[Feature: How to Understand Populism] Roundtable Discussion: Deciphering the Transformation of Democracy through Populism

Today, we have gathered experts who have specialized in the study of "populism." In recent years, with the emergence of President Trump, the rise of populist parties in Europe even before that, and the influence on Brexit, the term "populism" is frequently used in the media. I am not an expert on populism myself, but since the term has been used in various ways by the media, I think there are aspects that make it quite difficult to grasp. I hope this roundtable discussion can help our readers' understanding, even if only a little. Among you, was Mr. Yoshida the first to address this in his 2011 book, "Thinking about Populism"?

When I was an undergraduate in the 1990s, there was an entry for "populism" in a political science textbook, but it only had incomprehensible explanations, such as how it was different from "popular" or "popularism." Ever since then, the word populism stuck with me. In my specialty, French politics, Sarkozy became president in 2007, and in other countries, there was the third Berlusconi administration in Italy and the Koizumi whirlwind in Japan. These were generally called populist. At that timing, thinking again about what populism is led to the writing of the book "Thinking about Populism."

My specialty is European politics, specifically the Netherlands. In the 20th century, the Netherlands was known for its stable democracy and was considered a model of so-called consociational democracy in political science. However, it gradually began to malfunction in the 1990s. In the case of the Netherlands, grand coalition governments were the norm, and there was a good tradition of different forces repeatedly compromising and cooperating to manage things well, but this gradually came under criticism from non-partisan voters. Then, in 2002, a new party led by a figure named Fortuyn, who advocated anti-immigration and anti-establishment sentiments, suddenly surged to become the second-largest party. Since then, the Netherlands has rapidly adopted anti-immigrant and anti-refugee policies, and its politics have transformed. Furthermore, this spread to other countries throughout the 2000s and reached major European powers in the 2010s. How should we interpret this phenomenon? Initially, I wasn't very familiar with the word populism, but this phenomenon was neither right nor left, and it was different from existing ideologies. Thus, I thought the word populism would be the most appropriate and became interested in it. In the 2014 European Parliament elections, populist parties became the largest parties in the UK and France. Just as I thought this might be a phenomenon across all of Europe, the editorial department of Chuko Shinsho made a recommendation, and I wrote "What is Populism?" Initially, they suggested the theme "The Difficulties of Liberals," but I felt that what was happening in modern Europe was a phenomenon one level deeper. I thought the root of it was the rise of populism and the resulting transformation of democracy.

In Mr. Hieda's case, the way you are involved is a bit different from the previous two.

Around the time I finished my doctoral dissertation in 2010, there was ongoing talk that the European party system was changing from the traditional left-right conflict to multidimensional competition. It was beginning to be said that rather than left and right parties competing over the scale of redistribution, the socio-cultural axis—issues like immigration and same-sex marriage—was becoming central. Since my original major was welfare state theory, I began researching how this affects welfare policy. Within that, since populist radical right parties were typical authoritarian parties, I had a vague question about why people support such parties and what kind of people support them. Then, by chance, at a 2017 Japan Association of Political Science sectional meeting, I was asked to report on an analysis of the support base for European populist parties and presented my research. And, also by coincidence, the "Tomin First no Kai" (Tokyoites First Party) emerged in 2017, and I ended up analyzing it. Masahiro Zenkyo, with whom I worked on the research, had been analyzing the support base of the Osaka Ishin no Kai, which had been called a populist party. Since it looked like a populist party was about to appear in Tokyo as well, we analyzed what kind of people support it.

Everyone knows the word populism. However, when you try to use it as an analytical concept, it's somewhat fuzzy, and the objects it points to differ. Even after it has become so widely known, newspapers still translate it as "demagoguery" (taishu-geigo-shugi). Given that, when thinking about current politics, what kind of concept do you think populism should be, and what should it refer to?

Since today is a good opportunity, I think we should just create a definition here (laughs). However, even in Western literature, there seems to be a convergence on using Cas Mudde's definition for the time being. To summarize Cas Mudde's definition: "It is a movement that strictly divides society into the elite and the people, where the elite are evil and the people are virtuous, and current politics is dominated by the evil elite; this elite rule should be overturned by the democratic action of the people to realize the general will." I think this definition is probably the most influential in political science.

