestic and foreign policy.

However, on the other hand, Trump himself is a person with very high uncertainty, and with Congress being very closely matched, the future trend of whether policies will move or not is unclear. As with this election, does it mean that current America holds uncertainty in the sense that truly small changes produce large differences in results?

Everyone, thank you very much for your time today.