The Hong Kong Issue from British and European Perspectives

It is only natural that the United Kingdom, as the former colonial power, would have interest and concern regarding the future of Hong Kong. Twenty-three years after the handover, Hong Kong's "Britishness" may have diminished, but it cannot be abandoned. Furthermore, the UK is a party to the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration, which secured China's promise of the "One Country, Two Systems" framework to ensure Hong Kong's freedom for 50 years after the handover.

For Europe, the Hong Kong issue is primarily a matter of fundamental rights, represented by the freedom of expression. Concerns regarding the tightening of control over intellectuals in China and the Xinjiang Uyghur issue had already been rising.

In this context, the Chinese government enacted the National Security Law and applied it to Hong Kong on July 1 of this year. As a result, acts that threaten national security have become subject to broad crackdowns, and speech that criticizes the authorities or civil movements is already facing significant restrictions. This is a challenge to "One Country, Two Systems" and is the reason why it is said that "Hong Kong is no longer Hong Kong."

As a countermeasure, the British administration under Boris Johnson announced that it would accept Hong Kongers who hold or are eligible for British National (Overseas) (BNO) status—those born before the handover—into the UK. Previously, they were only allowed a six-month stay, but they are now permitted to stay for five years, including the right to work and study. Additionally, they can apply for permanent residency after this initial five-year period, and for citizenship one year after that. The policy applies to nearly 3 million BNO-eligible individuals and some dependents, such as their children. The British government estimates that up to 200,000 people could potentially migrate to the UK.

The rights of Hong Kong citizens were also debated during the 1997 handover, but they ultimately became extremely restricted. This time, the conditions have been significantly relaxed. Given that immigration issues are always politically sensitive and were one of the causes of Brexit, the rapid decision to accept Hong Kong citizens is noteworthy. Behind this lies the fact that British sentiment toward China had already deteriorated due to the response to COVID-19, and the opposition Labour Party was also calling for bold measures.

In addition to its own measures, the UK played a major role in building an encirclement of China using the "Five Eyes" framework—an intelligence cooperation network consisting of the US, UK, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. Having left the EU at the end of January this year, the UK likely intended to demonstrate "Global Britain" both domestically and internationally through active diplomacy.

In Europe (the EU), there was initially a sense that Hong Kong was a "British problem." Nevertheless, as freedom of expression and freedom of the press were violated, calls for a more decisive response grew stronger. Similar to the UK, the deterioration of European sentiment toward China, which had begun before the Hong Kong issue surfaced, can be pointed to as a background factor.

The EU approved sanctions against Hong Kong on July 24. This is a package of measures by individual countries and the EU as a whole. The main contents include considering measures for asylum, migration, and visas for Hong Kong citizens; restrictions on the export of equipment for repression, communication interception, and cyber surveillance to Hong Kong; the possibility of strengthening scholarships and academic exchanges; increased engagement with civil society; and the suspension of new (economic) negotiations with Hong Kong.

Unlike the US sanctions, some criticize the EU's measures as having limited effect because they did not include actions against mainland China. However, since only a few countries in the world have actually taken the step of imposing sanctions, the EU's actions are drawing attention. A series of suspensions of extradition treaties between various countries and Hong Kong is also occurring.

Furthermore, the document deciding the sanctions stated, "The content and enactment process of the National Security Law raise doubts about China's willingness to comply with international commitments, undermine trust, and affect EU-China relations." This is a warning that the Hong Kong issue will damage the entirety of Europe-China relations.

In recent years, the EU has been hardening its stance toward China by using economic tools where it holds a comparative advantage. Strengthening investment screening and taking a strict approach to the issue of state-owned enterprises (subsidies by foreign governments) are at the core of the "EU-style" encirclement of China. While these are not targeted solely at Chinese companies, there is no doubt that China is the target.

Furthermore, in response to the COVID-19 crisis, improving the resilience of the European economy through the diversification of supply chains has become a priority. While attention first focused on masks and medical supplies, the challenge itself is medium- to long-term, and a wide variety of goods and technologies could be targeted. In addition to strengthening cooperation with partner countries that share values, including Japan, returning manufacturing bases to the EU is also an option.

This is also referred to as "open strategic autonomy." It does not aim for a closed self-sufficiency system, but reducing dependence on China is key. Cooperation between the US and Europe, and further between Japan, the US, and Europe, is required for the protection of critical technologies and the handling of data.

Triggered by the Hong Kong issue, Europe-China relations are changing, and there is a possibility that US-Europe relations will also shift regarding the Hong Kong and China issues. This can be described as an important phase for Japan as well.