That's right. Certainly, Cas Mudde's ideational definition is becoming mainstream now. However, based on the Latin American experience, people like Kurt Weyland define populism as a political strategy. There are several types of links between politicians and voters. One is mediation by political parties—that is, various groups in society, such as labor unions, business circles, and industries, link with politicians by exchanging support for parties that provide policies favorable to them. There is also clientelism, where the politician is the patron and the supporter is the client, and the client gives support to the patron in exchange for the patron providing public works directly to the voter. However, different from those, there is a populist type of linkage. This is a linkage where a charismatic leader gains and maintains power by linking directly and without mediation to unorganized voters as a strategy to mobilize people. This is the definition of populism as a political strategy. In the case of this definition of populism as a "political strategy for mobilization," a charismatic leader is necessary. The leader mobilizes by linking directly with voters through the creation of an elite vs. anti-elite dichotomy. In my research, these two definitions compete, and the specific images of populism they assume do not necessarily overlap.

Cas Mudde's definition fits the leaders quite well, but the voters are not necessarily mobilized in that way. It seems difficult to narrow the definition down to one.

As just mentioned, populism is actually neither a descriptive concept nor an analytical concept. Politicians called populists, or voters with a "populist attitude," basically never say, "I am a populist." In other words, the reason the word populism or populist is hard to understand is that it is a term of struggle in politics, a word used to disparage the opponent. Elites in a certain field call things they find unfavorable "populism." Therefore, what is considered populism changes depending on the context and the actors. Probably the first book on populism research in political science, Ionescu and Gellner's "Populism" (1969), includes the US People's Party, the Narodnik movement, and McCarthyism. In other words, for the political, economic, and cultural elites of the time, there was a tendency to call new or unknown political forces populism, and that continues today. Conversely, to understand populism intrinsically, a discourse analysis approach is needed to see what has been named populism so far and what commonalities those perspectives share. A while ago, two young political scientists at Harvard University, Gidron and Bonikowski, researched the commonalities of studies that have called themselves populism research. Here, as Mr. Hieda mentioned, it is said that there is one form like Weyland's that sees it as a political strategy, another that sees it as an individual leader with a specific political style, and an approach that sees it as a political ideology. Populism research can be divided into these three patterns, but what is common across all subjects is that they postulate a unified object called "the people," attack the "morally corrupt elite," and cultivate a niche market in politics. This point is commonly observed in current populist politics as well.

Mr. Mizushima's book also has the subtitle "Enemy of Democracy or Hope for Reform?" There is the value question of whether populism is an ally or an enemy of democracy.

As you said, "populist" has basically been used negatively until now, especially in the political space, but recently movements have emerged that label themselves as "left-wing populism" to resist the monopoly of political and economic power progressing under neoliberalism. Also, in the United States, there is a movement where the word populism can be used with a kind of positive connotation when criticizing the status quo, in the form of a kind of popularism where the people, not the elite, are the protagonists of politics. I feel that point represents the duality of populism.

Basically, in Europe and Japan, populism is perceived negatively. On the other hand, in the United States and South America, that is not necessarily the case. There are differences in the implications and nuances of the word populism depending on factors like changes in political systems or whether they experienced a fascist period. There was a time when President Carter was called a populist, and Obama himself uses the word populism positively. We must also take into account the differences in context between the Americas and Europe.

There is also the question of whether to call populism as a social movement "populism." If you define populism as a political strategy, it refers to the strategy by which a leader mobilizes voters, so whether you call the Tea Party movement in the US populism or not changes depending on the definition.

Speaking of analytical concepts, Mr. Hieda's research strongly reflects an awareness of trying to analyze populism as empirically as possible. Are there difficulties in moving to empirical analysis while taking these conceptual disputes into account?

It is indeed very difficult. For example, Cas Mudde defines populism as a "thin-centered ideology," which has three elements. These are "anti-elitism" (the corrupt elite vs. the virtuous people), the theory of "popular sovereignty" (the will of the people should be reflected), and "homogeneity of the people" (the people who hold that sovereignty are homogeneous). Research by people like Wutke criticizes previous studies for mixing up all the question items for anti-elitism, popular sovereignty, and homogeneity, and then calculating an average to say populist attitudes are high or low. However, the three elements of Mudde's definition are necessary conditions; it only becomes populism when all three are present. If you mix them and average them, you might end up treating someone who is only strong in anti-elitism but low in other values like "homogeneity of the people" as a populist. In our actual research, if we assume anti-elitism, popular sovereignty, and homogeneity of the people separately, discrepancies occur where someone strong in anti-elitism supports a certain party, but that doesn't mean they necessarily believe in the homogeneity of the people. This raises the problem of whether we can call these people populists or say that this party is supported by populists.

I'd like to move the topic to the differences in populism by region. What are your thoughts?

As I mentioned earlier, in the US and Latin America, I think there is a concept that populism is basically a "right" thing, even if it has negative aspects. On the other hand, in Europe, recent populism—though left-wing versions have appeared—is inevitably accompanied by xenophobic and nationalistic parts. This difference might be due to the experience of fascism, as Mr. Yoshida said, but in my view, European populism and elite criticism appeared quite early and have been linked to anti-immigrant and anti-foreigner sentiments since at least the 1980s. The reason for this is that, basically, the leadership in European countries since the 80s has been linked to the movement to form the EU, held power regardless of left or right, and was politically liberal and tolerant toward immigrants and foreigners. Liberal elites gained support from intellectuals, universities, and the media, and a welfare state system was built that appeared to provide certain benefits to foreigners and immigrants through redistribution. In contrast, the Americas are regions where redistribution has not progressed as much as in Europe, as is clear from the Gini coefficient. When there is realistic socio-economic inequality, rather than anti-liberal elite, there are elites who hold political power and are also economically wealthy, like landowners or mine owners, and the movement opposes them. Thus, populism can be said to have a kind of progressive tendency. In the case of Europe, when the entity performing distribution under the welfare state system becomes integrated with the political and economic elite, a populism that criticizes the liberal elite and the image of "immigrants living comfortably on welfare scraps even without jobs" (like welfare chauvinism) became quite strong in the 90s. This has become what is called welfare chauvinism. I think the way elite criticism manifests—whether it results in right or left—differs between criticism of political and economic elites amidst clear socio-economic inequality like in the Americas, and elite criticism in countries where income has been leveled to a certain extent under a welfare state system.

The polarization of the two major parties in the US began around the 1970s, but around the same time in Europe, compromises were reached on various issues, such as the need for policy decisions by bureaucrats, a certain amount of income redistribution, and the idea that discrimination is wrong. I wonder where these opposite political developments come from, but based on what you just said, even in Europe, after it seemed a compromise had been reached, new challenges emerged. Does this mean that anti-immigrant and anti-foreigner sentiments became a turning point? Ironically, in terms of Trump's populism in the US today, anti-immigrant and anti-foreigner sentiments are elements, so although the intermediate process is different, you could say they exist as commonalities.

Issues raised by populists include the immigration problem, and by extension, discourse that Islam is an enemy of civilization, as well as anti-EU sentiment. However, in any case, a scapegoat is necessary. It's true that the number of immigrants is increasing, but there is a reason why that becomes an issue. Unless we account for those dynamics, we won't understand populism. Speaking with a hypothesis, historically, populism tends to occur when the economic and industrial structure changes significantly and the structure of interest mediation under it is shaken. For example, the late 19th century, when the People's Party rose in the US, was a time when agriculture was mechanized and the industrial economy was taking off in earnest. Shortly before that, there was the Narodnik movement, and in both, farmers were the main actors. The next wave of populism was post-war McCarthyism and French Poujadism, which corresponds to the period when a new society of urbanization and mass consumption was created, educational levels rose, and the number of people going into higher education increased. The current third wave is not unrelated to the full-scale start of post-industrial society since the end of the 20th century. While financial capital and the digital economy drive growth, the old middle class and working class remaining in traditional steel, coal, and manufacturing industries have become populist supporters. To put it simply, they are "Rust Belt workers," but a similar pattern exists in the UK and France. I think those people have become the source of populist politics and are creating the room for growth. So, why were such people created? Modern populism, whether Trump-style or Le Pen-style, is a combination of protectionism on the economic dimension and authoritarianism on the socio-cultural dimension. This is because there is a niche market there. To say this with a hypothesis, the US Democratic Party, the French Socialist Party, the British Labour Party, and the German SPD (Social Democratic Party) all became more liberal in their economic policies in the 90s. The Clinton Democrats signed NAFTA in '93, New Labour appeared in the UK in '97, and the Schroeder administration, which advocated the "Neue Mitte" (New Center), was born in Germany in '98; all of them came to accept market economy principles, unlike the former social democratic parties. In France, the Jospin administration carried out massive privatizations, even more than previous conservative governments. Thus, social democratic parties became liberal in economic policy, but the conservative parties also became relatively liberal in the socio-cultural dimension, as seen in the Merkel and Cameron administrations. Consequently, the niche markets that emerged were protectionism on the economic axis, which the former social democratic parties used to occupy, and authoritarianism on the socio-cultural axis, which the former conservative parties used to occupy. I understand current populism as something that emerged to fill that void.

In the US, it is said that the populism of the late 19th century and today's situation are very similar in terms of the size of the gap and various other points. The Yoshida hypothesis is convincing in that the enemy has changed to GAFA.

In Kitschelt's 1995 book, he called the combination of neoliberal right-wing on the socio-economic dimension and authoritarianism on the socio-cultural dimension the "winning formula" for radical right parties. However, the situation changed right around the time the book came out, and as you said, the niche became left-wing on the socio-economic axis and authoritarianism on the socio-cultural axis—a blue ocean. I analyzed data from 14 countries in the European Social Survey for about the last five rounds. When looking at the positions of eight types of occupational classes on the socio-economic and socio-cultural axes, for example, blue-collar workers are somewhat left-wing, seeking redistribution on the socio-economic axis, and are also authoritarian. A significant portion of these people have become the support base for right-wing populist parties. In fact, looking at occupational classes, people at the bottom are in an authoritarian and slightly left-wing position on the socio-economic axis. However, when analyzed, it's not that the person's position on the socio-economic axis affects support for right-wing populist parties. What affects it is the socio-cultural axis, especially attitudes toward immigrants. But setting aside those ideological positions and looking at income levels, of course, the top 30% do not support populist parties, but the bottom 30% don't either. The middle supports them. In particular, people who subjectively feel their economic situation is bad are more likely to support right-wing populist parties. Therefore, the reason for supporting populist parties is not necessarily that immigrants are actually harming these groups as economic competitors in the labor market. Those who actually compete are the bottom 30% in terms of income. In other words, although they aren't actually competing, perhaps a subjective economic anxiety about the future—that they might be left behind as the existing production and interest mediation structures change, or that their children's lives might not get better—is converted into ideologies like anti-immigration, leading to support for populist parties.

Yann Algan, a welfare economist, has done an interesting voter analysis. One axis is whether they trust others. The other axis is a subjective question about whether they are satisfied with their lives. It turns out that "people who do not trust others and are not satisfied with their lives" support right-wing populist parties. Conversely, people who are "not satisfied with their lives but trust others" support left-wing populist parties. He states this is a characteristic of the voter markets in the UK, US, and France. This is also emphasized in "The New Minority" (by Justin Gest), which I co-translated; it can be explained not by absolute income, but by the amount of "deprivation." Deprivation is relative—something felt through comparison with others. Workers who lost social capital like community and family felt hostility toward liberal elites, which led to the generation of populism. Therefore, my opinion is that populism cannot be understood without looking at "how the elites acted."

An important support base for Trump is people in the Rust Belt, such as the Midwest. They are the so-called forgotten people, but it was noted that they are not the lowest class. They are middle class, but they are people who don't know when they might be laid off. However, if you ask whether they, middle-class white men, supported Trump only for economic reasons, that's not all. Combining it with racism and xenophobia became the trigger for Trump support. This feels almost identical to what Mr. Hieda just said. While saying Europe and the US are different, it's interesting that many common roots are emerging.

If we also need to look at leaders, then in terms of how they seize power or what political means they use to exert influence, the nature of the electoral system, how parties are formed, and systems like national referendums are also relevant.

What you just said is very important. The general flow in Europe where populist movements started in small countries and later spread to large countries is largely because small countries have introduced proportional representation systems. In the Netherlands, you can form a parliamentary group even with a few percent of the vote. There, by raising sensational issues like "ban the burqa" regarding Islam, support can spread all at once. Originally, many small European countries adopted proportional representation to protect minorities, but that proportional representation has served as an important foothold for populists. The UK has a single-member district system, but the reason the UK Independence Party (UKIP) was able to gain a certain amount of power was the proportional representation system of the European Parliament elections; getting 30% there makes your visibility skyrocket. I think it's important to actually look at the systems of each country.

Speaking of electoral systems, among the UK, US, and France, which use majoritarian systems, populists actually took power in the UK and the US. There are commonalities between the US and the UK. There is the far-right, and a "cordon sanitaire" (quarantine line) is necessary to contain them. However, when that becomes impossible, the phenomenon occurs where populism enters and takes over the conservative party from within. If Trump hadn't been able to participate in the Republican primaries, he would have ended up as a "strange guy" like Ross Perot, the "third man" of the 90s. In the UK's case, as the presence of the UKIP party (now the Brexit Party) grew, a wavering Cameron called for a referendum and ended up losing the bet. This relates to the earlier point that "you can't understand populism without looking at the elite," but especially in the case of right-wing populism, how the established conservative parties act is significant. This was also true of the conservative parties in the Weimar Republic that gave birth to Hitler; there is an aspect where established politicians invited populism in. If conservative parties try to co-opt populist politicians and lift the cordon sanitaire, it becomes a dangerous situation. As in the case of Brexit, if you turn something that doesn't fit the traditional axis of party conflict into an issue, it ends up dividing the party itself. Once that happens, populist politics can no longer be stopped.

I'd like to gradually touch upon the situation in Japan. A characteristic of the paper Mr. Hieda recently published about the 2017 Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election is that while research has traditionally focused on the receiving side of populists in European regions centered on proportional representation, it looks at what happens when you focus on more majoritarian Japanese local elections.

In the end, it comes back to the difference in definitions. For example, regarding the Osaka Ishin no Kai led by Toru Hashimoto and the Tomin First no Kai led by Yuriko Koike, in terms of a political strategy definition, they clearly use populist mobilization. They mobilize by creating direct, unmediated links with voters. Are the voters mobilized by these populists (by political strategy definition) the same as the support base for parties called populist in Europe? The political strategy approach has an implicit assumption that if a charismatic leader appears, voters are somehow unconditionally mobilized. However, why they are mobilized is a complete black box. So I analyzed it, and the result was that the people supporting Tomin First no Kai—which fits the political strategy definition of populist—were completely average voters. There was a slight tendency toward anti-elitism, but it wasn't significant. They weren't for popular sovereignty, and they didn't believe in the "homogeneity of the people." Rather, in terms of Cas Mudde's ideational definition, voters with tendencies toward anti-elitism or popular sovereignty supported the Communist Party in this election. In other words, the results suggested that populism by political strategy definition and populism by ideological approach definition might be quite different things. I feel like there is no answer yet as to why populists by political strategy definition were able to mobilize the masses and gather support.

Doing work on the US, I feel like, "Well, that makes sense." In the 2016 US presidential election, exit polls showed about 90% of Republican supporters voted for Trump, but that doesn't mean everyone was inspired by ideational populism.

In the US, it's mostly party identification; 90% of Republican supporters will vote for the Republican candidate, whoever it is. At the earlier primary stage, as shown in research by Oliver and Rahn, voters with populist attitudes clearly supported Trump among the many candidates.

In Japan, a characteristic is that those called populists are overwhelmingly local government heads, with the exception of Junichiro Koizumi. In Japanese local assemblies, which are effectively proportional, there are representatives of various vested interests and vocational groups. In contrast, the heads are elected on a single-member district basis, making a mobilization strategy that attacks individual interests a rational approach. They then target the non-partisan and white-collar layers common in urban areas with policies and messages. I think this creates a pattern where reform-oriented, neoliberal-oriented populist heads are born. When we speak of populism ideationally, that "idea" changes with the times. I think the essence of populism lies only in "anti-elitism," and if you pair that with a charismatic leader, those two as a set are sufficient for a definition of populism. How populism manifests and what ideas are contained within it likely change significantly depending on the era and context.

In the three major metropolitan areas—Tokyo, Nagoya, and Osaka—populist forces hold both the head of government and the largest force in the local assembly, but there is almost no penetration in other regions. I think this is a very interesting phenomenon. If we consider why populist movements in Japan do not have the intense anti-immigration sentiment of Europe or the intense demands for redistribution of left-wing populism, I think it's largely because Japan is a relatively "Galapagos" country not yet exposed to globalization. In Japan, whether in fiscal or monetary terms, international constraints are virtually non-existent. In Europe, if you want to increase social security spending, you are instantly locked into the framework imposed by the EU and the Euro and can't increase it at all. Consequently, anti-austerity movements like Podemos in Spain or SYRIZA in Greece arise from that. In Japan's case, especially post-war, the LDP government followed a policy of "balanced development of the national land," and distribution to rural areas was carried out reasonably well. That system continues to this day under different names like "Regional Revitalization." You cannot find abandoned regions on a large scale in Japan like the Rust Belt in the US, Henin-Beaumont in northeastern France, or the old coal mining areas in northeastern England. Behind this is the post-war Japanese distribution system to rural areas. In particular, the local allocation tax is a very powerful leveling system. Thus, in Japan, there is no motivation on the rural side to start an anti-vested interest, Rust Belt-style movement. On the other hand, the ones who did not benefit from this interest distribution structure to rural areas were precisely the three major metropolitan areas. In large metropolitan areas, many voters do not feel they actively benefited under the post-war LDP government. Rather, they likely find figures like Toru Hashimoto, who shouts criticism of vested interests, or Yuriko Koike's "politics without strings attached" relatively attractive compared to LDP politics, which is linked to pork-barrel spending, corruption, and clientelism. I think the above are the characteristics of populist movements in Japan and the historical background for why populist-like things do not emerge in rural areas.

I think anti-elite or anti-vested interest sentiments can emerge, but for elements like "the will of the people should be reflected" or "the people are homogeneous" to appear, a powerful enemy is needed. Populism, to put it in Lasswellian terms, only says "the people should get what they want, when they want it, how they want it." Then, who are the people? At that time, if there are immigrants in a visible form, "we" is formed in the way of "immigrants are not us." Or, in a situation like Spain with economic hardship, "we" is defined in opposition to exploitative financial capital or the EU imposing austerity. However, with something like the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly LDP, even if you say "Tokyoites First," it's hard to create a sense of unity among Tokyoites, and in Osaka's case, few people think "the Osaka people are..."

Structurally, I agree with both of your points, but looking at the situation, although the dealignment of voters has progressed in Japan since the 90s, voter consciousness remains stable in the center. Furthermore, Japanese elites are by no means liberal compared to Western elites; rather, there are more conservative elites. Consequently, the way populism appears as an antithesis to that also changes. Another situational point is that the current Abe LDP administration—though I don't define PM Abe as a populist—occupies the position held by Western-style populists, being protectionist in economy and authoritarian in socio-culture, so there is no room for outsiders to enter. That is one reason why Trump-style or Le Pen-style populism is not seen in Japan.

Reading Ryuichi Kanari's "Trump Kingdom," the workers in the US who feel they have been "deprived of various things" seem to have a vibe similar to what are called "mild yankees" in Japan. They love their hometown, love their old friends, stay in their hometown forever, get married, and support the local sports team. However, I don't feel they have the mentality to become Trump supporters.

The psychiatrist Tamaki Saito previously said that it's the mild yankees who support Abe's politics.

In Japan's case, the foreign population is about 2% of the total population, which is completely different from Europe. Japan has set up firm barriers in terms of both people and the economy, and despite the revised Immigration Control Act from 2019 allowing about 300,000 simple-skilled workers to enter, almost none are coming in even now. Most foreigners actually coming to Japan are either integrated into the labor market in some way or are studying; there aren't foreigners who are targets of criticism like in Europe, such as those supposedly "freeloading" on welfare. In that context, I think populism advocating the exclusion of foreigners will not take root in Japan for the time being.

In the survey at the time of the 2017 Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election, LDP supporters showed significantly higher xenophobia than the average. So they are not anti-elitist. They trust the elite. They don't believe in popular sovereignty. However, they think people are homogeneous. And thus they are xenophobic.

That means Tomin First supporters aren't very conscious of the existence of foreigners or immigrants.

Not conscious at all. Their xenophobic tendency is actually lower than the average.

Since that makes it sound like Japan is safe, let me say something a bit provocative (laughs). In sociologist Kenji Hashimoto's book "The New Japanese Class Society," he refers to non-regular manual workers with an annual income of 2 million yen or less as the "underclass." When their consciousness is surveyed, about 30% are xenophobic and redistribution-oriented. If such people increase in the future, there is a possibility that Western-style populism could arise in Japan. Although the number of immigrants and the degree of globalization of financial capital are low in Japan, as I said earlier, deprivation is relative, and something like the Zaitokukai could have a certain appeal. In fact, last year, the theory of "welfare tourism"—where parents of international students come and use health insurance when they receive medical care—was viewed as a problem in local assemblies. There are people who want to turn welfare freeloading into a political issue. So I don't think the seeds aren't there in Japan. The reason welfare chauvinism works is that the right to receive welfare is the core of the nation-state. That's why it's compatible with nationalism. Japan's "social security freeloading theory" is likely a story aimed exactly at that. It's the story of "our tax money."

In Japan's case, one issue when talking about exclusion is the Zainichi Korean people. There are people who spread rumors as if they have special privileges, and a certain number of people are taken in by that.

The people Kenji Hashimoto calls the "underclass" do not go to vote in the current situation. They should overwhelmingly abstain, and in our survey, abstainers show characteristics such as low trust in existing politicians, low trust in parliamentary democracy, and strong xenophobia. These people also have low trust in pluralism, but there is a tendency to think it would be better if experts who are not politicians made political decisions. In a sense, if a charismatic leader fanned xenophobia, they might join in.

The fact that populist supporters are habitual abstainers is a very important point. If I were to add one more thing to the definition of populism, it would be "politically awakening" people who usually have little political interest or don't participate in elections in the first place. That becomes the reservoir for populist politicians. It might be appropriate to call those who successfully mobilized that room for growth, using the politically indifferent or those who feel politics is distant as a driving force, populists.

Exactly. In the 2019 House of Councillors election, "Reiwa Shinsengumi" showed considerable excitement despite being almost ignored by major media, and it captured the hearts of people who feel they are being hurt by existing politics and economics. "N-Koku" (The Party to Protect the People from NHK) is also, in a sense, a mirror image of "Reiwa." In the case of N-Koku, they conversely criticize NHK as a kind of vested interest. When I asked young people, many said they don't support N-Koku but understand what they want to say. As you said, even if they are a minority in Japan as a whole, there are challenges to the existing order in various forms, and I think there are people who support them.

I think the possibility of left-wing populism, like support gathering for "Reiwa," is more likely in Japan. This is because people who support the Communist Party are anti-elitist and for popular sovereignty. Those who flowed to Reiwa this time are likely people who previously voted for the Constitutional Democratic Party or the Communist Party. If people who have such distrust of existing elites and believe the will of the people should be reflected are ignited by some trigger, there might be a great explosive power.

What do you think the situation surrounding populism will look like in the future?

It's true that the growth of right-wing populists in Europe has settled down somewhat in each country, but I think it will be quite difficult for established parties to occupy the positions they once did. In the 2019 European Parliament elections, the two major forces—the European People's Party and the Socialists and Democrats group—fell below a combined majority for the first time in 40 years. Previously, those two major forces accounted for about two-thirds of the total. On the other hand, in terms of left-wing trends, new movements like the "Green Party," which are supported by younger people, are also growing. Also, Macron-style centrist liberal groups are growing. From a system where the two former major forces held most of the political space, it has now become a five-pole system: center-right, center-left, liberalism in the middle, "Greens" and left-wing populists on the left, and right-wing populists on the right. In that sense, you could say pluralization has progressed.

The growth of the "Green Party" is an interesting phenomenon. As the main axis of party competition in Europe completely shifts from the socio-economic left-right axis to the socio-cultural authoritarian-libertarian axis, the ones who have issue ownership are the "Greens" and the right-wing populist parties. That's why support gathers for them. The existing Christian Democrats and Social Democrats have competed in the center on economic matters, so even if they talk about immigration or the environment now, they won't be believed.

Pierre Martin, a French political scientist, points out with France in mind that in the future, the parliamentary forces of parties in developed countries will be divided into three. One is the block of the "Green Party" and social democrats on the left, the middle is the liberal group that is globalist and pro-EU, and on the right is the block of nationalism and authoritarianism. This is also the internal political manifestation of the trilemma (democracy, globalization, national sovereignty) mentioned by Rodrik. The problem is that none of them can expect a stable majority. Consequently, we probably won't see stable politics.

Speaking of the US, Samuel Huntington once said in his book "American Politics" that there is an "American Creed"—things like liberty and equality—and when the current situation is perceived to have drifted too far from the creed implanted at the founding, resistance movements emerge. That can take various forms, like campus unrest or populism. Today's "America First" is likely driven by people moved by the passion that they must reclaim the good old small-town American life from the fear of being exposed to the waves of globalization and mass immigration, and it just happens to be represented by Mr. Trump right now.

As long as there is representative democracy, populism will never completely disappear from politics. A gap between those who represent and those who are represented is inevitably born. This is because as that gap expands and contracts, once it exceeds a certain critical point, populism will always be invited in. Another factor is that the middle class is shrinking and the situation where no future outlook can be seen will continue. In the US presidential election and the French presidential election, the greatest contrast among voters was their outlook on the future. For example, 80% of people who voted for Clinton thought their children's generation would be better off than themselves, while those who voted for Trump thought the exact opposite. The same trend was observed in France, where Macron and Le Pen fought. In that sense, a situation has arisen where people imagining opposite futures coexist within one nation-state. That is evidence that the wealthy, stable, and homogeneous social structure of the post-war era is breaking down. As long as such a situation exists, I think populist politics will continue to expand its room in the political space as a concrete force, rather than disappear.

The depletion of the middle class is a phenomenon seen in Japan as well.

Under current globalization, the social mobility of the middle class has disappeared. If it exists at all, it is only downward mobility. At the high end of society, there are highly educated people centered in the finance and IT industries, while at the low end, low-wage interpersonal service jobs are being taken by immigrants. The majority middle class, which emerged for the first time after the war, is now facing the misfortune of disintegration. If they were the ones who guaranteed politics within the established conservative and liberal parties, it could be said that the room for that is steadily diminishing. I believe we must consider the seriousness of this as a problem for democracy.

Regarding redistribution, when we look at how it actually manifests, Taro Miyamoto used the excellent expression "leveling-down democracy." Rather than demanding more for themselves, many are driven by a mentality of not being able to tolerate others benefiting.

Speaking of populism in the three major metropolitan areas, populist leaders claim that spending can be saved through reform. In fact, in the case of the Osaka Ishin no Kai, support is strong in wealthy areas like Hokusetsu—that is, north of the Yodo River. So, it is not that people struggling with their livelihoods are being mobilized by such reformist parties; it is the opposite. It is a matter of people wanting to entrust things to reformers because they feel they can no longer afford to support those who rely on public spending.

A "fair share of the burden," then.

It is easier to understand the NHK Party if you think of it as an anti-tax hike movement as well. At its core is a consciousness of no longer wanting to bear the burden, so I think it is exactly the same point.

As the middle class weakens and its core wears away, I suspect that what people turn to is an "existence with non-democratic legitimacy." For instance, there was that strange surge of support, including among young people, for the new Emperor recently, and when the Pope visited Japan, even non-believers were somehow caught up in the excitement. Both the Emperor and the Pope are entities whose legitimacy lies outside of democracy. Could we not say that the sight of entities so far removed from democracy receiving such applause within a democratic country clearly illustrates the contradictions facing modern democracy?

Indeed, during the turmoil of the Conte administration in Italy, and as we see in Belgium now, when parliament becomes dysfunctional and a majority cannot be formed, actors outside of parliamentary politics become important stabilizers. As you mentioned, we have begun to see phases where democracy is supported from the outside, not just symbolically but functionally. Perhaps we are in such an era.

Listening to this discussion, while there were points about how the definition of populism applies slightly differently in each case, I have also understood that there is a common structure behind why populism gains power, whether regarding immigration or inequality. Thank you all for today.